FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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

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

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

Field Marshall Rommel (center) was responsible for Hitler's mighty "Atlantic Wall" defenses. Would they stand up against an Allied invasion? The test came on June 6, 1944, "the longest day" of World War II.

Did these crossword puzzles tip off Hitler to the time and hour of the D-Day invasion?

(printed in the London Daily Telegraph June 1944)

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Puzzle fans who turned to the London Daily Telegraph on June 2, 1944, had no trouble finding the word for Number 11 Across. It was OVERLORD—the 8-letter word that means "Bigwig". But puzzle fans at Supreme Allied Headquarters hit the ceiling. OVERLORD was the code word for the D-Day invasion—4 days off. Were readers in Berlin "solving" the puzzle too? Worse yet, other D-Day code words appeared on the same puzzle page . . . NEPTUNE, OMAHA, UTAH, MULBERRY. Were German spies transmitting the biggest secret of the war? This incident is just one of many "coincidences" surrounding the allied invasion of Normandy. They are all described in **The Longest Day.** You may have it, if you wish, as one of your 4 books—all for only 98¢ plus shipping and handling, with trial membership.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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



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

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

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

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

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AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

JULY 1970

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 48 JULY 1970 No. 4

LEGACY OF THE COLD WAR IN INDOCHINA

By Townsend Hoopes

A QUESTION recently posed by a distinguished colleague is central for anyone who earnestly seeks to understand how an entire generation of American political leaders, with the best will in the world, pushed the country onto the slippery slope that led ever downward into the engulfing morass of Indochina. The question is this: "Why did so many intelligent, experienced and humane men in government fail to grasp the immorality of our intervention in Vietnam and the cancerous division it was producing at home, long after this was instinctively evident to their wives and children?"

As a nation we are still only beginning to address this prickly and uncomfortable question. The New Left has of course long since rendered its own verdict: namely, that the entire leadership was venal, and was moreover acting within the compulsions of an imperialist system. For those, however, who still value reason and believe in factual, proportioned discourse as the most reliable road to approximate truth, the question is serious and compelling; ultimately it is inescapable. While we remain at some distance from a complete answer, it seems certain that an important part of the answer lies in what has been called the cold-war syndrome and in its ramified legacy. Every American over 40 (especially those between 40 and 60) shares involuntarily in this legacy, to a greater or lesser degree, because the cold war was the pervasive reality of the years in which that generation came to its political maturity. By cold war I mean, of course, the highly charged and dangerous power struggle that billowed up out of World War II between a monolithic communist structure directed by Stalin and a rather more loose,

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hastily reassembled coalition of nations led by the United States.

There is a tendency today, especially among younger people, to denigrate the Stalinist threat, to discount the challenge and the perils it presented, and by various efforts at historical revisionism to conclude that the cold war was an unnecessary happening provoked by American imperialists and militarists. The evidence of those who helped to formulate the democratic response, or who merely lived through the period, is of course quite different. The cold war was a real and bitter struggle touched off by Stalin's utterly serious efforts to subvert and capture Western Europe, to penetrate the Mediterranean basin, and to gain a major influence in the strategic Asian anchor, Japan. No doubt, U.S. insistence on free elections in Eastern Europe confirmed the worst suspicions of Soviet leaders that a universalist American capitalism intended to deny Russian paramountcy in the belt of states through which Hitler's terrible invading force had marched, a buffer zone regarded by Stalin as the minimal requirement of Russian security. But it was not merely the case of a Kremlin leadership understandably paranoid in the aftermath of unprecedented human loss and physical devastation inside its homeland; it was also the case of a leadership impelled by the iron logic of a messianic ideology, a fact that made the Soviet Union compulsively expansionist and thus something quite different from the classic nation-state. Through his far-flung operatives Stalin discerned, in the war-bred chaos beyond his borders, new opportunities to extend Soviet power.

Disciplined, activist communist parties all over the world were almost instantly responsive to central direction from the Kremlin; and they were bent upon widespread disruption and seizure, stimulated by the brute fact that much of the civilized world lay physically and economically prostrate in the immediate wake of World War II. To meet and turn back a fundamental challenge to the power balance which we had fought that war to restore, we were thrust by irresistible logic into a series of dramatic salvage operations—to aid the Greeks and Turks, rebuild Europe through the Marshall Plan, establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, stand in Berlin, fight in Korea. As the one free nation with the necessary strength and coherence to lead the resistance, we were forced by the steady pressure of postwar crises to exertions of a scale and character that seemed to make our universal involvement a perma-

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nent necessity. While, in fact, the restoration of Western Europe and Japan, and the effective blunting of Moscow's ideological-military thrust, required only about eight years, the effort was totally absorbing. Combined with the harsh lesson in power realities taught by World War II, its effect was to shape the thinking of an entire American generation with respect to the way power is organized in the world and with respect to the requirements of U.S. security.

II

The Korean war in particular shaped our national attitudes about the developing situation in Vietnam and thus made probable, as early as 1954, our ultimate military intervention 11 years later. For the attack on South Korea was a Russian decision—a command by Stalin to send a Russian-trained puppet army across an established international boundary line. Washington saw the attack as a naked, centrally directed aggression, a bold attempt to upset the precarious postwar balance, a dagger aimed straight at our vital interest in Japan. This grave view was confirmed by the United Nations, not only in resolutions, but in sending to battle combat forces from 14 member nations. Such a vigorous response, mingling free-world idealism with a practical determination to defend the global power balance, was a singular triumph for the collective security idea. As it redeemed the dismal failures of the League, so also it confirmed the suspicion that the communist menace excluded no means in pursuing its expansionist aims.

Washington had thought it discerned the Russian hand in Southeast Asia even before this event. A month before the attack on Korea, the United States extended military and economic aid to those three petty states to which France had in 1948 granted a nominal independence within the French Union. Announcing the new policy from Paris, May 8, 1950, Secretary Acheson said in part: "The United States, convinced that neither national independence nor democratic evolution exists in any area dominated by Soviet imperialism, considers the situation to be such as to warrant its according economic aid and military equipment to the Associated States of Indochina and to France in order to assist them in restoring stability. . . ." While the policy reflected, in part, a price demanded by France for her coöperation with NATO, it seems fair to assume that the language was of Ameri-

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can choosing. As the Korean war deepened, so did our assistance to the French forces in Indochina. A joint statement in September 1951 by high diplomatic and military officials of the two governments expressed "complete agreement that the successful defense of Indochina is of great importance to the defense of all Southeast Asia," and emphasized that American and French policies in Indochina "are not at variance." The United States promised faster deliveries of military equipment. A similar communiqué of June 30, 1952, expressed "unanimous satisfaction over the vigorous and successful course of military operations;" it added that the "excellent performance of the Associated States' forces in battle was found to be a source of particular encouragement." Already underwriting one-third of the total cost of the Indochinese war, we proceeded further to expand our military aid to "the French Union."

In 1954, we were just a year beyond a painfully achieved Korean truce, after three years of bloody fighting. The communists had won the civil war in China, a result which brought severe psychological shock to Americans, who had nurtured sentimental notions of the Chinese people and of U.S.-Chinese relations. Mao was consolidating his control over that vast land mass and its population then numbering 600 million people. Chinese communist intervention in the Korean war, brought on by a serious misreading of diplomatic signals on both sides and by the Truman-MacArthur decision to march to the Yalu, had highly charged America's fears of the Yellow Peril; more broadly, it had reinforced our perception of a precarious coalition of free states under assault across the entire globe by a seamless international conspiracy. In the circumstances, it was almost inevitable that the United States would view the impending French departure from Indochina as merely the opening of another avenue for communist expansion in Asia.

The possibility of local, independent communist action lay outside the range of our cold-war vision. As Secretary Dulles said in June 1954: "At the moment, Indochina is the area where international Communism most vigorously seeks expansion. . . . The problem is one of restoring tranquility in an area where disturbances are fomented from Communist China, but where there is no invasion by Communist China." From the penetrating analyses of George Kennan, the leading Russian expert of his time, the somewhat undiscriminating inference was drawn that *every*

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form of communism flowed without limit into power vacuums and open crevices wherever they presented themselves. And Indochina without the French seemed to fit that interpretation almost precisely, with Ho Chi Minh dominant in North Vietnam and the Chinese land mass controlled by Mao.

America's policy, engineered by President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles, thus set about building an anti-communist counterforce in the South—first by helping to establish the de facto reality of a new sovereign nation, next by finding and installing a new national leader (Diem), and then by endowing him with abundant economic and military assistance. The United States was not a signatory to the Geneva Agreements (nor to the Final Declaration of the conference which spelled out the agreement to all-Vietnam elections in 1956); as President Eisenhower explained it on July 21, 1954, the agreement "contains features which we do not like." In a separate statement at Geneva, the United States declared that, while it would refrain from the threat or the use of force to upset the terms of the settlement, it would take a grave view of any renewal of communist aggression in the area. It then moved urgently to conclude the SEATO alliance and to bring under its protection Cambodia, Laos and one-half of Vietnam, *i.e.* "the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam."

In July 1955, the new government in Saigon took, with U.S. encouragement, the next logical step; it rejected the North Vietnamese invitation to discuss elections, on grounds that were above suspicion in the West, given the context of total struggle against "International Communism." Saigon argued that the people in the North would be unable to express their will freely, and that falsified votes in the North could outweigh genuine votes in the South. Underlying every specific move was the firmest American determination to prevent any further communist advance.

It is significant that these policies and actions were strongly supported by the American people; there was no dissent from within government, very little from Congress or the press, and nothing significant from scholars or other close observers of foreign affairs. As a nation we had little perception that we might be frustrating a widely supported national independence movement by lending our aid and our prestige to what were at best colonial puppets, who suffered an innate incapacity to win over any sizable segment of the Vietnamese people to their side,

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and who, as it turned out, could not govern at all without the direct presence and support of a very large U.S. expeditionary force. What we saw predominantly was another disagreeable, but utterly necessary, effort to plug the dike against further communist expansion in Asia.

III

It is very difficult to argue today that that judgment did not reflect the historical and political truth for America at the time, for it was based on direct, chilling and bloody encounters with Stalinism at many strategic points on the globe. The trouble and the tragedy have been that the American response to the cold war generated its own momentum and, in doing so, led us progressively to actions beyond the rational requirements of our national security. Looking back, one can see why men of good conscience —even men with a sense of history—were vulnerable to the developing *hubris,* for the major elements of our national response had roots in some of the noblest American traditions. From Woodrow Wilson down through Franklin Roosevelt we were bequeathed the legacy of America's democratizing mission in the world. And whatever retrospective cynicism Americans might have felt at having fought in 1918 "to make the world safe for democracy," it did not make the "Four Freedoms" or the "Atlantic Charter" any less compelling as political aims in 1945. From Woodrow Wilson and Henry Stimson came the strong belief in the need for collective security against aggression, a conviction reinforced by the disastrous failures of the League of Nations in the 1930s which had led us to the holocaust of World War II. From the tense confrontation with Stalinism came a semi-official, increasingly dogmatic anti-communism.

Each of these strands of policy was legitimate and useful, if applied with a sense of proportion. But what began happening after, and as a result of, the Korean war can be seen with the benefit of hindsight as extension pressed to the point of distortion. Stimson's doctrine held that collective action was required to prevent rather clear-cut aggressions by great powers against the *vital* interests of other great powers, in order to maintain or restore a working balance of power among those leading states. But John Foster Dulles, who practiced a devil theory of communism, began to apply the collective security idea to cases where great power involvement was merely speculative or tenu-

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ous, or where the U.S. interest, seen in proportion, was only marginal. The Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), viewed by Dulles as a barrier to a Soviet military attack southward into the Middle East, merely generated improvements in the road network and other communications linking Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan; it also provided Pakistan with arms in order to balance off India.

CENTO did not, however, prevent Soviet penetration into the Middle East; that feat was accomplished bloodlessly by the proven Western stratagem of offering military equipment—in this case to Egypt, Syria and Yemen. The South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), created in response to what was seen as the danger of communist Chinese hordes pouring down through Southeast Asia and on into Malaya, Burma and Indonesia, brought together a strange collection of physically weak or politically disabled partners. Indeed the unlikelihood that they could or would ever act effectively in concert was so apparent that the alliance provided only the thinnest cloak for what was privately understood to be its underlying purpose: namely, the protective exercise of U.S. power. Six months before the treaty was signed, Secretary Dulles had warned of a possible communist Chinese invasion of Southeast Asia. "If such overt military aggression occurred," he said on June 11, 1954, "that would be a deliberate threat to the United States itself. The United States would of course invoke the processes of the United Nations and consult with its allies. But we could not escape ultimate responsibility for decisions closely touching our own security and self-defense."

By these and similar pronouncements the Chinese communist menace was inflated, and the American defense line drawn through the heart of Southeast Asia. Thus were distortions of threat and interest progressively embedded in the unspoken suppositions of policy formulation, accepted by both political parties and sustained by American public opinion. From 1950 onward, we underwrote, for example, a large Nationalist Chinese Army on Taiwan, a policy based partly on the rationale that it was necessary to guard against a large-scale invasion from the communist mainland; more objective analysis showed in 1965 (when Mao's armed forces were better organized and equipped) that his chances of sending a sizable amphibious force across 120 miles of open water in the face of Nationalist aerial surveillance,

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the Seventh Fleet, and quickly available U.S. combat airpower was approximately zero.

By a similar process of inflation, the proportioned impulse that produced the Marshall Plan led later to the delusion of "nation-building" in Vietnam, and to Lyndon Johnson's expressed hope of bringing the full fruits of the Great Society to the Mekong. Prudent and rational anti-communism, which recognized Moscow and Peking as major adversaries in the international arena, but understood that ideology is transient while national interests endure, degenerated for a time into a sort of religious obsession which saw the threat as a changeless, all-encompassing evil; the result was to becloud clear thought. The pressures thus arising from a combination of real and spurious threats, and from our assumption of vast responsibility in a world seething with change and discontent, moved U.S. policy—and American opinion—toward a Pavlovian tendency to see every local uprising as a mortal test of wills between a communist octopus and the free world coalition. The trouble was, of course, that this view of our various adversaries as a monolith persisted long after the facts on which it was based had begun to shift.

The sea changes in the communist situation that occurred in the late 1950s and the 1960s are now well known; one needs therefore to cite only the major developments as reference points: (1) the Sino-Soviet breach, which split the vaunted unity of communist doctrine and thus progressively undermined the Soviet position as Mother Church; (2) developments within the U.S.S.R. itself—caused by years of effective NATO containment, the aging process, and the effects of affluence—which moved Russia toward the posture of a status quo power and noticeably reduced Soviet revolutionary fervor in relation to the underdeveloped world; (3) Moscow's progressive loss of appeal to and control over communist parties throughout the world that lie beyond the physical reach of Russian military power; and (4) the growing uneasiness of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe, brought about by broader economic and cultural relations with the West and the radiated effects of de-Stalinization in Russia. The latter process led, of course, over a period of years, not only to signs of public criticism of the official system in Russia, but also to varying kinds of self-assertion in Eastern Europe, where latent nationalism needed only opportunity to be rekindled. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 seemed to mark

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the end of officially tolerated post-Stalin liberalism, but it did not end Russian uncertainties in Eastern Europe; moreover, it once again showed the world a siege mentality that could hardly enhance the attraction of communism in other places.

Notwithstanding these developments—which between 1954 and 1964 were of course unevenly paced, partially disguised, and incomplete—every American policy action in Vietnam during that period, under three Presidents and ranging from economic aid to military training to military supply to the sending of advisers, continued to be based on what seemed a self-evident proposition: namely, that the expansion of "International Communism" presented everywhere, and in nearly every form, a direct menace to U.S. security that had to be stopped—in the last resort by whatever means were necessary.

We thus embarked upon large-scale military intervention in 1965 because the President's advisers, and the President who accepted their advice, remained the prisoners of their cold war experience at a time when communist power had in fact ceased to be monolithic and was breaking up into ideological and political fragments. Intellectually aware of this fragmentation, American leaders were nevertheless unable to acknowledge and apply the implications of that process for either "International Communism" or the U.S. interest in Southeast Asia. Still impelled by the long shock wave produced by the communist victory in China and the French collapse in Vietnam, they saw instability in that area as primarily the consequence of alien subversion; they also saw it as intolerable—and remediable.

The cold-war syndrome prevailing in Washington in 1965 thus represented no break with the Eisenhower and Kennedy periods. None of those responsible perceived the necessity—or the possibility—of redefining our interests or our role in the world in ways that would permit the drawing of more careful distinctions between those commitments and involvements that are in fact vital to our national security, and those that spring more or less from our deeply held view of what the world "ought" to be and of how it "ought" to be organized. A few viewed the prospect of a protracted testing of wills in insurgent-counterinsurgent combat with missionary zeal, accepting as an article of faith the dubious notion that an insurgency blocked in Vietnam would deter an insurgency planned in Jordan or Trinidad. Convinced absolutely of America's altruism, they were per-

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suaded that only through the application of American-guided "nation-building," American counter-guerrilla doctrine, and, if need be, American military forces could backward nations be saved from the scourge of instability and brought to their rightful place in the modern world.

Our efforts on behalf of South Vietnam through 1964 are not, I believe, fairly construed as immoral, if one thus understands the origins of the governing U.S. attitudes and the formidable new strength and dimension they were given by the relentless pressures of the cold war. Though flawed by progressive misconceptions, U.S. policies toward Southeast Asia were well intentioned and pursued in the earnest belief that we were defending freedom. Yet at each of several critical junctures—in 1962 when President Kennedy (at the prompting of General Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow) introduced artillery and fighter-bomber aircraft into South Vietnam and raised U.S. advisory strengths from 700 to 16,000; after the overthrow of Diem in November 1963; in the autumn of 1964 when the collapse of the cardboard régime in Saigon seemed imminent—American leadership failed to grasp the central truth: namely, that the U.S. interest in Southeast Asia is limited, not vital; that while a limited effort to shore up South Vietnam was warranted, a total effort to save a government founded at low tide upon the receding sands of the French colonial empire was both alien to our interest and destructive of our reputation. The sudden discontinuity in the American presidency may well have been the decisive factor after 1963.

In any event, the chances for restraint, for acknowledging mistakes with reasonable grace, and for an intelligent cutting of losses were missed. The nation went over the brink and down the slippery slope. We failed to see that the realization of our ostensibly limited objectives in Vietnam required in fact the total frustration of the other side's aims, and thus might well involve a wholly open-ended commitment. North Vietnam's unexpected tenacity, deriving from the fact that the war was for Hanoi a vital struggle, led us in the event to the application of progressively unlimited means. This loss of proportion led to wanton destruction, to a gross disparity between ends and means, and therein lies the immorality.

It would be, of course, incorrect and unfair to place all of the blame on President Johnson and his advisers, for, as is evident, we are dealing with what has been a national state of mind. It is

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well to remember that the advisers were widely regarded when they entered government as among the ablest, the best-informed, the most humane and liberal men who could be found for public trust. And that was a true assessment. President Johnson himself reflected a fateful duality, with overtones of personal tragedy. In late 1964, before the decision to insert American combat forces was taken, there is evidence that he clung to very real doubts concerning the wisdom of further U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, and that he resisted the contrary advice of major cabinet officers. But once he was overborne by the felt pressure of events or the collective weight of his advisers' experience, once he was committed, then his visceral preference for victory came into the open. From that point onward, his domineering personality and his strong allergy to dissent within the bosom of his official family made it almost certain that advice to him would continue to be homogeneous.

Three years later—with a half-million Americans waging no better than a military stalemate, with physical and human destruction in Vietnam on a rising scale, with our domestic scene punctuated by protests, draft resistance and the fateful merging of anti-war and racial dissension—it still required a near cataclysmic event to arrest a policy of open-ended escalation. To put the matter more precisely, it required the dramatic, undisguisable shock of the Tet offensive to knock the props out from under the contrived structure of official optimism, to create heavy public pressures for change, and thus to enable a few well-placed and determined men within the government to restore a measure of proportion to our policy in Vietnam.

IV

What are the outlines of the situation today, a little more than two years after the Johnson decisions that put a ceiling on the war? They suggest the tenacity of the legacy. Shopworn, altered by circumstance, lacking the full confidence of old, the cold war syndrome appears nevertheless to be alive and well and living in Washington.

One perceives that President Nixon had the opportunity (like President Eisenhower with respect to Korea in 1953) to take definitive steps toward liquidating the war during his first months in office, without political risks for himself, indeed with political benefit for both his own party and the cause of

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national unity. In fact, his opportunity was broader. It was no less than the chance to lead the nation firmly away from a decade of self-deception in Indochina, to admit a national mistake and by that cleansing act begin to uncoil the contradictions and restore the national balance. He could have set himself the task of demonstrating that, after five years of major fighting, we had done as much as we could do to assist South Vietnam, and that our proper course should now be an orderly but unswerving withdrawal, recognizing two central realities: that the tangled political issues which torture and divide Vietnam, growing as they do out of long colonial repression and the consequent struggle to define a national identity, can be settled only among the Vietnamese themselves; and that contrary to the erroneous assumption on which U.S. military intervention was based, the particular constitutional form and ideological orientation of Vietnamese politics do *not* affect the vital interests of the United States.

It is significant that the new President did not take that road, but meditated upon the problem until the honeymoon period was over and the war had become unmistakably his responsibility and that of the Republican Party. Why did he do this? One is drawn by his actions and utterances to the conclusion that he personifies the ambivalence of his generation, which is now in uneasy transition from the ingrained certitudes of the cold-war syndrome toward somewhat unpalatable new truths. He is somewhere between believing in the essential rightness of this war and understanding that the American interest requires its liquidation. He has evolved a policy that seems aimed at substantially reducing and possibly ending the American role, but so conditionally and gradually as to make the process almost imperceptible. At the same time, he has been unwilling to abandon either the rhetoric that supported our intervention in the first place or the implicit insistence that our proxy must prevail even if we depart. Like his immediate predecessor, he appears to lack the scale of mind and the inner security required to risk even a transient loss of national prestige for the sake of a healthy national adjustment to reality in Southeast Asia.

On November 3, 1969, Mr. Nixon said he was proceeding on two fronts: "a peace settlement through negotiations or, if that fails, ending the war through Vietnamization." Negotiations have thus far failed—chiefly because the U.S. negotiating position does not reflect current realities. With minor embellish-

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ments, this position still rests on the President's proposals of May 14, 1969, calling for mutual withdrawal of United States and North Vietnamese forces followed by internationally supervised elections, which would be arranged by a special commission in which the National Liberation Front would participate. But Hanoi has never been prepared to accept arrangements for elections worked out under the auspices of the Thieu government and in which the winner would take all; and the U.S.–South Vietnam military position (now affected by the withdrawal of 110,000 American troops and the announced intention to remove another 150,000) is not sufficient to compel the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. The resulting deadlock at Paris ought not to be surprising; it reflects the fact that our present political aims exceed our bargaining power.

To put it bluntly, the one thing we can negotiate at this stage of the war is the manner of our going. Averell Harriman, who speaks with a special authority on the subject of negotiations with the North Vietnamese, appears to believe that if we would declare our intention to leave South Vietnam, we could negotiate not only the return of our prisoners, but also the formation of a neutral government in the South, including but not dominated by the National Liberation Front, and committed to settlement and cordial relations but not merger with North Vietnam. According to Mr. Harriman, an unambiguous American declaration of departure could bring the Russians into a coöperating position, and could thus establish the preconditions for international guarantees of the negotiated arrangements, including, after a reasonable period, international supervision of all-Vietnam elections.

It does not seem impossible that a clear-minded President could lead American opinion to an understanding that firm action along this line need not be cause for a national nervous breakdown; in fact, the military and economic, as well as the psychological, advantages of removing our leg from the quicksand are fully demonstrable. Our power and influence would not evaporate. We would not be rendered incapable of defining and defending our vital and legitimate interests. On the contrary, our ability to reassure our NATO and Japanese treaty partners, and our capacity to exert a firm and steadying influence on the dangers in the Middle East, could only be enhanced by the restoration of our global poise. Our industrial, technical and cul-

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tural achievements would continue to astound and attract the world.

President Nixon remains convinced, however, that American prestige in Asia rides on the survival of an anti-communist régime in Saigon. He thus sees an approach such as the Harriman proposal as leading to "humiliation and defeat for the United States." He employs the scare tactic of a "bloodbath" if we should depart under conditions that would leave the survival of the Thieu régime in doubt. In this he misrepresents the known facts concerning Hanoi's treatment of Catholics in the North since 1954, and ignores: (a) the clear reality that an announced U.S. intention to depart would create a strong incentive for compromise settlement among virtually all South Vietnamese, except the inner circles of the Thieu régime; (b) the marked Vietnamese capacity and penchant for accommodation; and (c) the fact that a bloodbath exists in Vietnam *here and now*—in the form of indiscriminate killing and destruction produced by B-52 saturation raids, search-and-destroy operations, "free fire" zones, and atrocities such as those perpetuated at Song My. From such a perspective, the President was not moved to modify his negotiating position at Paris, but to invade Cambodia in what most experienced observers regard as an illusory attempt to force Hanoi to negotiate on his terms.

Thus strapped to a negotiating position that cannot succeed, he is thrown back upon the policy of Vietnamization. This is a policy of a certain virtue, but it is important to understand what it can and cannot accomplish. If linked to a definite deadline for total withdrawal, it can be a vehicle for the relatively rapid extrication of American forces; if not so linked, it can become the deliberate or inadvertent centerpiece of an argument designed to show that the permanent retention of sizable American forces in South Vietnam is an inescapable necessity if we are to avoid "humiliation and defeat." In neither case, however, is Vietnamization likely to lead to an ending of the war through political settlement. For by enlarging and strengthening South Vietnamese armed forces, it buttresses Saigon's natural resistance to compromise negotiation; on the other hand, it cannot change the military balance sufficiently to modify Hanoi's refusal to negotiate on Saigon's terms. Unfortunately, President Nixon is trying to leave the impression that Vietnamization is somehow equivalent to negotiations, in the sense that it leads to "a just

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peace;" in fact, it moves in the opposite direction—toward making the war interminable.

The Nixon policy thus comes down to a continuation of the strategy of attrition, hopefully at lower and therefore politically acceptable levels of violence, and ending hopefully at some distant date in a sort of triumph by survival for the Thieu régime. It is a policy built on the gossamer dream that the Thieu forces can in fact be enabled to stand alone against North Vietnam within the time-frame defined by American domestic pressures for the withdrawal of U.S. forces. It is a policy which seeks to control events in Southeast Asia, while at the same time reducing U.S. forces and thus U.S. bargaining power and influence in the area. It is a policy which declines to come to grips with the hard choices that must be made if U.S. forces are to be protected as their numbers decline and the war continues.

In particular, the insistence on a very gradual, very conditional departure creates vulnerabilities that are potentially grave. The lingering nature of the process makes it vulnerable to unanticipated intervening events—like the Lon Nol coup in Cambodia—which knock it off balance, create new pressures for compensatory military action, and thus further confound an already complicated set of equations. At the same time, the conditional nature of the process—the uncertainty over whether we intend to leave totally or only partially—precludes a negotiated settlement and works against the development of even a tacit understanding with the other side with regard to lowering the level of violence. It thus increases the jeopardy of U.S. forces. It also keeps alive the hopes of those who, erroneously believing the 38th and 17th parallels present analogous issues, want to "do a Korea;" that is, apply indefinitely whatever American muscle is required to transform South Vietnam into an anti-communist bastion.

It is reasonable to suppose that the perception of some or all of these weaknesses in present U.S. policy, and a desire to escape their consequences, was what led President Nixon to his watershed invasion of Cambodia. That decision, taken virtually without consulting any person or institution that shares his Constitutional responsibility, brought to a climax an already growing crisis of confidence in the national leadership. It showed how seriously the President had underestimated the risks of his policy for the continued cohesion of our own society. It showed that

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the Indochina issue is more than ever a virulent poison in the national bloodstream, reaching now to all segments of the population, but permeating those citizens under 25 years of age who are called upon to do the actual fighting and who by 1975 will comprise nearly half the population. It made blindingly clear the grave peril of extending our national preoccupation with the Indochina war for an indefinite period.

These are somber indicators of the prospect before us; yet the shocked and impassioned general reaction to the Cambodian adventure may in fact point the way to more hopeful developments. For that reaction seems to show that, while the President and a small, influential segment of the foreign-military bureaucracy remain residually hooked on the cold-war syndrome, there is rapidly widening agreement in the Congress, the press, the intelligentsia, and even in the putative silent majority on these propositions: (1) the United States does not and cannot control events in Southeast Asia, either at the present level of effort or with a much larger commitment, and neither can the Russians or the Chinese; (2) the United States has no *vital* interest at stake in Indochina; we can accept and adjust to whatever outcome is arrived at by the people who live there; (3) the United States must wholly terminate its military role in Indochina within a short time (by the end of 1971 at the very latest) or else accept grave risks of our own national disintegration; and (4) if our elected leaders will cease their appeals to the emotionalism that unavoidably surrounds the concepts of "national commitment" and "national prestige," and will deal in true proportion with the real choices facing us in Southeast Asia, there is no reason why our rich and powerful country cannot extricate itself with reasonable poise and dignity, without a traumatic loss of self-confidence, and without a lapse into mindless isolation.

The highest test of character is to learn from the past, to admit one's mistakes, and to act on that admission. This remains the course of honor and reason and sanity for United States policy in Indochina. Any other course can only compound the present contradictions and lead us to the kind of trauma that could quite literally dissolve the bonds of our political union.

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FROM THE VIETNAM WAR TO AN INDOCHINA WAR

By Jean Lacouture

DURING the last week of April 1970 the Vietnam war became the Second Indochina War. On April 24 and 25 representatives of the four movements of the Indochinese Left convened at a certain spot in south China to seal an alliance that had been contracted many years before by three of the movements—the North Vietnamese Lao Dong, the Pathet Lao and the South Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF)—and to which Prince Sihanouk, overthrown a month earlier by the Cambodian Right, was now adhering in a conspicuously unconditional manner. The *Indochinese* revolutionary front thus came into being.

Five days later, President Nixon announced the entry into Cambodia of sizable American contingents backed up by South Vietnamese units. This operation, dubbed "Total Victory," was presented in Saigon as an attempt to wind up the war and be done with it. In this manner a strategy was defined which confuses the idea of victory with that of extending the conflict outside Vietnam. In the light of the disclosures made two weeks before by a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding American participation in the fighting in Laos, the conclusion is inescapable that on April 30, 1970, the United States embarked on what is now the Second Indochina War.

Thus Richard Nixon became the first Republican President to increase the responsibilities of the United States on that Asian landmass into which Washington's best strategists have so often insisted that no American army must ever plunge. And the operation was launched under conditions that the worst enemies of the United States might have hoped for. "We must have two or three Vietnams!" Ernesto "Che" Guevara had trumpeted in 1967 in the name of the worldwide revolution. And there they are, from Luang Prabang to Kep: two or three Vietnams, that is to say, the whole of that territory of Indochina which French colonization seems, in retrospect, to have put together to serve as the framework for a revolutionary undertaking—a framework that is more open to Vietnamese energies than the restricted territory of Vietnam alone.

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The very word "Indochina" was created by colonization and for colonization; the Danish-born geographer Malte-Brun coined the term in 1852. In 1887, an Indochinese administration was set up, under the authority of a governor general presiding sometimes in Saigon and sometimes in Hanoi, composed of the following elements—the colony of Cochin China in the south; the protectorates of Annam in the east, which retained a ceremonial sovereign residing in Hué, and of Tonkin, in the north, where an "imperial delegate" resided; and the kingdoms of Cambodia and Laos in the west, whose monarchical systems were left intact by the colonizers. This arrangement was a strange combination of three Vietnamese countries strongly marked by Chinese influence and Confucian historical tradition and the little kingdoms of the Mekong, which belong, rather, with the cultural sphere of India and are wholly dominated by the strictest form of Buddhism.

In concocting this amalgam of nations and civilizations, the French colonizers were, like their British rivals in Nigeria, attempting to set up the most economical kind of operation, one by which some of the colonized peoples are made to exploit the others. And to a large extent they succeeded. In Vietnam they managed to maintain a class of mandarins, which enabled them to develop an artful indirect kind of colonization. In Laos and Cambodia, a class made up of Vietnamese petty officials, small businessmen and artisans served as the motor of French colonization. In this way a relatively economical system of exploitation was established, and the three peoples to be dominated were, in appearance, lined up against one another.

In fact, the French colonizers overshot their objective; in spite of themselves they united, in a strange way, these three different peoples, at very dissimilar levels of development, and in so doing imposed on them a single historical framework which the revolutionaries are now making use of for their own purposes. Of course, the Vietnamese intermediaries did inspire ill feeling and hatred of the kind which recently exploded in Cambodia. But this ill-will does not appear to be great enough to deflect the three peoples from developing together on converging courses in the years to come.

II

This Indochinese concept, intimately bound up with history

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and with colonial methods, was, indeed, very quickly seized upon by the revolutionaries, who retained the framework imposed by their enemy the better to struggle against him. This was what one of the founders of the Vietminh dubbed one day the strategy of "the glove turned inside out."

On February 3, 1930, in Hong Kong, the Vietnamese Communist Party was founded; Ho Chi Minh (then Nguyen Ai Quoc) immediately became its top leader. But six months later the leader called his comrades together in another conference in the course of which he gave the party a new name, rechristening it the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP). It was after consulting with the leaders of the Third International that the future president of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam reached this decision, which in his eyes had the merit of giving the revolutionary effort he had just launched a more international character. It is worth noting, moreover, that the program which Nguyen Ai Quoc promulgated at that time included the following aims: (1) to overthrow imperialism, feudalism and the reactionary bourgeoisie in Vietnam, and (2) to achieve the complete independence of Indochina. Thus the first strategist of communism in this region restored a distinction consonant with the inequalities of the three countries in terms of development by calling for a *social* revolution in Vietnam and a *political* one in the peninsula as a whole.

It must be admitted that this Indochinese strategy was for a long time quite artificial, since the ICP remained for many years essentially Vietnamese. And it must be noted that when the Laotians and Cambodians truly embarked on revolutionary action they founded their own organizations—the Pathet Lao for the first and the Pracheachon for the second.

It was on an almost exclusively Vietnamese basis that Ho Chi Minh and his comrades launched the revolution in 1945. In the two neighboring countries the independence movement was sparked by very diverse forces: in Cambodia, they were, at first, two traditionally educated intellectuals, Hiem Chieu and Son Ngoc Minh, and in Laos a curious triumvirate of half-brother princes: the feudalist Petsarath, the liberal Souvanna Phouma and the Marxist Souphanouvong. Very quickly, moreover, the Vietnamese revolutionaries were to set up cells within the Laotian movement, while in Cambodia the local revolutionaries were to conserve a much greater degree of autonomy.

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In 1951, six years after the outbreak of the colonial war against France, the three Indochinese movements concluded a Viet-Lao-Khmer alliance for the purpose of preparing to extend the fighting to the whole of the peninsula. Two years later, indeed, General Giap, pinned down by the French expeditionary corps in the key zones of the deltas of the Red River and the Mekong, suddenly decided to widen the theater of operations and entice his enemies onto new battlefields. In April 1953 he drew the French general staff toward Laos, encouraging them little by little to think that that was the terrain on which they could smash him. Between November 1953 and May 1954 came the creation, then the resistance, and finally the collapse of the entrenched camp of Dienbienphu. In broadening the First Indochina War, Giap faced the loss of everything. (This was a lesson which American strategists do not seem to have remembered; I shall have more to say on the subject.)

The Geneva Conference in 1954 was to bring the First Indochina War to an end. The Indochinese front was not, indeed, much in evidence at those councils: since the revolutionary parties had not had sufficient time to coördinate their efforts, Laos and Cambodia were represented there by governments whose only wish was to separate their problems from those of Vietnam and to draw a veil over the existence on their territories of groups that were more or less Marxist. But these groups were to grow bigger in the course of the ensuing years, and at the second Geneva Conference, the one devoted to Laos in the summer of 1962, the Indochinese theme was invoked much more often. The delegate from North Vietnam, Ung Van Khiem, hinted that a neutralization of the Indochinese region would be salutary. He specifically excluded the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam from this, but left the door open for the future.

This idea was taken up again in a much more precise and interesting form in various programs promulgated by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, founded in December 1960, which went on record as favoring an alliance of neutral nations comprised of Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam. It seems astonishing today that observers at the time did not take greater note of the very great originality of this program and the audacity it took for those South Vietnamese underground fighters to place their future within a framework in which, at least for a time, Cambodia and Laos would be closer to them than North

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Vietnam. Of course, for most of the American experts the NLF did not exist except as an echo of hypocritical orders dictated by Hanoi.

It was at the beginning of 1965, on the initiative of Prince Sihanouk, that Indochina emerged clearly as the major theme of all struggle against the American intervention and for political and economic reconstruction. On February 14, 1965, a "conference of Indochinese peoples" met in Phnom Penh. For Sihanouk this was most importantly an opportunity to have his country's frontiers guaranteed by the North Vietnamese and the NLF, whom he saw as the eventual victors and thus as his future neighbors. For Hanoi and the Front it was a chance to demonstrate the solidarity against imperialism of the revolution and neutralism, of the national masses and the national bourgeoisies, of the Vietnamese and their neighbors.

Geopolitical front, socio-economic alliance: at Phnom Penh were to be found all the factions opposed to American hegemony, from the intellectuals, mostly bourgeois and Catholic, of Tran Van Huu's "Committee for Peace and for the Renovation of South Vietnam" to the guerrilla fighters of the Pathet Lao and the bureaucrats of the Cambodian Sangkum. The major theme of the Phnom Penh meeting was the search for a formula for the neutralization of the whole of Indochina, the first step toward which might be an international conference like that of 1962, broadened to consider the future of the three countries. But the delegate from Hanoi, Hoang Quoc Viet, opposed this idea of Prince Sihanouk's: the bombardments of the North by the U.S. Air Force had just stiffened Hanoi's attitude still further. The Phnom Penh conference made no advance along the road to peace; but it confirmed and made manifest the "Indochinese" theme, and brought to light aspirations held in common by the most diverse delegations. It was, on this level, a success.

The American bombing of North Vietnam also contributed to the "materialization" of Indochina. It did this in three ways. First, the Vietnamese revolution, attacked at the very center of its strength, sought any and all means of hitting back, and all fronts thereafter became acceptable for striking a blow at the enemy. Secondly, this retaliation, with priority targets in South Vietnam, required a step-up in the transport of men and supplies from North to South by way of the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which goes through Laos for several hundred kilometers and

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through Cambodia for about a hundred. And finally, this aerial strategy gave an impetus to the increase of flights by American aircraft over the most diverse objectives—including, among others, frontiers; from this across a multiplicity of aerial incursions, in 1965 and 1966, which progressively nudged Cambodia into the war.

It was, however, in Laos that the greatest extension of the war outside the frontiers of Vietnam occurred. Since 1964—that is, since the actual dissociation of the neutralist coalition government formed in 1962, a sort of modus vivendi had been established, dividing the kingdom into two zones: in the west, seven provinces, from Luang Prabang to Savannaket, controlled (less and less) by the Vientiane government of Prince Souvanna Phouma, and to the east, from Sam Neua to the Cambodian frontier, five provinces controlled by the Pathet Lao and traversed by the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The double neutralization, both diplomatic and governmental, imposed by the 14 powers participating in the second Geneva Conference had thus given way to an actual partition.

After the halt of the bombings of North Vietnam in November 1968, however, the American bombers stepped up their raids on the Ho Chi Minh Trail linking North and South Vietnam across Laos and part of Cambodia. The frequency and amplitude of these bombings were described in a report of a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee published in April 1970. Testifying before this subcommittee, Senator Stuart Symington declared that these raids had practically supplanted the raids over North Vietnam that had been halted, and revealed that the U.S. ambassador in Vientiane had the authority to order these bombings and specify where the bombs were to be dropped, which, according to the Senator from Missouri, made that diplomat virtually a "military proconsul." Directly challenged on this matter, former Ambassador Sullivan declared that since he had been replaced in Vientiane by his colleague Godley these bombing raids had doubled.

So Laos, where almost 40,000 North Vietnamese soldiers are permanently entrenched in a zone which covers almost half the country and against which the U.S. Air Force daily launches from 300 to 400 aerial strikes, has certainly been "in the war" for several years. But operations there took on a new dimension in February 1970, when the Pathet Lao, aided by its Vietnamese

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allies, overran the Plaine des Jarres, the strategic crossroads of the country, which the tacit partition of Laos had provisionally kept outside its sector. The strategic ascendancy of the communist forces was thus affirmed: it was becoming increasingly obvious that Prince Souphannouvong and his allies held the country in their hands, and that if they did not take either Vientiane or Luang Prabang it was in consequence of a political decision and not a strategic incapacity. (What is more, in spite of the redoubling of operations by the U. S. Air Force after the capture of the Plaine des Jarres, the Pathet Lao's military and political ascendancy grew still more, so that it was able, at the beginning of May, to take an important center in the south, Attopeu.)

But this strategic ascendancy has not been used (or not yet) by the leaders of the Pathet Lao in pursuit of "total victory." After his forces had seized the Plaine des Jarres, Souphanouvong sent his half-brother and rival Souvanna Phouma an offer to negotiate within the framework of the 1962 agreements, to the end of establishing a coalition government, restoring territorial unity and cutting short all foreign intervention. Obviously, the successes it had achieved in the course of the preceding months would enable the Pathet Lao to increase its demands and its share of power. But the situation of the Vientiane government was so bad that it accepted the principle of negotiation, with Washington's approval.

It will be up to future historians to find out whether or not this trend toward "appeasement" in Laos helped to set in motion the operation of March 1970 in Phnom Penh, and whether or not it was to prevent the initiation of a process which might have led to a generalized negotiation of Indochinese problems as a whole that the "ultras"—South Vietnamese, Cambodians, Thais (and perhaps, but not probably, Americans)—prepared and carried out the Phnom Penh coup d'état.

III

For it is, in any case, the Cambodian episode that has just given the war its true dimensions. We must inquire into the background of it, for the overlapping of strategic combinations and internal intrigue may throw light on the probable future evolution of Indochina as a whole. The affair began in the summer of 1966. Within a few weeks, the Sihanouk régime, which had managed until then to keep the kingdom out of the war and

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maintain a precarious balance at home between a feudal system adapted to the needs of a nascent capitalism and a progressive intelligentsia (very small in numbers but very active), found itself in a shaky condition at the very moment when the visit in August of General de Gaulle served to shore it up.

One may recall that General de Gaulle's speech at Phnom Penh caused a considerable stir. From then on, Sihanouk became the accomplice in what the entire anti-communist cause in Southeast Asia considered a most troublesome program. In their view, this outpost of Gaullist subversion had to go. In the end it was to be gotten rid of more easily than they imagined because Sihanouk's great ally in Paris was eliminated, and because his successors would turn out to be less attached to the policy General de Gaulle had defined in Phnom Penh.

But Sihanouk found himself on dangerous ground both internationally and at Phnom Penh. He had allowed his relations with Peking to degenerate, thus weakening himself in dealing with the Americans. At home, a few weeks after General de Gaulle's visit, general elections were held—elections which the Prince had wanted to be "freer" than such events had ever been before in Cambodia. The result was to bring a majority of influential landowners into the parliament. Khmer society became represented by those controlled by money and by feudal relationships. Sihanouk had wanted to pay tribute to democracy: instead, he placed the noose of feudalism around his neck.

In the next four years, his personal power was steadily eroded by private interests and those friendly to the Americans. At the same time, neutrality was encouraged and a start was made in establishing state control of the economy. In 1967, one of the leaders of the Left intelligentsia, Chau Seng, who under Sihanouk had held almost all the high offices except the ministries controlling the army and the police, warned the comrade-prince that intrigues were being brought to a boil by the chiefs of the former party of "national renovation," the traditional Right. The names of two of these had already been singled out: Prince Sirik Matak and General Lon Nol. Sihanouk had long been wary of the former and had sent him abroad from one embassy to another. But Lon Nol? He was a soldier, therefore disciplined; and since he was not even a prince, how could he possibly be ambitious enough to think of substituting himself for a descendant of the kings of Angkor?

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From 1967 to 1969 Sihanouk, more and more responsive to pressures from the Right, seemed to be letting his relations with Peking become strained, allowing private interests to regain complete control over foreign commerce and banking, and launching a "red hunt" and an anti-Vietnamese campaign.

But why, in the fall of 1969, did Prince Sihanouk go so far as to entrust General Lon Nol with power three months before setting off on a long sojourn in France? Why did he thus entrust his régime to a man he had been warned against, and whose friendly relations with the West had long been known? This can be seen as an overestimation of his own charismatic power, which he believed to be so vast that he could wield it from afar. Or it can be seen as a sign of lassitude. Or it may be considered a Machiavellian trick. Like everyone else, Sihanouk was aware of the growth of the Vietnamese presence in his country. It is possible that in order to avoid having a direct confrontation with his associates, who were beginning to threaten his neutrality, he wanted to stand aside, leaving to General Lon Nol the chore of "cleaning out" Cambodia of the Vietnamese presence, to come back later with his hands clean and his country freer. This is only an hypothesis, but it cannot be completely discounted. One can be too subtle and be mistaken, not so much as to the objective as to the means used. Sihanouk underestimated either the ambition or the convictions of Lon Nol, and the influence of the general's friends in Saigon, if not in Washington.

Sihanouk, who was on the point of slipping into the Western camp, thus found himself abruptly recaptured by the party of revolution. This did not come about wholly by chance. With all his sudden changes of fortune and his diplomatic acrobatics, Norodom Sihanouk had fought almost constantly for over 15 years for peace and neutrality—a neutrality frankly oriented to the East and much more favorable to the interests of Peking and Hanoi than to those of the West. So it was not altogether surprising to find him at the opening of that curious conference of Indochinese revolutionaries which, as I said, was one of the two most obvious signs of the extension of the conflict, both ideologically and strategically, to the entire peninsula.

IV

The inspiration for the Indochinese conference which convened on April 24, 1970, in a little village in southern China

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about a hundred kilometers south of Canton came as in 1965 from Norodom Sihanouk. But it was no longer 1965. And it was no longer the colorful, laughing leader, the "star" of Phnom Penh loaded down with unshared powers, the ironic virtuoso of diplomatic tightrope-walking between East and West, who met with the "serious" revolutionary chieftains of Vietnam and Laos. This was now an exile struggling to throw his rivals out of Phnom Penh, a leader flung back by a Rightist coup into the arms of the very same *Khmers Rouges* he had been hunting down three months before. He was now a revolutionary, and as such all the more radical for having been recently converted.

It was in a barracks guarded by soldiers in coarse blue uniforms and surrounded by barbed wire emplacements, a barracks which the Chinese hosts entered only to find out whether the visitors needed anything, that the four groups of Indochinese leaders met for two days. The atmosphere of these sessions, one of the participants informed me, was "brotherly." The chosen language was French, which is spoken perfectly by the lawyer Nguyen Huu Tho, president of the NLF, by the engineer Souphanouvong, the leader of the Pathet Lao, by the militant Marxist Pham Van Dong (the son of a mandarin) and by Prince Sihanouk. It was, another witness said, a meeting of "old Indochina hands," a phrase that is all the more colorful for being the same one used by aging French ex-colonials when they get together in some dusty, sunny café in Marseilles or Nice for nostalgic chats about the good old days.

The greater part of the conference was given over to drafting the final communiqué, a mixture of threats to the United States and its "lackeys," optimistic proclamations of "final victory," and rather prudent or moderate reminders of the concluding texts of the Geneva conferences, denounced long since by Peking as null and void. An amusing (or significant) incident occurred at the last session. Prince Souphanouvong was in the chair: he called in turn upon his Cambodian and South Vietnamese colleagues to speak. He was preparing to wind up the proceedings himself when Pham Van Dong protested: "You've forgotten me!" "Our friend has anticipated the unification of Vietnam," Prince Sihanouk remarked, making everybody laugh except the delegate from the NLF.

The most interesting themes developed at that conference seem to have been three. First came the affirmation of a very firm

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solidarity among the four movements—but a solidarity sufficiently flexible not to have led the chiefs of "red Indochina" (or those who aspire to being such) into creating a common combat structure. Second, there was the proclamation of the *original nature* of the different struggles and their diversity, from Hanoi to Phnom Penh and from Saigon to Vientiane. Clearly, Pham Van Dong and his delegation wanted to avoid the impression of being imperialists, or even excessively forceful federators. "They were very diplomatic," a witness told me, thinking perhaps that this diplomacy was not necessarily, in the long run, disinterested. And third, there was the reminder of the *"neutralist"* themes explicitly or implicitly formulated in the Geneva texts of 1954 and 1962, and in the political platforms of the NLF and the Pathet Lao (not to mention, of course, the Sihanouk "line")—theses which could be of use in later negotiations. So in proclaiming themselves certain of military victory the Indochinese leaders were careful to leave out any form of political settlement. Militant Indochina is, then, not just a war cry: it can also be a program for peace.

V

In the meantime, the war is spreading and wreaking havoc. What is most startling in President Nixon's decision of April 30 is its suicidal aspect. I am not speaking here about the consequences of this move for internal American politics, or about the effects it will have on relations between Washington and Moscow. I do not even wish to comment on the obvious contradiction between the two aspects of a strategy which claims that it will rapidly reduce the number of men fighting in the Asian war while it enlarges the field of battle. I prefer to confine myself to a more specifically Indochinese aspect of the question.

There is, first of all, what might be called the gift that has been made to General Giap. In all his steady stream of writings over the last 10 years or so, Hanoi's commander-in-chief has never ceased to assert that every extension of the field of battle serves the revolutionary interests. This is so, he explains, for two reasons: (1) because it is to the advantage of the side with the greater firepower and superior heavy equipment on the ground to concentrate the fighting, while it is obviously in the interest of the side with the greater mobility and lighter armament to break up the fighting and seek to enlarge the combat zone; and

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(2) because the revolutionaries basically count on the complicity and support of the people, whereas a foreign force has to devote a great deal of time and effort to winning over or controlling by force the people among whom the fighting is going on.

For months, observers had been wondering whether Giap would dare apply his own doctrine and himself extend the front and the battle-zones outside the areas of Vietnam within which he had been more or less held in check since the counterblow that stopped the Tet offensive of February 1968. Now it is his enemies who are spreading the fighting to all of Indochina, under conditions which, in Cambodia, are uniting the masses behind a prestigious political chief who is entering the fray against these enemies. Thus, the operation launched on April 30 seems to me to be contributing to the revolutionary unification of the old colonial Indochina.

Will such a united Indochina become the satellite of China? Mao's speech of May 20 gave many observers the impression that Peking was finally ripping off the mask and proclaiming China's right to control the Indochinese area, much as the Soviet Union held Eastern Europe in thrall after World War II. In my view, this interpretation is wrong. Of course the Chinese leader took the opportunity the Cambodian operation afforded him to attack in the harshest terms the American role of world policeman, and to rejoice in seeing American power entrapped in the Asian rice paddies. But it is noteworthy that his speech did not mention any precise threat or specific action. His appeal was to world revolution, for moral aid and approval, not a call for military escalation. It was a song of triumph rather than a warlike gesture.

The evolution of the Indochina war is the fulfillment of Peking's hopes. The character of the conflict more and more clearly illustrates the validity of the warning of Lin Piao regarding the strategy of countryside versus cities, *i.e.* what is happening in Laos and Cambodia is as it was in Vietnam. The Chinese strategists do not predict complete victory. Revolution in Indochina does not mean Chinese domination. But while a united Indochina, more or less inspired by Hanoi, cannot oppose China, it can limit Chinese expansion. At present, Indochina is fighting under a Chinese banner but its aim is to survive under its own colors.

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VIETNAMIZATION: CAN IT WORK?

By Robert H. Johnson

THE uneasy public quiet on Vietnam which the President achieved with his speech last November 3 was shattered by the large-scale U.S. military intervention in eastern Cambodia. Once more U.S. policy in Southeast Asia became the subject of major controversy. In this situation there is some danger that we shall become so caught up in the immediate issues that we neglect more fundamental questions with respect to current American strategy. The new actions are a product of a basic fault in the structure of U.S. policy but do not, by themselves, define that fault.

In his November 3 speech the President offered a strategy based upon the twin approach of negotiations and Vietnamization of the war, accompanied by withdrawals of American forces. He was pessimistic about the outlook for negotiations but told us that Vietnamization would permit the United States to disengage from the war even if negotiations failed. In the period since, the United States has further downgraded negotiations as an essential part of any solution. The only subsequent hint that the government might not consider the Vietnamization strategy sufficient by itself was provided by the President's speech on April 20 announcing future troop withdrawals, in which both the volume and tone of his discussion of negotiations implied a recognition that they were important. He stated explicitly that negotiations at least provide "a better, shorter path to peace." But there was no evidence following that speech of a change in the U.S. position in the Paris negotiations, and the President's action in Cambodia 10 days later clearly gave priority to Vietnamization. This priority was reflected in the renewed emphasis upon the use of military means to end the war and in the justification of the Cambodian intervention on the grounds that it was needed to protect American lives and to "guarantee the continued success of our withdrawal and Vietnamization program."

The basic question therefore remains: Has the President been right in de-coupling Vietnamization and American troop withdrawals from negotiations or are the two strategies essential complements to each other?

The search for an answer to this question must begin with an

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effort to project into the future the probable results of the Vietnamization and withdrawal policy. Three principal factors will determine the outcome of that policy: North Vietnamese and Vietcong reaction to its implementation; the stability and general viability of the government of South Vietnam; and the closely related question of the ability of the South Vietnamese government and armed forces to cope with the problems of the South at various levels of American withdrawal. As we turn to an examination of these factors, we should realize that now, as in the past, there are almost no agreed "facts" with respect to Vietnam and that any estimate of the future is certain to be disputed.

No one in Vietnam or elsewhere has any clear idea as to likely military reactions by the communists as the United States withdraws from Vietnam. However, we do have the warning last December of General Giap, North Vietnam's Defense Minister, that Vietnamization will be a "tragedy" for U.S. and South Vietnamese forces and that these forces "which have taken severe beatings will get yet harder ones."

It is very clear that the communists wish to see the United States withdraw as quickly as possible. It seems likely that their reactions will depend upon their estimates of U.S. intentions. If the United States were clearly going to remove all American forces quickly, the communists would probably lie low and let us get out with minimum casualties. However, if, as has become increasingly evident, the United States plans to maintain a substantial residual force in South Vietnam for some time, the temptation to undertake some kind of military action against American or South Vietnamese forces will be quite high. The communists would hope to induce pessimism, political change in the South and a more nearly total withdrawal. In April Hanoi did, in fact, call upon communist forces to kill American soldiers at a rate "far beyond the 100-a-week level, which the United States ruling clique has considered bearable." After this, American battle-deaths began to rise significantly above that level.

Political stability in South Vietnam will also be very difficult to estimate in a changing situation. President Thieu is coming increasingly to resemble the late President Diem in critical respects: he is becoming, in the words of a Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff Report, "increasingly autocratic, secretive and isolated." Like Diem, he seems much more concerned with assuring the absolute security of his present narrow political base

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than with broadening it. The deep distrust which permeates Vietnamese political relationships is likely to be accentuated by the strains imposed upon the government as it assumes increased responsibility for the war.

The ability of the Thieu régime to cope with the problems of the South will be even more affected by its administrative and military capabilities. While there is considerable optimism in the U.S. government at present about the progress of the rural pacification program, the Senate committee staff report notes that many American officials in the field consider the gains to be fragile and heavily dependent upon the ability of the army of Vietnam (ARVN) to continue to hold the countryside as the Americans leave. Of six factors that are reported as accounting for improved ARVN performance in the past year, four are based upon U.S. matériel, planning, operational and advisory support.[1] Even though most of these elements of support may be continued during an intermediate period after withdrawal of U.S. *combat* troops, the American ability to influence Vietnamese military planning and action is likely to decline with the elimination of the most important direct U.S. contribution to combat. Moreover, the complex military operations which the United States has mounted in order to exploit the full capabilities of its sophisticated military equipment may be beyond the capacity of the Vietnamese to manage on their own.

The situation in the one area from which all U.S. ground combat troops have been withdrawn, the Mekong Delta, has generally been viewed with considerable euphoria as evidence that Vietnamization is succeeding. But the quiet in this area does not simply reflect a weakening of the communist position but also a clear communist policy of lying low while they rebuild their military forces and political structure for the continuing future struggle.

The predominant, but not unanimous, opinion of senior U.S. and Vietnamese officers in Vietnam is that the North Vietnamese are no longer capable of defeating the ARVN with a massive attack. The issue, however, may be incorrectly posed. The U.S. military ever since 1954 has tended to believe that massive com-

[1] As noted in the Staff Report for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee already mentioned ("Vietnam: December 1969," Washington, United States Government Printing Office 1970). The other two factors are improved ARVN leadership and increased South Vietnamese confidence. This latter factor is certainly also related in some degree to U.S. support.

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munist attacks represent the main danger of military catastrophe in South Vietnam. Yet when, in late 1964, the ARVN was on the ropes and about to cave in, its weakness was created more by a combination of political malaise and smaller-scale punishing attacks than by massive military actions. The continuing high rate of desertion from the ARVN is certainly not reassuring as to its ability to sustain high losses without grave effects upon morale and effectiveness.

It is evident from President Thieu's cautious views as to the appropriate timing of U.S. withdrawals, as well as from the continuing flow of news reports on the views of American officers in South Vietnam, that many in Vietnam—aware of the persistent, long-standing weaknesses of the ARVN's military efforts—are rather less sanguine than U.S. policy-makers about the prospects for a reasonably early U.S. pullout.

The U.S.-South Vietnamese military action in Cambodia warrants separate treatment since, potentially, it affects all of the factors just discussed. In the short run it is likely to reduce somewhat the capacity of the communists for military action in the Delta and the Saigon area. Longer-run effects are much less certain.

By placing renewed emphasis upon a military solution to the war and raising new questions in the minds of the communists as to the pace of future U.S. troop withdrawals, the action will reduce the incentives the communists have had to lie low in order to encourage such withdrawals. In any event, past communist behavior suggests that they will seek to make some kind of significant military or politico-military riposte to the Cambodian operations. The idea of "cleaning out" the communist sanctuary in Cambodia may seem attractive, but prior experience with "cleaning out" communist base areas should remind us that this is not a once-for-all operation. Communist forces will return after U.S. and South Vietnamese forces withdraw and the United States is now, in effect, committed to an indefinite continuation of such cleaning-out action. The rationale that argued for the original action will argue for its continuance.

Moreover, if the operation seems initially successful, there may be increased pressure for a similar "cleaning-out" operation in southern Laos (the so-called "Panhandle"). This is a very old idea; proposals for doing it were being made at least as long ago as the beginning of the Kennedy administration. While U.S. and

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South Vietnamese covert military actions in the Laos Panhandle have reduced the pressures for such an operation, "success" in Cambodia is likely to produce renewed demands by the military for more massive and open intervention. The Laos corridor is, after all, a great deal more important than the Cambodian sanctuary to the war in Vietnam. The political arguments against taking such action will seem weaker now that fuller publicity has been given to our involvement in Laos.

Thus, in undertaking to clear out the Cambodian sanctuaries we have increased our long-term responsibilities. The capability of the South Vietnamese to continue such complex, large-scale military actions by themselves is open to question. Moreover, to transfer such responsibilities to the South Vietnamese will, in the longer run, risk serious political difficulties in view of traditional animosities between the Vietnamese and Cambodians (or Lao). But the more basic long-term dangers relate to the responsibility the United States may now have assumed for the survival of a non-communist government in Cambodia, a question that can best be discussed as part of a broader consideration of the options open to the communists as the United States withdraws from Vietnam.

For purposes of a more specific analysis of the probable outcome of a Vietnamization and withdrawal policy, we can project three stages or levels of U.S. force withdrawals. In making these projections it is assumed that the administration will not significantly alter its present negotiating position. This will permit us to focus, in this initial analysis, upon the possible consequences of a policy which is based wholly upon a Vietnamization strategy.

II

Withdrawal of most U.S. ground combat forces. The first projected level would involve the removal of all U.S. ground combat troops except for those forces needed to protect base areas containing other U.S. military elements. It would leave about 225,000 military personnel in Vietnam consisting mainly of a full-scale logistic support element, air and artillery elements, and a large-scale military advisory group. Such a withdrawal probably represents the maximum for which specific planning has been undertaken. In late March, a withdrawal down to this level was contemplated by mid-1971, but events since may have

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set back this target date somewhat.[2] In this situation it seems highly likely that the United States would also retain more or less its present large nonmilitary establishment in Vietnam. Aid, intelligence, information and other such personnel would be needed for their contribution of advice and support to quasi-military and nonmilitary counterinsurgency operations.

The principal danger which the U.S. government appears to foresee under these circumstances is the possibility of major communist attacks upon U.S. forces during withdrawal, or after its completion. Such communist attacks seem a genuine danger, especially if there is no evidence of definite U.S. plans for the early withdrawal of remaining forces. Communist attacks would be designed to demonstrate the dangers of retaining such a residual force in Vietnam and to shake the confidence of the South Vietnamese. The residual forces would have some capability for self-defense of their immediate base areas, but would be dependent for broader area defense upon South Vietnamese ground forces.

If the communists attacked, they would risk U.S. reëscalation of the war, perhaps in the form of resumed or expanded air attacks upon the North. They would probably not consider it likely that the United States would reintroduce any substantial number of the withdrawn ground forces. While North Vietnam would certainly prefer to avoid a resumption of air attacks upon itself, past experience has demonstrated to Hanoi and to us that such attacks are unlikely to have a significant effect upon the outcome of the war. Other escalatory steps such as the mining of Haiphong Harbor, a ground invasion of North Vietnam or nuclear action would carry such high political and military costs or have such limited military value as to seem implausible as a threat and very unattractive to America as a form of action.[3] Any

[2] *The New York Times,* March 25, 1970, p. 1. To reach this level, a withdrawal of 225,000 men would have been required by mid-year, as compared with the withdrawal of 150,000 by the spring of 1971 announced on April 20. More recently, however, Secretary Laird has said that U.S. involvement in ground combat will end by July 1971.

[3] In the view of many experts an invasion of North Vietnam is the one action that would very probably trigger direct communist Chinese involvement in the war. While it seems most unlikely that the United States will ever employ nuclear weapons except in a situation involving an attack upon the United States, there is a marginal possibility that the threat of nuclear action might be seen as useful in inducing a political settlement. It is possible that the President's thinking on this subject may be influenced by the view that it was a veiled threat of nuclear attack on North Korea by Eisenhower that produced the Korean settlement in 1953. This is, at best, a debatable proposition and the analogy with Vietnam is open to most serious question.

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such reëscalation of the war would certainly produce a very substantial political reaction in the United States and would recreate the difficult problem of how to deëscalate.

But the communists would have other options. One alternative would be to leave U.S. forces alone but to undertake greatly expanded attacks upon the armed forces and civilian personnel of the government of South Vietnam designed to shake its confidence in its ability to go it alone. American withdrawals to date have apparently not yet seriously disturbed the confidence of the South Vietnamese in their capacity to cope, because those withdrawals have not yet reached the critical point, and perhaps because the government of South Vietnam remains to be convinced that we shall, in fact, withdraw all combat forces in the foreseeable future.

To the communists, major attacks upon South Vietnamese elements could be more attractive than attacks upon U.S. forces. Such attacks would be more likely to raise serious questions about the validity of U.S. assumptions underlying its Vietnamization policy; would be somewhat less likely to provoke U.S. reëscalation; and, most important, could very favorably affect the political situation in the South, which must, in all circumstances, be the central communist objective.

A third option, and one which the communists could exercise under all of the scenarios discussed here, is a major military move in Laos. Such a move could have two immediate objectives —to remind the United States of the dangers of continuing to remain on the ground in mainland Southeast Asia and to point to the fact that the Laos problem cannot be settled by Vietnamization of the war in South Vietnam, but must be settled as part of a larger negotiation. Whether moves in Laos earlier this year had some such motivation or were part of the continuing jockeying for military and political position in that country is difficult to say.

Depending upon how far the communists carried their military action, such a move could present the United States with an excruciating dilemma. Continued non-communist control of that part of Laos that borders the Mekong River is viewed as crucial by the Thais and they would certainly place very heavy pressures on the United States to respond to communist action which threatened their Mekong frontier. But open, direct U.S. military involvement in Laos is a very unattractive proposition

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as President Kennedy perceived in 1961 when he opted instead for a negotiated settlement. It is also obvious that the Laos nerve of the Congressional opposition is exceedingly sensitive.

While we have no explicit commitment to the defense of Laos, we do have rather strong explicit and implicit commitments to the defense of Thailand. Under the Rusk-Thanat agreement, which was a by-product of the 1961–62 Laos crisis, the United States undertook to fulfill what it considered to be its obligations under the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the event of a threat to Thailand, whether other SEATO members agreed to act or not. Moreover, by participating directly and indirectly in the combat in South Vietnam, the Thais have committed themselves to "our side" in a manner that is quite unprecedented in past Thai foreign policy. To the Thai, the principle of reciprocity in social and political relationships is of key importance. They are very likely to view their commitment to us as entailing a reciprocal obligation on our side in the event that they are seriously threatened through Laos.

Even though the Thais have begun to hedge their foreign-policy bets somewhat and may be looking toward a future accommodation with North Vietnam and communist China, we cannot assume that they will not ask for major U.S. support in the event of a serious threat to their Laos frontier. Moreover, the question of Thailand aside, it would be very difficult for the United States to sit still during a military conquest of Laos, both because of the broader international political consequences and because of the potential effects upon Vietnam.

Finally, recent developments have provided the communists with new opportunities for action in Cambodia. They are able to back a leader, Sihanouk, who still possesses considerable popularity and an aura of legitimacy among Cambodians. Utilizing this political base and a combination of Vietcong and North Vietnamese forces with existing Cambodian communist and tribal resistance movements, the communists could make life quite difficult for a weak Lon Nol government. While the establishment of a major full-fledged guerrilla movement will take some time, the communists are likely to be capable of major military forays or the establishment of liberated zones without meeting much effective resistance from the Phnom Penh régime unless that régime receives direct U.S. or South Vietnamese military support.

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The United States has now implicitly, but clearly, accepted responsibility for the security of a non-communist government in Cambodia. In his April 30 speech, the President argued that the communists posed a threat to the independence of Cambodia and he represented the military action against the Cambodian sanctuaries as response to the Cambodian government's plea for outside aid. The United States, "with the chips down," had come to the support of a small nation under attack. While the President has since denied that we have undertaken a new commitment, the administration has apparently given its blessing to a developing de facto alliance between Thieu and Lon Nol. Thus, the commitment has not been eliminated, but only made somewhat indirect.

In any of these situations, the United States would face some very difficult and unattractive policy choices. So long as there continues to be a substantial U.S. presence in South Vietnam, America is inextricably caught up in the defense of South Vietnam. Moreover, our actions have increasingly committed us to the continued survival of the Thieu government. Yet, as our experience since 1965 demonstrates, we cannot even begin to redeem our commitments without employing U.S. ground combat forces. Thus, in a situation where the communists attack U.S. or South Vietnamese forces and the South Vietnamese demonstrate an inability to cope with the attacks, the United States will very likely face the options of letting the attacks succeed or of reintroducing ground forces. The potential problems presented by Laos and Cambodia illustrate the now obvious fact that we are caught up in an Indochinese struggle and that a solution confined to Vietnam is no complete solution.

III

Withdrawal of logistic support forces. At the second projected level, with both ground combat and logistic support forces withdrawn, the U.S. military presence would be reduced to an advisory effort and, perhaps, continued air and artillery support. An advisory group of 25,000 to 50,000 has been mentioned in the press. If nonmilitary as well as military personnel are included, 50,000 would seem a fairly conservative estimate in view of the fact that 23,000 civil and military advisers remain in the Mekong Delta after withdrawal of all U.S. combat troops from that corps area. (There are four corps areas in South Vietnam.)

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The immediate military arguments for retaining U.S. air and artillery support under these circumstances are likely to seem quite compelling. Such support would strengthen South Vietnamese capabilities, help protect American advisers and give those advisers more leverage in their attempts to influence Vietnamese military and nonmilitary actions. But arguments based upon longer-term political, military and ethical considerations would be much more negative. To mention the ethical argument only at this point—we draw back in horror from the Mylai massacre, yet, so long as we continue to bomb South Vietnam, we unavoidably perpetrate many such indiscriminate killings, differing from those at Mylai only in their more impersonal character and in the presumed intent of those involved in the killing.

If the United States reduced its involvement to an advisory effort, would we be well out of the woods in Vietnam? The answer, quite clearly, is no. We would simply have begun to get out of Vietnam the way we came in and, along the way, would very probably confront the old dilemmas that caused us to deepen our involvement so drastically in 1965.

If the communists had permitted us to withdraw U.S. forces to this level without reacting in one of the ways earlier discussed, their failure to react would perhaps reflect an assumption that the faster the United States withdrew, the less effective the U.S. program of Vietnamization and the better the prospects for early communist success. They would have taken us at our word that U.S. withdrawals would be related, in part, to the level of communist activity. Only if withdrawals were occurring at a quite steady and rapid pace would such a strategy be likely to seem attractive to the communists.

Once we were down to a residual advisory force (with, perhaps, air and artillery support) and it appeared that we were likely to maintain that force in South Vietnam for the indefinite future, the incentive situation would change. The communists would then very likely see it in their interests to undertake a program of political and military pressures directed against South Vietnamese forces and officials designed to produce major political changes in the South and to make the United States confront the untenability of its policy. They would seek, in this effort, to exploit war weariness and the adverse morale effects of the withdrawals in the South. They would probably consider

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it quite unlikely that the United States would respond by reintroduction of ground forces.

Would the government of South Vietnam be able to cope with renewed pressures? Clearly, estimating becomes extremely hazardous because this point is quite far down the road and much could happen on both the communist and non-communist sides between now and then. If the pessimists with respect to prospects for successful Vietnamization are correct, the South Vietnamese government could be in serious trouble. Moreover, many observers in South Vietnam who are optimistic about the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves militarily are skeptical of the Thieu government's ability to survive in a political struggle with the National Liberation Front. Furthermore, and rather paradoxically, if Vietnamization should succeed in providing relative military security, that very security might encourage the reëmergence of the atomistic, dog-eat-dog politics so characteristic of Vietnam, which would provide increased political opportunities for the communists.

Confronted by these uncertainties, one proposition of which we can be quite certain is that the communists would not stop trying to cause serious trouble in the South. Another proposition of an almost equal degree of certainty is that the South Vietnamese government and its forces would not be free of serious vulnerabilities. From these propositions we can draw the rather obvious conclusion that there would be some clear risks that the communists would produce significant political and military deterioration in the South.

If such deterioration should occur, the presence of U.S. advisory elements could present the United States with serious dilemmas. The possibility that our large advisory group might be caught up in a politically or militarily collapsing situation would be likely to seem as horrendous a contingency to policymakers in, say, 1974 as it evidently seemed to President Johnson and his advisers in 1965. If we were faced by political deterioration, the strong temptation would be to shore up the government of the day in the South or to back whatever leadership promised to continue the struggle against the communists. Even a gradual, relatively peaceful, takeover by the communists would be embarrassing, to say the least, if it occurred with 25,000 or more U.S. advisers and billions of dollars of U.S. military equipment still in Vietnam.

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Thus we return to the rock-bottom fact that so long as the United States is committed physically and politically to any degree in South Vietnam, there is always a risk that we shall pay, and pay dearly, for that commitment. As in the past, our first inclination in a weakening situation will be to throw more economic and military matériel into the breach. But if that fails, we would confront the question of military reinvolvement. If we retained U.S. air and artillery forces in the South, we would have more to work with from a military point of view, but it would, by the same token, be easier for us to slip into a deeper military involvement.

IV

Withdrawal of all special U.S. advisory elements and all combat forces. For purposes of analysis, it is assumed that, at this level, the United States would withdraw all special civil and military advisory missions and, if they had been retained earlier, all air and artillery units. Such a withdrawal would be based upon the assumption that the South Vietnamese no longer needed such support. In effect, we would consider that we had "won" the war, temporarily at least. Our relationship to South Vietnam would revert to the situation that existed prior to 1961 before the Kennedy administration build-up of advisory and air units. While no one seems to be thinking of this as a serious possibility for the foreseeable future, it is a case worth examining because it presumably represents the final goal of a policy based wholly upon Vietnamization of the war.

We must assume that in such a situation we would continue to be involved in a substantial aid program to South Vietnam. Unless the communists had faded almost completely away—a most unlikely contingency—the South Vietnamese would need to maintain a substantial military establishment for some time. The large quantities of military supplies and equipment which we have supplied in the past, and are presently augmenting under the Vietnamization program, would need to be maintained and replaced. Even in the very unlikely event that there was little sense of immediate threat, the United States would be likely to pour substantial amounts of matériel into Vietnam for the indefinite future, if for no other reason than as insurance to reduce the risk of future combat reinvolvement.

A large South Vietnamese military establishment would place

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demands on the South Vietnamese economy which would force the continuance of substantial U.S. economic aid. Reconstruction needs would require additional assistance. These military and economic aid programs would, in turn, mean a continued large aid establishment in South Vietnam. Hundreds—very likely thousands—of U.S. military and civilian personnel would remain in the South.

In the absence of a negotiated settlement, the United States would very probably confront the question of security guarantees for South Vietnam. The government of South Vietnam would be likely to press strongly for some kind of bilateral or multilateral guarantee before the last American combat elements departed. The Geneva Accords machinery, established in 1954, has broken down quite completely and could hardly be glued back together again without a new international agreement. While current U.S. public opinion, Congressional attitudes and stated administration policy would all suggest that we would be unlikely to commit ourselves in any way that might seriously risk future combat reinvolvement, what would an administration which is formally committed to the continued independence of South Vietnam do in such a situation? It would be unlikely to feel that it could cast South Vietnam adrift after having "won" the war; it would fear that such action would simply encourage the communists to resume the struggle after our departure.

To assume that we shall arrive at this point within the context of a policy based upon seriously intended Vietnamization is to assume that the military capacity and the political threat of the communists have been temporarily, at least, severely blunted. It is not to assume, however, that the communists have no significant military or political capabilities and it is decidedly not to assume that they have given up the struggle. Hanoi has an interest in South Vietnam that is, ultimately, deeper than our own. We may leave, but the communists will not quit. The communists would, following a U.S. departure of this scale, very likely initiate a gradually mounting program of pressures. How severe these pressures would be would depend in part upon the extent to which our withdrawal was made possible by our genuine success versus the extent to which it was made possible by a deliberate communist policy of lying low in order to encourage the final departure of U.S. combat and advisory units and to preserve communist assets for the future struggle.

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The ability of the United States to stay out of that future struggle would be inhibited by our continuing substantial presence in South Vietnam and by our probable commitments to its continued survival as an independent entity.

V

The preceding discussion suggests some of the problems ahead and directs our attention to action that might minimize the risks involved in our policies. That discussion and what follows are based upon the assumption that, as indicated by the President's statement last November, the United States sees Vietnamization as a viable substitute for negotiations leading to a political settlement in the South. One must, however, bear in mind the possibility that the administration has not, for tactical reasons, revealed its full strategy and that its planning has, in fact, linked the strategies of Vietnamization and negotiated settlement along lines discussed below. Alternatively, the President may have hoped that a Vietnamization and withdrawal policy would induce the communists to lie low and thus permit us to get out of Vietnam with minimum casualties even without a negotiated settlement. The administration may have been willing to accept a fairly high probability of a communist takeover thereafter. Both of these speculations run counter to past public explanations of policy, and in the wake of the Cambodian action and the justifications that have been offered for it, both now seem quite unlikely interpretations of administration intentions.

Increasingly it has become evident that, as Chalmers Roberts noted some months ago in *The Washington Post,* President Nixon, like President Johnson before him, wants to "win" the war in Vietnam in the sense that he wants to leave behind a noncommunist government in Saigon able to withstand any communist threat. This objective has been reflected in our continued support of the Thieu government in its opposition to any agreement in Paris which would clearly provide for substantial participation by the communists in political power in South Vietnam. Seen in this perspective, the Vietnamization strategy is clearly a strategy for winning the war. A serious U.S. negotiating position would involve acceptance of the fact that, while we have not lost the war in a military sense, neither are we capable of winning it. Being incapable of winning it and confronted by a foe who is certain to outlast us because of the higher relative

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value he places on success in the effort, we have in effect, even though not in fact, lost the war.

One of our recurrent hopes, which was revived in connection with the Cambodian operation, is that a show of great determination will cause the communists to see negotiations our way. But neither border operations nor resumed bombing of the North is any more likely to achieve this objective than past efforts to bomb North Vietnam into reasonableness.

Four specific defects of a policy based wholly upon Vietnamization have been suggested:

1. Vietnamization makes no provision for a political accommodation between the communist and non-communist forces in South Vietnam. It therefore leaves the central issue of the Vietnam struggle unresolved. With this issue unresolved we can anticipate continued political instability and continued political and military strife in the South.

2. Vietnamization by itself provides no assured basis for the total withdrawal of U.S. military personnel, including military advisers, within a reasonable time period. If the struggle continues, therefore, it is quite likely that we shall remain involved in it, with all the risks attendant thereto as sketched above.

3. Without new international machinery, obtained through negotiations, the United States will lack any body or arrangement to which it can shift the burden of responsibility for Vietnam. (I am not sanguine that, under the best of circumstances, we shall obtain very strong machinery. But some kind of machinery, weak though it may be, is essential if we are to lay our burden down in a reasonable period of time.)

4. Vietnamization fails to deal with the problems of Laos and Cambodia. Laos is a serious vulnerability for America; a convenient pressure point for the communists. For both it is a secondary theater of the Vietnam war. So long as the United States maintains a significant presence in South Vietnam—or even if it is largely out of South Vietnam, but remains committed to its defense—it can hardly agree to a settlement in Laos which would give North Vietnam free access to the corridor through eastern Laos into South Vietnam. To accept a Laos settlement which precluded the harassment of communist movement through the Laos corridor would be to leave South Vietnam with a serious vulnerability which would certainly be exploited by the communists in the absence of a political settlement in

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South Vietnam. On the other hand, without a political accommodation in the South, the communists are most unlikely to agree to a Laos settlement which effectively inhibits their use of the Laos corridor. Thus, a settlement of the central issue of the Vietnam war is necessary to a meaningful agreement with respect to Laos.

In Cambodia we have assumed a double responsibility: first, for preventing the border areas from being used by the communists to threaten U.S. and South Vietnamese forces; and second, for maintaining a non-communist government in Phnom Penh. We are unlikely to be able to divest ourselves of either responsibility so long as the political struggle continues in South Vietnam.

Because each of these defects could give the United States most serious trouble and because none of them could be resolved without serious negotiations, it is clear that Vietnamization without such negotiations is most unlikely to succeed in extricating the United States from Vietnam within a reasonable time.

Given limitations of space, it is hardly possible to do more than sketch out below the manner in which the policy of Vietnamization might be re-coupled to a negotiating strategy. Vietnamization represents a useful and necessary part of any plan for extricating ourselves from Vietnam. It involves a return to the principle upon which President Kennedy insisted and which we abandoned with the escalation of 1965—the principle that this is a Vietnamese war which ultimately can only be won, if it can be won at all, by the Vietnamese themselves. It is useful to return to this principle not only because it is correct but also because it provides the United States with a reasonable and understandable policy posture, both in the United States and in Asia. Reliance upon this principle will help reduce the political costs of U.S. withdrawal. The main danger in the Vietnamization policy is that it will be taken too seriously in the sense that we come to believe that it offers a real prospect for a "successful" outcome of the war.

A genuine effort to reach a truly viable settlement must begin with the recognition that the political role of the communists in the South is the heart of the matter. However, as Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, recognized in an article published in *Foreign Affairs* in January 1969, any agreement on this issue must be achieved

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among the parties in South Vietnam itself. This places the United States in the difficult position of being dependent upon the government of South Vietnam for achievement of a settlement through negotiations, just as it is dependent upon that government in any effort to achieve success in the South through Vietnamization. If the United States is willing to abandon the concept of Vietnamization as a kind of "win" strategy and view it instead as an essential part of a political settlement strategy involving negotiations, it can be a useful tool in creating the conditions for a political accommodation in the South.

Under these circumstances, the policy of Vietnamization and U.S. force withdrawals would be utilized to make clear to the political élite of South Vietnam that it must decide, in a relatively limited period of time, what kind of political arrangements in the South are supportable on a long-term basis without continuing substantial U.S. assistance. In order to force such a decision, the United States would need to set a quite early deadline for the withdrawal of *all* U.S. forces, including logistic support, advisory and air and artillery elements.

It could be argued that such a deadline should be given to the South Vietnamese privately in order to maintain the theoretical bargaining leverage provided by communist uncertainty as to how long the United States will stay in Vietnam. But as a practical matter any deadline given to the South Vietnamese will soon be known by the North. Moreover, a public declaration of intent has the advantage of making the decision more irreversible and thus forcing the South Vietnamese élite to confront its situation more quickly and frankly. It also has the virtue of reducing the likelihood of dilemma-creating attacks by the communists on U.S. or South Vietnamese forces.

A public American commitment to total withdrawal by a specified deadline, rather than reducing communist incentives to negotiating an agreement, could under proper circumstances actually enhance them. It is already evident from communist behavior that they feel little, if any, incentive to negotiate under present circumstances in which the United States refuses to confront the central political issue in the South and in which it seems bent upon withdrawing at least its ground combat forces at no price to the communists. A commitment to withdrawal which is part of a strategy clearly directed toward achievement of an accommodation between communists and non-communists

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in South Vietnam would encourage, and could necessitate, a serious negotiating effort by the communists.

Even though the communists may believe that the political odds clearly favor them, they too confront uncertainties about the future which could be reduced, though not eliminated, by a negotiated settlement. The most obvious uncertainties are those relating to the effects of the Vietnamization program upon the military capacity of South Vietnam, especially if the United States continued "normal" military and economic aid programs after its force withdrawals.

Although the United States cannot itself negotiate political arrangements in the South, it can utilize an active secret diplomacy for exploration of the issues involved and, in this manner, could put additional pressure on Saigon. It is likely that the Thieu government's initial response will be to stiffen its already tough negotiating stance. A policy of continued active, unqualified support for Thieu is inconsistent with a successful American negotiating strategy. We need to draw back from our embrace of Thieu. He is providing us ample excuse for doing so in his increasingly repressive political actions. As we did in 1963 in the case of Diem, we need to make evident to the Vietnamese élite, including the military, that we are not committed irrevocably to the present government.

If, as rumored, Ambassador Bunker will soon leave Saigon, we shall be provided with an opportunity like that which occurred in 1963 with the shift from Ambassador Nolting to Ambassador Lodge to disengage from the existing régime. Our objective should not be the overthrow of the Thieu government, but rather the creation of a set of political pressures which would make political accommodation with the communists more likely. These pressures might lead to the replacement of Thieu, but Thieu might, if he comes to accept the necessities of the situation, be the leader of the effort to reach an accommodation.

If we can resolve the central political issue of the role of the communists in South Vietnam, it should then be possible to negotiate a new international framework—or to revive the Geneva framework—so that we can rid ourselves of our unilateral responsibility for the future of South Vietnam. It is hardly realistic to deal with the problem of Laos in a sentence, but the most obvious solution would be to negotiate a de jure partition along the lines of the present de facto partition. Such

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an arrangement would offer the Thais protection of their Mekong frontier while permitting the communists to continue to hold the areas that they have so long occupied and from which we are, in any event, incapable of dislodging them. However, with a settlement in South Vietnam, a less linear solution to the Laos problem may be more likely and more feasible. The Cambodian situation is too fluid for prescription, but an agreement to put back in power a Sihanouk, who at the moment is communist-leaning, might provide a solution that we could swallow and that would be acceptable to the communists.

The strategy proposed here rejects a simple U.S. pullout, such as is espoused by many critics of the war. Such a pullout would be likely to be seen by some Asians who are still important to us as a simple abandonment by the United States of its assumed responsibilities and would be likely to carry international political costs that it would be better, if possible, to avoid. On the other hand, the strategy is based upon the assumption that we cannot win the war through Vietnamization or any other means. It would require us to accept what would be, at best, a communist-leaning government in the South and a strong likelihood of the future reunification of all of Vietnam under communist auspices. Such a unified Vietnam is quite likely, however, to be able to maintain its independence from communist China.

It is obvious that it is precisely because this is the likely outcome of any serious negotiation that both President Johnson and President Nixon have resisted taking the actions necessary to produce an agreement. While such an outcome is regrettable in terms of the objectives we have sought in the postwar era, it is also inescapable. It is even more regrettable that we did not recognize this outcome for the necessity it was in 1965 and that we have had to pay such a tremendous price in lives lost and domestic problems unsolved in order to learn some lessons about revolutionary warfare in Vietnam and about the limitations of our power. To continue to refuse to recognize this necessity is to perpetuate the error and the costs.

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BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE ALLIANCE

By Michael Stewart

PREDICTION is a chancy business. Nevertheless, one cannot consider policy without making some general judgments (or if you like assumptions) about likely developments. My first assumption is that the countries of the Alliance as a whole will continue to have the resources and dynamic to contribute to shaping the future. We are not and shall not be simply in the position of having to respond to events. The combined gross domestic product of the countries of the Alliance is 55 percent of total world gross domestic product. Our present share of world trade is also 55 percent. I assume that there will be no substantial recession in world trade, and I believe that we shall at least maintain our share of it. There should therefore be no lack of material resources for the countries of the Alliance. Nevertheless, our ability to attain the objects of our policies will be limited by various factors.

A feature of the sixties has been the steady assumption by the Soviet Union of the role of a superpower, primarily in its military aspects. Their growing worldwide interests should lead toward an increasingly realistic and wide-ranging dialogue with the West, and in particular with the United States. On the other hand, the much advertised Soviet concept of peaceful coexistence as an ideological, political and economic struggle sets certain limits to the possibilities of improvement in East-West relations. One may think that this conception of a continuing and inevitable struggle is wholly out of date. But we must deal with other countries within the limits which their outlook imposes. In seeking to discuss matters of common interest with the Soviet Union, it is as well to bear in mind both that there has been no apparent change in their traditional long-term aims, and that the Soviet political system allows a greater tactical flexibility in the pursuit of national advantage than the West can afford.

The still unanswered question to which the seventies may help to give an answer is whether economic considerations, and the very complexity and extent of the preoccupations which face the Soviets in the international field today, will lead them not only to set a limit to their ambitions, but also to work for genuine settlement with the West.

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The Alliance certainly has no interest in the sharpening of tension between the Soviet Union and China and even less in the outbreak of hostilities between them. However, both the ideological and national differences between the two countries are so profound that it is difficult to imagine anything other than a limited reconciliation between them. The most likely outcome seems to be a state of continuing tension. The effect of this on the Soviet Union may well be to reinforce rather than reduce its preoccupation with maintaining its influence in Eastern Europe. The effect on China may well be to postpone still further any chance of Chinese readiness to play a more coöperative role on the international scene.

The foreign policies of the individual countries of the Alliance will continue to be concerned with many particular national interests and problems. For Britain, these will include the successful accomplishment of our withdrawal of military forces from the Far East and the Persian Gulf; the maintenance of Commonwealth links; and the safeguarding throughout the world of specific British interests. We shall remain intimately concerned with the progress of our dependent territories and the questions these responsibilities will pose. We shall still face the Rhodesian question and the dispute about Gibraltar. All the countries of the Alliance will share a continuing interest in the development of the United Nations, in disarmament, and in improving trade and economic relations within the developed world and between the developed and developing worlds. Despite these preoccupations, however, it seems that there will be no major issues, apart from Indochina and the Middle East (both of which are to some extent a function of East-West relations), likely to hinder the Alliance in the pursuit of its chief objectives: its own security, relations with the Soviet bloc, and West European integration.

II

So successful has NATO been in keeping the peace that there is a tendency, especially on the part of the younger generation, to question whether we any longer need such an alliance. But the facts speak for themselves. Unpalatable though it may be, we have to recognize that the very considerable forces which the Soviet Union continues to deploy in Eastern Europe constitute a serious potential military threat to the security of the West.

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We cannot ignore the fact that there are some 30 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe now and many more in the western Soviet Union within easy striking distance of NATO territory. Moreover, the Soviet Union has developed its strategic nuclear forces to the point where they are broadly comparable to those of the United States. The Soviet government is clearly determined to maintain that position, and it is plain that NATO's defensive role is as vital now as it has ever been.

I therefore welcome the reaffirmation which President Nixon has given on more than one occasion of the importance which he attaches to the Alliance. In the report, U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, which he submitted to the Congress on February 18, 1970, he stated that the security of Europe and that of the United States are inseparable, using the graphic phrase: "We can no more disengage from Europe than from Alaska." The course of events in two World Wars offers ample evidence for the point.

I also welcome the emphasis which President Nixon has placed on the need for partnership in the Alliance. Partnership in this context has two aspects; sharing in discussions and decision-making within the Alliance and sharing the burden which the maintenance of an effective defensive capability imposes on the Alliance as a whole. During the coming months the Alliance will be facing difficult and delicate decisions in a number of areas. In tackling these it will be crucial that an appropriate balance is struck between the European and American contributions. A good example of the kind of consultation which makes sharing in decision-making meaningful is provided by the Nuclear Planning Group. There nuclear and non-nuclear members of the Alliance participate equally in planning affecting the nuclear deterrent. The United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany have, for instance, recently completed and had approved by their allies a paper laying down guidelines for the initial tactical and defensive use of nuclear weapons. The United Kingdom, like the other members of the Alliance, has also greatly valued the intensive and detailed consultations that have taken place with the United States in the North Atlantic Council on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. Of particular significance in the immediate future will be the consultation, now getting under way, on some of the questions raised in President Nixon's report to the Congress on U.S. foreign policy.

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The members of the Alliance will together be looking at how best to deploy their joint resources for effective implementation of the current strategy of flexible response—the strategy best suited to the requirements of the situation we all face.

It would be unrealistic to expect that members of the Alliance will under present circumstances readily accept increases in their expenditure on defense. The most practicable way for the Europeans to improve their contribution to the Alliance's overall effort—as we recognize will be necessary in the years ahead—is through European defense coöperation. It is for this reason that the Euro-Group was established within NATO. While the Euro-Group has no formal terms of reference, no institutional characteristics, and indeed no official existence, it serves to clarify European thinking and interests in various basic Alliance issues. Within the Group, which functions at the working level, the Permanent Representative level and the Ministerial level, continuing attention is given to practical ways and means of improving European coöperation and coördination in the defense field.

Progress toward a greater degree of European defense coöperation is consistent with the overall trend in Western Europe toward closer political and economic integration. We have to bear in mind the need to ensure that developments in all three fields are compatible with each other. There is no reason to suppose that movement in this direction will weaken the Atlantic Alliance. On the contrary, the creation of a European identity within the Alliance is clearly the way to give reality to President Nixon's concept of partnership: as he has said, the European members of the Alliance "will deserve a voice in the Alliance and its decisions commensurate with their growing power and contributions." It should also not be overlooked that European defense coöperation may provide a way of helping France to move back into closer military coöperation with the other members of the Alliance. This will be a key issue if Europe is to play its rightful role in meeting the challenges the Alliance will face in the seventies.

III

As I have already pointed out, the North Atlantic Alliance is a natural and necessary response to the continuing divisions between East and West and to the military and political confronta-

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tion in which these divisions have resulted. The unity and strength of the Alliance are important, not only in order to defend its members, but also in order to provide a firm base from which to negotiate with the other side and so remove the fundamental divisions. Like President Nixon, I believe that we may now be entering an era of East-West negotiations; I very much hope so; the British government has always worked hard to reduce the areas of difference between ourselves and the communist world. No more than anyone else do we enjoy paying for a large military establishment; nor do we like to live with the continued risk that the unresolved conflict between East and West could erupt into a wholly destructive war. Moreover, as a democratic government we face a task, from which our Soviet counterparts are exempt, of repeatedly justifying our dispositions to our public opinion and demonstrating that the rigidities of East-West relations are in no way attributable to lack of effort or vision on our part.

Yet, when we embark on negotiations, we must not forget that in talking to the Russians weakness is not a virtue, and that an obvious willingness to surrender positions on our side or to make unilateral gestures is not necessarily the best way of getting the Russians to discuss real questions of substance, far less to make concessions. This is why any approach to negotiations on our part can only go hand in hand with a firm determination to maintain the cohesion and military credibility of the Alliance. Only by so doing will we be able to convince the Russians that they can get something of what they want if they let us have something of what we want in return.

This is the background against which I see negotiations developing on three main themes of the greatest importance—both to the Europeans and to the Americans—the global negotiations between the superpowers, especially the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; negotiations about the political problems of divided Europe; and negotiations intended to scale down the massive confrontation of soldiers and weapons now facing one another across the center of the continent.

IV

Probably the most important development in the dialogue between the superpowers is the talks on strategic arms limitation, begun in Helsinki last December and resumed in April in

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Vienna. It is obviously in the interests of the NATO Alliance that the burden laid on its major partner by the costs of preserving the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent should be limited, and that the nuclear arms race should be abated. It is encouraging that both appear to be engaging in the talks with a genuine desire to reach agreement. I am confident that the U.S. government will not lose sight of the need to maintain the credibility of its nuclear commitment to Europe. As to the nature of an agreement, with our nuclear experience Britain is well placed to appreciate the problems involved in reaching any accord. All members of the Alliance must recognize the advantages of setting any agreed level of strategic nuclear armament as low as possible. However, the development of interacting systems, and in particular the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) and Multiple Independently Targeted Reëntry Vehicle (MIRV) systems, makes this more difficult as time goes on. I hope it is not too late to limit them. The progress of the talks will have its effect on the climate of discussion of political ways of assuring peace in Europe.

In dealing with the political problems of European security, one must realize that not all the problems of divided Europe are immediately tractable. There is, however, a prospect of fruitful negotiations on the questions of Germany and Berlin. For here the three Western powers—together with the Russians, their erstwhile wartime allies—retain their rights and are directly involved in any search for progress on the German problem. Our rights in this respect will remain paramount until such time as a final peace settlement is negotiated. It is on this basis that we and our French and American allies talk with the Russians about the situation in and around Berlin. I believe that the Soviet Union shares a common interest in maintaining the rights of the Four Powers in Berlin, and that there is indeed a general recognition that no lasting progress can be made on the German problem unless the situation in Berlin is put on a more satisfactory and firmer basis. At the same time the British government has of course warmly supported Herr Brandt in his efforts to improve the Federal Republic's relations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Eastern Europe, and to negotiate an adequate modus vivendi between the two parts of Germany. The Federal Government has, in embarking on its new policy, shown the fullest realization of the desirability of keeping in close touch with its allies.

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Negotiations on the political problems of divided Europe are only half the story. There is also the question of force levels. As I have already said, the existence of such large forces in Central Europe is not only expensive; it helps to perpetuate the existing state of tension. This is why the West proposed in June 1968 that the other side should join with us in studies of the possibility of mutual and balanced force reductions. We think that both sides should have a real interest in such reductions, provided that they can be so conducted as to maintain unimpaired the degree of security which each side now enjoys by virtue of its existing defense arrangements. Clearly, neither we nor the other side could contemplate reductions which weakened our relative capacity to defend ourselves. At the same time both we and the Warsaw Pact countries have a positive interest in diverting funds from military purposes to those of peace.

The other side, however, has so far shown no interest in discussing the problem. The Soviet Union argues that it is a problem more suitable for the disarmament talks at Geneva; that it is too complex for early discussion; even that it has been advanced by the West only to divert attentions from the Warsaw Pact's own suggestion that there should be an "all-European conference" to agree on a declaration for nonuse of force, and on arrangements for economic, technical and scientific coöperation, between East and West. This is, of course, not so. We ourselves are not opposed to a European security conference. But what is really important is that there should be substantial, and successful, talks on matters of real importance.

Such talks have already begun—on German questions and in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The Soviet proposal for a conference is primarily a proposal about procedure. There is room for legitimate discussion about whether an all-European conference is the best procedural device for forwarding the interests of European security at the present moment. There may be other devices, such as some form of continuing East-West machinery. All these possibilities are now being examined in NATO.

In the last analysis, what matters is not the form but the content, not the procedures but the will to make them work. One cannot get away from the fact that there must still be doubts about whether the Russians have that will, and these doubts are still the major cause of insecurity in Europe. European security

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requires security for all states in Europe and that means full sovereignty, without arbitrary limitations, for all. We must probe the Russians for any signs of willingness that they are prepared to do business. They have in the past reversed their position entirely, and come to genuine agreements with the West where none had seemed possible. They did so in Austria in 1955. They may do so again. The West cannot afford to let any such opportunity pass. If progress cannot be achieved, it will not be due to any lack of will on our part.

V

The best if not the only way for Western Europe to pull its weight in the struggle to achieve a balanced and stable partnership with North America and to break down the barriers to East-West understanding is through the progressive construction of a united Europe. A united Europe will be able to maintain European influence in a world where the superpowers are likely to play a predominant role. A divided Western Europe would have little influence on world events.

I shall not attempt in this article to define the modalities of European unity, or the exact shape which a united Europe will have 5, 10 or 20 years from now. It has been increasingly assumed in Western Europe, including the United Kingdom, that the Community road is the right road to follow. Since the British application in May 1967 we have made it clear that we believe that Europe can emerge as a Community expressing its own point of view and exercising influence in world affairs, not only in the commercial and economic but also in the political and defense fields. Britain wants to play a full part in this process. That remains our position.

Much has happened in Europe in the three years since our application. There have been changes in France and in Germany. There has been the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The recovery of the British balance of payments has transformed our own situation. But none of this has changed the government's determination to embark on negotiations, nor the determination to see them succeed on terms fair to all. We have a great deal to give to Europe, and thereby to the West as a whole. If negotiations were to fail it would be a grave loss to Europe as a whole as well as to the United Kingdom.

My predecessor, George Brown, set out the reasons for the

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British application and the issues which we wish to see settled in negotiations in his historic statement to the Western European Union in July 1967. The government has confirmed that this remains our position. We want negotiations to be confined to the few major issues set out in that statement. We are prepared to see those questions upon which the main issue of success or failure does not depend settled afterwards under Community procedures. We want negotiations to be completed as speedily as possible in order to join with our future partners—as we hope—in the work to be done in moving toward European unity.

It is widely recognized in Europe that it is not advisable at this stage to lay down a blueprint for integration in the fields of foreign policy and defense in the same way as has been done with a great measure of success for economic questions. Nor is it possible at this stage to say what new institutions would have to be set up to cover the development of an integrated Western Europe. But while the measures to be taken in the medium term will have to be decided pragmatically, the longer-term aim is clear.

The efforts we in Europe have made since the war to achieve greater unity have taken a variety of forms; some have been pursued by one group of European countries, some by another group. These groupings have naturally overlapped with each other, but they have not consisted of exactly the same countries in each case. In looking to the future, and to the longer term, there must be provision for the fusion of these groupings into a single group. The field open to European integration is a very wide one. At the end of the day members of the Community will have to be prepared to accept its full political, military and economic obligations. It would be very much a second best, and would hamper progress across the board, if some European countries were to abstain from integration in certain fields.

It is impossible at this stage to predict what institutions will be needed as European integration goes forward. These will have to develop pragmatically as countries increasingly perceive their common interest, as they grow more confident that they can pursue that interest more effectively together, and as they perceive what institutions will help to make the expression of Europe's interests more forceful. The development of institutions toward political unity may well be needed to make the best of the tremendous opportunities for Europe which lie ahead in the

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seventies and the eighties—most of all the opportunity to restore Europe's influence and standing in the world.

At the same time as we believe in the emergence of an integrated European community expressing its own point of view and exercising its own influence in world affairs, we must bear in mind the need to avoid creating further divisions within Western Europe. Some countries in Europe might be prepared to accept all the obligations laid down in the treaties establishing the European Communities but would hesitate to assume less specific but nevertheless equally important obligations for the future, connected with progress toward political unification. This is a real problem, and a solution will have to be found in the next few years. But it will be found only by reference to the main principles I have tried to sketch out.

In the economic field it has sometimes been suggested that an enlarged Community will seek to become a closed trading bloc and will undermine the progress made since the Second World War in the liberalization of world trade. This is not so. The existing Community's increasing strength and unity in the economic field already oblige it to take increasing account of the interests of third countries. As the Community becomes bigger in numbers and in economic strength it will have to think even bigger, too. It would be quite contrary to the interests of an enlarged Community to put up its shutters against world trade. A liberal trade policy is quite compatible with the attempt to build up an economic system and advanced technological industries in Europe which could compete on equal terms with the United States—something the original donors of Marshall Aid had in mind. A strong Europe will also contribute to the development of international monetary coöperation.

In the political field a Europe of this kind will give the United States the strong partner it requires and will enable Europe to contribute more in sharing the worldwide burdens of which the United States has borne so large a part since the Second World War. I am particularly thinking of aid to the developing countries. A Europe of this kind will represent a new and distinct force on the international scene, but not a "Third Force" in the sense that it will deliberately seek to adopt policies or strike attitudes divergent from those of its major ally. On the contrary it will have every interest in retaining the closest links with the United States. Even if we may occasionally argue about methods,

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the West Europeans share with the North Americans the same fundamental attachment to human rights and the rule of law.

VI

The policies and program I have described are ambitious. There can be no doubt that Europe has the necessary economic resources to undertake its tasks. The European Community's record of economic growth in the last 10 years speaks for itself. The economic position of Britain has been transformed. One measure of this is the turn-around in our balance of payments. The surplus we are now running, coupled with the confidence in sterling it has helped to engender, has enabled us to pay off most of our short-term external debt. To some extent this success can be attributed to the devaluation of 1967 and the supporting measures we have taken since then in the fiscal and monetary fields. More important, however, for our longer-term growth and viability is the way in which our balance-of-payments achievements are being underpinned by an extensive program of industrial and technological reform. The encouragement of investment, the setting up of the Industrial Reorganization Corporation, schemes for industrial training, emphasis on the need for better management and the encouragement of management training—these and many other measures are all contributing to a progressive modernization of the British economy and growth of productivity.

We have, then, the resources. Do we have the political will? Our future European partners must speak for themselves. I am content to note that all the governments of the Six have expressed themselves in favor of British entry into the European Communities and such tests as there have been of West European public opinion have indicated that there is strong support for a more closely integrated Western Europe, including the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, the House of Commons voted in 1967, by an overwhelming majority, to support the government's decision to apply for membership in the European Communities. Our three major parties have repeatedly reaffirmed their support for the government's policy of seeking negotiations. Over the past decade there has been a decisive shift of informed opinion in Britain in favor of full involvement in Europe. There is no question of that shift of opinion, which took some considerable time to come, being reversed in a hurry.

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It is true that largely because of anxiety about a rise in food prices, there is a fluctuating majority who answer "No" to the question "Do you want Britain to join the European Communities?" However, a large majority both support the opening of negotiations and expect Britain to join the Community. A certain lack of general interest in the idea of a united Europe is natural after 10 years' waiting to join the Communities. But the leadership in every walk of life and the younger generation are decisively in favor of British entry. Public opinion can be expected to take a more positive attitude when negotiations have started and look like succeeding.

Throughout the Alliance none of our policies will be of any value unless they can command popular support. This support will depend to some extent on people's judgment of narrow economic and political advantage, but far more on their assessment of broader social and political objectives. Equally necessary is that our domestic policies should live up to and demonstrate the validity of our professed ideals. Our whole system will lose its dynamic and prove rotten at the core unless we can show that democracy is the best instrument for meeting the major challenges of our time—racialism, technological change, the revolution of rising expectations, the conflicting requirements for central economic management and devolution of authority. We must continue to show that ours is not only the efficient society, but also the humane society.

Fortunately our strongest critics in this respect are close at hand. Throughout the West younger people in particular have demonstrated their preoccupation with the need for improvement in the quality of life, their concern with social problems and problems of the environment, their desire for more participation, and their suspicion of conventional concepts of authority, freedom and government. It is important that there should be a clear response to these concerns. Without popular support there is no chance of our carrying through the complex programs of transatlantic partnership, closer West European integration and East-West talks. Such support will be forthcoming only if we can show that our domestic and external policies are two sides of the same concern and if we emphasize the opportunities which they offer us for achieving better conditions both in our own countries and throughout the rest of the world.

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CAN THE UNITED NATIONS BE REVIVED?

By Richard N. Gardner

TWENTY-FIVE years after the League of Nations was born a successor organization was being formed at San Francisco. This fate, at least, has been spared the United Nations. The United Nations is not dead. But it certainly is ill. It is suffering, even supporters admit, from "a crisis of confidence," a "decline in credibility," and "creeping irrelevance." However we define it, the fact is that the world organization is being increasingly bypassed by its members as they confront the central problems of the time.

To be sure, a negative diagnosis of the patient's condition requires some qualification. One can argue that the important thing to say about the United Nations is not that it has fulfilled so few of its ambitious mandates, but that it has accomplished so much in the face of all the difficulties inherent in the international situation. The achievements of the organization are real and are worth recalling even though we may tire of hearing them recited at U.N. Day celebrations. The United Nations *has* helped prevent or contain violence in Cyprus, the Middle East, the Congo, Kashmir and other trouble spots through peacekeeping and peacemaking missions. It *has* launched an unprecedented effort to raise living standards in the less developed countries through its network of Specialized Agencies and special programs. It *has* speeded the process of decolonization and eased the transition to independence for over a billion people. It *has* done an impressive amount of lawmaking, not only in the field of human rights, but in such areas as outer space and the oceans. Before we yield to the temptation to write the United Nations off as wholly ineffective, we might ask ourselves what the world would have been like during the last 25 years without it.

The twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, however, is an opportunity not just to celebrate past achievements, but to launch a continuing process of renewal and reform. If this process is to begin, we must pull no punches in analyzing the current state of the world organization. The United Nations today probably enjoys less confidence on the part of its members and the public at large than at any previous time in its history. The

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obvious reason is its demonstrated inability to deal with the central problems of war and peace in the world. It is hard to explain to people in most countries why the organization cannot do something to bring peace to Vietnam. It is hard to explain to Arab and Israeli opinion why it cannot assure a just settlement in the Middle East. It is hard to explain to African opinion why it does not implement its innumerable resolutions calling for an end to colonialism and racial discrimination in Rhodesia, South West Africa, South Africa and the Portuguese territories. It is hard to explain to American opinion why the United Nations does nothing to prevent the Soviet Union from suppressing liberty in Czechoslovakia or stop communist support for "wars of national liberation." It may even be hard to explain to opinion in communist countries—and elsewhere too—why the United Nations is silent in the face of unilateral U.S. actions in the Dominican Republic and Southeast Asia.

The decline of the United Nations is particularly notable in the United States, the country which took the leading role in its formation and provided far and away its greatest single source of support. Relations between Washington and the world organization turned sour during the Article 19 crisis and became increasingly abrasive during the late Johnson years over Vietnam and the U.N. role in the Arab-Israeli crisis. The Secretary-General's abrupt withdrawal of UNEF and the pro-Arab bias of certain U.N. resolutions alienated opinion in the administration, Congress and the public at large. The present American attitude toward the organization, however, is less irritation than indifference. The Nixon administration pays little attention to it in the conduct of foreign policy, and American leadership in the world body has declined to an all-time low. Despite the noble efforts of a revitalized United Nations Association and other nongovernmental organizations, the American people seem less interested in the United Nations than ever before—as may be verified by the empty galleries at U.N. meetings and the decline in coverage even by papers like *The New York Times*.

II

Can anything be done to revive the United Nations from this low estate? It is easy enough to assemble a shopping list of reform proposals, but such an exercise is sterile unless it is related at the outset to the political context in which the organization

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has to operate and to the fundamental causes of its illness. Moreover, proposals are worth making only if they are likely to yield significant benefits *and* have some reasonable prospect of approval from those members whose support is constitutionally and politically indispensable.

In a fundamental sense, the United Nations' problems are not so very different from those that afflict the political institutions of its members. There is a crisis of authority—a trend toward lawlessness and violence—between as well as within nations. It is said of international as well as domestic institutions that they are insufficiently responsive to the times, that they have failed to promote change by peaceful means, and that their failure to act upon real grievances and real needs leaves no recourse but self-help. For many young people around the world, the United Nations is an ossified "establishment" just like many institutions of domestic government.

The analogy between the U.N.'s afflictions and those of national political institutions may help us come to grips with the central problem. If the institutions of domestic government do not work, we are quick to recognize that the fault lies with the people who have the responsibility to make them work. The responsibility in the United Nations lies with 126 governments. As one U.N. ambassador likes to say: "There is nothing fundamentally wrong with the United Nations—except perhaps its members." Virtually all members pay lip service to the United Nations while at the same time pursuing their short-term national interests, often at its expense. Virtually all members take a largely instrumental approach to the organization, citing Charter principles when they seem to yield a short-term advantage, ignoring them when they do not. This has always been true of the Soviet Union. What is profoundly disquieting, however, is that it is becoming increasingly true of other countries, including the United States. For example, the United States only asked itself how the United Nations could help it to do what it wanted to do in Vietnam—it never seriously asked itself how it should conform its Vietnam policy to its U.N. commitments. With few exceptions, U.N. members ask what the United Nations can do for them, not what they can do for the United Nations—or for the building of a civilized system of collective security and world order.

It is this attitude which explains the demoralization at U.N.

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headquarters today. Rules of procedure and past decisions of the organization are frequently ignored by members because they are temporarily inconvenient. References to Charter principles or other sources of international law are regarded with increasing cynicism. There has been a marked decline in third-party attitudes and a marked increase in the tendency to vote, not on the merits of a question, but with regard to bloc affiliations and the protection of other interests. If a clear and unambiguous case of aggression came before the Security Council or General Assembly today, there would be little confidence that a majority of the members would treat it as such and come to the aid of the victim.

Of course, the United Nations is a political institution. It is natural that members should seek to pursue their national interests through it. The question, however, is how they define those interests. The link between law and politics in the United Nations, as in any institution, is the expectation of reciprocity, the fear of reprisal, and the recognition that in the common interest of saving the community one cannot have one's way on every issue. For the world organization to work more effectively, its members will have to give greater priority to their long-term interest in building a civilized system of world order than to short-term considerations of national, ideological or racial advantage.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations recently said its members have 10 years left in which to subordinate their quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion and to supply the required momentum to world development efforts. After that, he warned, these problems would be out of control. U.N. delegates have repeatedly cited this ominous forecast in connection with the twenty-fifth anniversary. What is required, however, is for their governments to act as if they believe it. Each member, for example, might ask what changes in its own policies—not just in the policies of others—are necessary to revive the United Nations and save humanity from self-destruction. Only in such a spirit of self-criticism and open-mindedness could proposals for reviving the United Nations have any serious possibility of success.

The central contribution of the twenty-fifth anniversary, therefore, must be in helping U.N. members to redefine their national interests in the organization. Surprising as it may seem,

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few members have a clear idea of just what they want it to become. At a recent meeting organized by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), most of the delegates admitted that the present structure of international society was unsatisfactory and that by 1995—the fiftieth anniversary year—major changes would have to be made if the human race is to survive. Yet none of the delegates was in a position to present a preferred model of the future.

It is often said that politics is the art of the possible, but it is forgotten that politics is also the art of making possible tomorrow what seems impossible today. Even if few fundamental reforms in the United Nations prove possible on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary, the organization could launch some ventures that might make reforms more likely by 1995, or better still, by 1985 or 1975. This suggests that particular attention should be given now to such consensus-building activities as the seminars, studies and training activities of UNITAR, the strengthening of the public information area (with particular attention to the use of communications satellites and other new technology), the creation of a U.N. University and the establishment of a U.N. Service Corps in which volunteers from many U.N. member states could work side by side in U.N. programs.

III

There are 10 specific areas in which steps could be taken in the next few years, commencing with the twenty-fifth General Assembly, to make the United Nations a more effective instrument for the performance of its tasks. I believe they would serve the enlightened self-interest of all members, even though they would require almost every member to modify one or more of its present positions.

First, the United Nations should move as rapidly as possible toward universality of membership. This would mean offering admission to East and West Germany, North and South Korea, and North and South Vietnam, and it would mean acknowledging the People's Republic of China and Taiwan as successors to the membership of the Republic of China, with the Security Council seat assigned to the People's Republic. Agreement by the Permanent Members of the Security Council would be needed to secure the admission of the first three divided states, but the seating of Communist China and Taiwan under a suc-

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cessor state theory could be achieved by a vote of two-thirds of the General Assembly and by the procedural majority of nine in the Security Council, thus bypassing a possible veto by the Taiwan régime. The seating of all these régimes could be done in a way which did not prejudice the possibility of unification by peaceful means. While it is true that the problems of the two Germanys, the two Koreas, the two Vietnams and the two Chinas are all different, a "package deal" on all of them would make it easier for many countries to swallow their opposition to the seating of one or more. Such a bold step would give the United Nations opportunities it now lacks for assisting peaceful settlements in Indochina and Korea, as well as elsewhere, would open new channels of communication between the two halves of these divided states, and would enhance the long-term potential of the organization for dealing with such global problems as development, population and environmental defense. New steps should also be taken to encourage Switzerland to seek membership, in recognition of the diplomatic as well as financial resources which the Swiss could make available. If the twenty-fifth General Assembly is not prepared to seat these states immediately, it could at least appoint a committee to study how universality of membership might be achieved. The committee could provide an opportunity for key members like the United States and the Soviet Union to reassess their positions. It could also recommend interim steps toward universality—the adherence of all states to multilateral conventions and invitations to all states to participate in such U.N. meetings as the 1972 Stockholm conference on the environment.

Second, a special effort should be launched to streamline and improve the procedures of the General Assembly. Some of the reforms would be relatively modest—starting meetings on time, organizing the debate around groups of items, enforcing the rules against repetitive or irrelevant interventions, encouraging delegates to limit their remarks and submit more detailed statements for the record. The Assembly could also consider a more fundamental reform: it could eliminate the time-consuming general debate. In its place governments could submit written statements on the world situation in advance of each Assembly, on the basis of which the General Committee, with the help of an analytic summary by the Secretariat, could draw up a provisional agenda. Any member could insist on adding an item to this

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agenda, but it would have to take a special initiative to do so, and this might reduce the number of "hardy perennials" that are debated each year to no advantage. Under a reform of this kind, heads of state, prime ministers and foreign ministers could gather at the end of each Assembly rather than at the beginning to resolve major issues, assess the results and agree on measures to follow up the General Assembly's decisions. Consideration should also be given to ways of changing the Assembly's main committees from committees of the whole to committees of 45 members or so, even though the political obstacles to doing this are obviously great.

Third, a beginning should be made at reducing the gap between voting power and real power in the world organization. One measure already under consideration would be to offer "ministates" associate membership in the organization with the privilege of circulating documents and addressing meetings, but without the privilege of voting and the burden of paying a share of U.N. expenses. Hopefully some of the ministates already in the United Nations as well as those that are expected to apply for membership could be persuaded to accept this new status. Even with such an arrangement, however, there would still be a great disparity between voting power and real responsibility for implementing U.N. decisions. This problem exists even in the Security Council where, despite the Charter stipulation that members be chosen with regard to their contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security, six of the 10 elected members currently pay the minimum .04 percent toward the expenses of the organization. The members might well consider some formula under which five of the 10 elective seats could be reserved for 10 middle powers (*e.g.* Japan, India, Italy, Brazil and the U.A.R.), which would thus be guaranteed a place on the Council for two out of every four years. In the General Assembly, where the disparity between voting power and real power is even greater, more use could be made of small committees (*e.g.* a Peacekeeping Finance Committee of 21) in which the large and middle powers would have a greater proportion of places than they have in the Assembly as a whole. To make such a committee system fully effective the Assembly would have to agree that resolutions could be adopted only when they had been approved both by the small committee and the General Assembly—in effect a bicameral arrangement. More

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fundamental—and probably incapable of adoption in the short run—would be a system of dual voting (double majorities), under which certain kinds of resolutions would be considered adopted only when approved by the regular two-thirds majority including a majority of the large and middle powers. It is frequently argued that no reforms along these lines will be possible, since they require the approval of the small countries which now have the voting majority. Certainly such reforms will not be easy. But they may not be impossible if the small countries can be convinced that reforms would result in a United Nations more effective on matters of interest to them—and that in the absence of such reforms the major powers will increasingly bypass the organization on matters of substance.

Fourth, concrete steps can be taken to strengthen the U.N. peacekeeping machinery. All member states have a long-term interest in strengthening this machinery. Both the United States and the Soviet Union have experienced the perils of unilateral involvement. Both the superpowers, and the world as a whole, would benefit from a policy of reciprocal abstention by the superpowers from local conflicts and a strengthened U.N. capacity to patrol borders, supervise elections and verify compliance with nonintervention norms. Since the Soviet Union has now conceded that peacekeeping operations may be validly authorized outside of Articles 42 and 43, it may be possible to agree on guidelines for wholly voluntary operations when undertaken by the Security Council. These guidelines could provide for a committee of the Council consisting of the Big Four and troop-supplying countries to advise the Secretary-General on the conduct of each peacekeeping operation, although the Secretary-General would maintain sufficient operational control to assure peacekeeping effectiveness. Members of the Council could also agree to support financially operations carried forward in accordance with these guidelines. The question of the residual powers of the General Assembly to launch peacekeeping operations where the Council is unable to act can best be left open, in anticipation of the day when Peking may be occupying a Security Council seat. Beyond all this, the membership could make its most tangible contribution to peacekeeping by establishing a peace fund of $100 million or more, with substantial contributions from both the United States and the U.S.S.R., to liquidate the organization's deficit, retire the U.N. bonds and

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provide a modest amount for future peacekeeping emergencies.

Fifth, new measures can be taken to strengthen procedures for peaceful settlement and peaceful change. The United Nations was intended to be an instrument for the settlement of disputes, not merely a forum where they could manifest themselves. There is need for new methods for settling disputes that can provide a cooling-off period for the fever of controversy to subside, that can mobilize opinion behind a reasonable settlement, and that can enable international agencies to take responsibility for outcomes for which the parties themselves cannot take responsibility. To this end, regular closed meetings of the Security Council could be held at the Foreign Minister level to discuss international problems. Greater use could be made of individuals or small committees of the Council to meet with the parties to disputes and explore possibilities of settlement. A panel could be created of persons available for fact-finding and mediation, and U.N. members could be requested to agree in advance to accept the use of the panel in disputes to which they were parties, even though they might reserve the right to challenge the facts found or settlements recommended by the panel members. New efforts could be made to encourage the Security Council to recommend terms of settlement in particular disputes, and the Permanent Members could agree not to employ the veto to prevent the Council from discharging its responsibilities in this way under Chapter VI of the Charter.

Sixth, the U.N. system should begin a step-by-step program of institutional reform to put it in a position to handle a much larger volume of technical assistance and preinvestment aid. The case for carrying on this work on a multilateral basis, and for channelling a much larger share of development capital through the World Bank and regional banks, is increasingly understood in most of the aid-giving and aid-receiving countries. But if the volume of U.N. technical assistance and preinvestment aid is to rise in the next decade, as it should, from the present level of approximately $200 million a year to something like $500 million, the system for delivering that aid will need further improvement. New efforts are needed at headquarters and in the field to assure a more unified effort between the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies in support of country development plans. The measures needed to achieve this end are now under discussion—having the Governing Council of the U.N.

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Development Program approve three to five-year programs of assistance to particular countries rather than individual projects, and increasing the quality and authority of the U.N. resident representatives. Studies should also be launched of more fundamental and long-term reforms, such as the creation of a Director-General for Economic and Social Affairs at U.N. headquarters, with the power to direct the work of the headquarters institutions, semi-autonomous bodies and Specialized Agencies (except for the Bank and Fund). The pressing problems of development, population growth and the environment transcend the old-fashioned functional categories of agriculture, health, labor and the like. The United Nations cannot be effective in dealing with these problems unless its institutional pattern is revised in recognition of this fact.

Seventh, the United Nations should put itself in a position to respond to the important new challenges which science and technology have thrust upon it. The phrase "science and technology" appears nowhere in the U.N. Charter, yet the new tasks the organization will be called on to perform in this area, little dreamed of at San Francisco, may prove to be among its most important. The time has come for the United Nations to deal with science-related questions, including outer space, seabed and other resources, population and the environment, in a more unified and professional way. To this end the General Assembly should establish a new committee on Science, Resources and Environment in place of the Special Political Committee (whose few items could be transferred to other committees). The Secretariat should establish a new Department for this same work headed by an Under-Secretary or Assistant Secretary. The present Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology for Development could be given a broader mandate and become an expert committee advising on scientific questions in this broader sense, not only as they affect developing countries, but as they affect developed countries as well. If reforms of this kind were undertaken, it might be possible to attract outstanding scientists to work in the U.N. Secretariat and serve on national delegations as members of the new General Assembly Committee, thus adding an expertise currently lacking in U.N. science work. These reforms would make it possible for the organization to stimulate and carry out new measures for global coöperation in outer space, the seabed, the environment and population con-

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trol which could, of course, serve the interests of all members.[1]

Eighth, special attention should be paid to a largely underdeveloped area of the Charter—the implementation of human rights. For most of its first quarter-century, the United Nations has focused on the rights of peoples to self-determination, but has paid less attention to the rights of individuals within nations, whose dignity and worth are affirmed in the opening lines of the U.N. Charter. True, the organization has developed an impressive body of human rights law in the form of Conventions and the two broad human rights Covenants. Further efforts to secure wider adherence to these instruments would be useful (the United States, which has one of the least impressive records in this regard, could ratify the Genocide Convention as well as the other instruments before the Senate). But what is most needed in the human rights area now is not more law, but a more effective system for implementing the law we already have. The establishment of a High Commissioner for Human Rights, discussed at recent General Assemblies, would represent a major step forward. Although he would have no enforcement powers, he could make regular reports on the performance of member states in meeting their human rights obligations and lend his good offices to the Secretary-General, the Human Rights Commission and the General Assembly in dealing with specific human rights problems.

Ninth, a sustained program should be undertaken to revitalize the U.N. Secretariat. Even sympathetic observers have noted the progressive deterioration in the quality of staff and perhaps even in fidelity to principles of objectivity and impartiality. A comprehensive, high-level study of the Secretariat should be undertaken with a view to reversing this trend. The study should explore in particular certain remedial measures that now seem called for—a substantial raising of the U.N. salary scale, which has slipped seriously in the last decade relative to salary scales in member nations; increasing the number of fixed-term as opposed to career appointments, so that outstanding and independent-minded professionals and scientists who might be unwilling to serve with the United Nations for a lifetime can take leave of their national careers for three to five-year periods; and easing

[1] For specific proposals for new U.N. programs in these fields, see the author's statement, "New Tasks for the United Nations," in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Hearings on the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations, March 1970, p. 258.

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the excessive requirements of anonymity now imposed on civil servants, so that they may publish material under their own names. In addition, we need to explore ways of providing income supplements for citizens from developed countries like the United States, to match the difference between an employee's salary at the United Nations and the salary he would earn in his normal employment. This might be paid in the form of deferred compensation by the national employer, or it might be paid on a current basis by the organization itself from funds provided by a private foundation. One final point: It represents no lack of appreciation for the outstanding services of the Secretary-General and his Cabinet to note that most of them have served the United Nations for a decade or more at great personal sacrifice and that their average age is over 60. New leaders will be needed at the top of the U.N. pyramid in the 1970s to provide the dynamic leadership the organization needs.

Tenth, a major overhaul is needed in the United Nations' system of budget preparation and financial management. The world organization has lagged behind most of its major members by its failure to develop a modern planning, programing and budget system. Neither the Secretary-General nor any central group in the Secretariat shapes the U.N. budget with a view to overall priorities. The budget is shaped from the bottom up rather than from the top down—the result of a series of uncoördinated decisions by Secretariat units and specialized committees. It is still presented in the form of "inputs" (travel expenses, conference costs, salaries, etc.) rather than "outputs" (the delivery of specific services to members in the form of peacekeeping, human rights and development programs). New measures are also needed to deal with the problem of "taxation without adequate representation"—the five permanent members plus Japan pay 2/3 of the United Nations' costs, yet members whose total contributions equal 4-1/2 percent of the budget control 2/3 of the votes. The principal contributors to the U.N. budget, who have concentrated recently on joint representations to the Secretary-General and other agency heads, might pay more attention to building alliances with those less developed countries which share a common interest in reducing unnecessary U.N. costs. Further attention should also be paid to strengthening the work of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), and keeping it in virtually permanent ses-

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sion to analyze not merely the headquarters budget but also the budgets of the special programs and Specialized Agencies.

IV

No program to revive the United Nations can possibly succeed without strong leadership from the United States. To say this is not to minimize the responsibility or the contribution of other countries. Obviously, the United States cannot and should not do the job alone. But the facts of life are that the U.S. input into the system—political, intellectual and financial—has been essential to every successful U.N. action in the last 25 years. For obvious reasons, this is likely to continue to be so for the foreseeable future.

All this makes the present U.S. attitude toward the United Nations particularly distressing. The trauma of Vietnam and the preoccupation with domestic problems has reduced the role of the world organization in official and public opinion. This should not be the case. Our disenchantment with unilateral action should enhance our commitment to multilateral coöperation. We ought to recognize that our domestic problems cannot be dealt with effectively if the international ones are ignored. Yet at the present time the "low profile" of the Nixon Administration is even more evident in the United Nations than in some regions of the world. Presidential and other high-level statements about the organization have been notable for their blandness and lack of any forward motion on matters of substance. In both the U.S. Mission and in the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs the emphasis is on damage-limitation rather than institution-building. The commendable objective stated in the "Nixon doctrine"—that the United States should do less by itself and more in partnership with others—has yet to be given substantive expression so far as the United Nations is concerned.

The absence of any policy for strengthening the United Nations has been accompanied by increasing evidence of penny-wise pound-foolishness on U.N. budgetary matters. Congress has cut U.S. contributions to the U.N. Development Program to the point where the nation can no longer put in its traditional 40 percent of the total. Congress has even required that $2.5 million of the U.S. assessed share of the assessed budgets of U.N. agencies be paid in nonconvertible foreign currencies—a requirement

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which may well put us in violation of the U.N. financial regulations if implemented in full. The United States, which has rightly complained in the past of the failure of other U.N. members to meet their financial responsibilities, is now in danger of slipping into default itself. Although the principal responsibility for these actions rests with the Congress, it must be noted that the administration made no major effort to prevent them.

Everyone agrees, of course, that in the face of rising costs and pressing domestic needs every effort must be made to reduce unnecessary expenditures in the United Nations as well as elsewhere. What is inadmissible, however, is the assumption widely prevalent in the Appropriations Committees and in parts of the administration that increases in U.S. contributions to international organizations must be limited in proportion to limitations placed on the other parts of the federal budget. Total U.S. contributions to the U.N. system in 1969, including the Specialized Agencies and the voluntary programs, amounted to $250 million —less than the cost of the New York City Fire Department and less than one week's cost of the Vietnam war. This is for an enterprise we once called "man's last, best hope for peace."

The implications of this budgetary attitude for attempts to revive the world organization are obvious. American delegates are in the anomalous position of saying they favor U.N. initiatives in environment and population matters, for example, provided they don't cost money. (If we are serious in what we say about the urgency of the world's population problem, the U.N. Population Commission ought to meet annually, not just every two years, but under present directives U.S. delegates would have to oppose this on the ground of increased costs!) Obviously, so long as the current financial attitude persists, the United Nations will not be able to respond as it should to the new challenges confronting it. Moreover, and this is a point frequently overlooked in Washington, the United States will be in a poor position to press for needed reforms in the organization—for better coördination of assistance efforts, for a higher quality Secretariat or for more rational methods of making decisions—if it is disengaging from its financial responsibilities and narrowly circumscribing the conditions of its participation.

The revival of the United Nations, therefore, depends more than anything else on a new approach by its most important member. That approach can be summed up in a single sentence:

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the central preoccupation of U.S. foreign policy in the 30 years remaining in this century should be the building of effective international machinery to manage mankind's common problems. Such a policy of peace through partnership would mean a totally new emphasis on the United Nations as well as on regional agencies.

The implementation of such a policy would be assisted by a number of changes in the way the United States handles its participation in the organization. At the present time the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and the officials backstopping him in the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs are all career foreign service officers. They are dedicated and highly competent people, but they do not possess the political "clout" to assert the multilateral interest at the highest level of decision making. If the United Nations is to play a central part in U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. Ambassador should be a national figure who can telephone the President at will and command headlines in the press with his statements on world affairs. By way of reinforcing this kind of influence, the U.S. Ambassador should be made a regular participating member of the National Security Council, sitting with the Council at all times and not merely when it thinks it is discussing a "U.N. issue," since everything the Council does is relevant to how the United States is carrying out its responsibility under the Charter.

To support the Ambassador in this new role, the NSC staff should include a top U.N. specialist with direct access to the President—someone it does not now have. In addition, the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs might be raised to the rank of Under Secretary, with responsibility not only for U.S. policy in the United Nations but also for handling the Department's responsibilities in financial and technical aid. There is understandable resistance to increasing the number of Under Secretaries in the Department, but this particular proposal would have the important benefit of strengthening the Department's multilateralists in relation to its regional bureaus and to competing interests in other agencies of the federal government.

Other changes would be necessary if the United States were really serious about the importance of the United Nations. It should upgrade and revitalize its mission in Geneva at the Euro-

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pean headquarters of the organization and its missions to U.N. agencies located elsewhere, placing them under the leadership of qualified U.N. experts. Too often these posts have been treated as second-rate foreign service assignments or, even worse, as rewards for the politically deserving. How the United States chooses its public members for its General Assembly delegations is also a measure of how seriously it takes the United Nations. When the President's senior domestic adviser deals with the environment in NATO and a former child movie star deals with it in the General Assembly, foreign governments as well as the American people draw the logical conclusions as to the relative importance of the two institutions.

A new approach is also needed in the recruitment of Americans for the U.N. Secretariat. It is doubtful whether any U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations has spent as much time on this question in an entire year as on a major speech in the General Assembly. Yet the long-term consequence of U.S. policy toward staffing the organization is vastly more important. The Soviet Union, France and Britain all understand this, as is reflected in the attention their permanent representatives devote to Secretariat matters. In the period immediately ahead, the United States will be faced not merely with the problem of replacing Paul Hoffman and Ralph Bunche, but also with finding qualified persons to replace a whole generation of Americans who joined the United Nations in the early years and are now approaching retirement. What is needed is a major effort, supervised at the top levels of the U.S. Mission and the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, to identify those key positions where vacancies will occur and the qualified persons from the academic, professional and business worlds who can step into these assignments. Preparation for filling these vacancies needs to be undertaken months and even years in advance, unless the United States is to become increasingly dependent on assigning foreign service officers to fill such posts. Greater reliance on fixed-term appointments, the institution of special compensation for income losses by Americans in these posts, and relaxation of requirements of anonymity in the Secretariat, as suggested earlier, would be particularly helpful to U.S. recruitment efforts.

If the United States accords central importance in its foreign policy to the United Nations, it will adopt a more affirmative attitude toward its financial contributions. One important step

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in the right direction would be to remove the U.S. assessed contributions to the United Nations from the State Department budget, where they have grown as a proportion of the total from 1/6 to 1/3 over the last 15 years. It is absurd to have contributions to the United Nations competing with the jobs of foreign service officers and subject to the same standards of budgetary restraint as are applied to the budget of the foreign service establishment. The budgetary problem would be made more manageable, too, if Congress could eliminate the seniority system, so that the key Appropriations Committees could be chaired by men whose view of U.S. participation in the United Nations is at least as favorable as that of the Congressional leadership. A forthcoming U.S. attitude is needed, too, on expansion of the headquarters site in New York. Unless we are generous in meeting our responsibilities as hosts to the world organization pressure to locate additional U.N. functions overseas will be irresistible, and U.N. efficiency and U.S. influence will both suffer.

These measures to upgrade the level of U.S. participation in the United Nations and finance the world organization more generously do not mean that the United States should passively accept whatever seems to be the view of the U.N. majority or defer automatically to Secretariat leadership. On the contrary, a genuine commitment to strengthen world order would imply lobbying hard for peacekeeping, economic or budgetary reforms where we believe they serve the general interest. We have become unpopular enough in a number of bad causes; we should not be afraid to be unpopular in some good ones.

The most basic division in the world today is not between communists and non-communists, between blacks and whites, between rich and poor or even between young and old. It is between those who see only the interests of a limited group and those who are capable of seeing the interests of the broader community of mankind as a whole. The United Nations' twenty-fifth anniversary provides a special opportunity to speak for these broader interests.

Man's ability to transform the world is only limited, as Lester Pearson recently reminded us, by "faintness of heart and narrowness of vision." It is only these qualities, in the last analysis, that can prevent the members of the United Nations from restoring their organization to the central place it was intended to play in world affairs.

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THE SPOILS OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION

By John Womack, Jr.

THE Mexican Revolution is doing well—not the grievous struggle for justice that started 60 years ago, in the ancient past before the First World War, but the famous economic boom that Mexican entrepreneurs have executed in the present generation. The old days of revolt are gone—the days of dictators falling, grimy rebels storming into the towns, cotton choppers and mechanics debating in sovereign assemblies. The grand staging of the Olympics two years ago gave proof that the business of the Mexican Revolution is now business.

In Guadalajara and Ciudad Juárez, in Monterrey and León, in Puebla and Mexicali, in scores of smaller cities, above all in Mexico City, the shimmering new buildings teem with transactions and accountings into the future. Already Mexicans run up bills on three credit cards of their own nationality, *Bancomer, Bancomático* and *Carnet Bancario*. This summer the Bolsa, the sedate old stock exchange in downtown Mexico City, will very likely go as modern as Milan's Borsa or Tokyo's Kabutocho, to excite closed companies into public issues of stock, to relieve harried banks, to multiply private investment. Also this summer national elections will take place; and under the auspices of the government, in patriotic showers of red, white and green confetti, the party that (under similar auspices) has won the last seven presidential elections, the last 14 congressional elections, and the last 200 gubernatorial elections, will elect overwhelmingly its candidate, whose slogan is "Upward and Onward!"

Why did the old struggle for justice—violent, confused, but intent—turn into the new drive for development? How did the Revolution become a bonanza? Analysts of the metamorphosis disagree, whether they are Mexican or non-Mexican. Some accept the change as a case of the logic of revolution, Mexico's Reign of Virtue inevitably cooling into Mexico's Thermidor. Others allege that the change was a matter of choice, that until 1940 Revolutionary presidents deliberately pushed for social equality, and that since 1940 they have deliberately indulged native businessmen. Those resenting the bonanza decry the change as corruption, or subversion, if not betrayal. Those favor-

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ing the bonanza welcome the change as the Revolution's happy fruition. Of all the theories the last is probably the truest, although not for the reasons its advocates have adduced, and not in the spirit they have evinced.

Reviewed through an historical argument, the great change in the Mexican Revolution from 1910 to 1970 happened inadvertently. The gist is that the original Revolutionaries, genuine "sons of the people," never outgrew their memories of frustration, rarely imagined policies more creative than revindication, once in office discounted the chance of novelty in national or international affairs, and got surprised into development, which their heirs now enjoy and justify as if it had happened on purpose. Disappointment or delight, the change was a realization of popular prejudices that few Revolutionaries understood and none knew how to avoid.

Thus, beginning in 1910, several movements attacked the régime of Porfirio Díaz, a dictatorship that conceded foreign domination of the economy. Demanding free politics were the liberals, whose martyr was Francisco I. Madero. Demanding land were the villagers and peons, whose champion was Emiliano Zapata. And out for kicks and spoils were the rowdies, whose hero was Pancho Villa. Later, while these movements continued, there were gangsters, whose typical boss was Manuel Peláez, and a nationalist movement for a natively dominated economy, whose head was an old politico, Venustiano Carranza, but whose force came from entrepreneurial characters like Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles. Constituting altogether the original Mexican Revolution, they did destroy the Díaz régime. Then they fought among themselves, to settle which movement would predominate. As the costs of the fighting were awful, the expectations from victory were immense. But the Revolutionaries had no notion of developing the country. They assumed that the economy would naturally recover.

By 1920 the chiefs definitely in charge of Mexico were nationalist entrepreneurs. Sincerely believing that only the operations of their class would bring gains to their fellow citizens working in factories and fields, they established themselves as the guardians of the national welfare. Wary of foreign interests that remounted in the country, they fortified the Revolutionary state to defend their claim. In the process they constructed an official party that represented a new dictatorship. Throughout

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their generation they would try to resolve the contradiction between their authoritarian deals and their democratic ideals. But for 15 years they did not try the resolution of development. Nor was it going on by itself. By 1935 the real GNP and the population were each only 10 percent larger than in 1910, registering no economic growth.

From 1935 to 1940 a maverick Revolutionary president, Lázaro Cárdenas, sponsored dramatic reforms in Mexico's political and economic structures. Intending to give workingmen their own voice in the Revolutionary state, he sanctioned hundreds of strikes, entitled almost a million landless families to farm nationalized property, and coöpted confederations of industrial unions and agrarian leagues into the Revolutionary establishment. (Actually he consolidated the Revolutionary state's control over the working class, urban and rural, a control which later entrepreneurs would use to their advantage.) Development was on his mind, but only in vague visions. As a spokesman revealed, "We have dreamt of a Mexico of agricultural coöperatives and small industrial communities, electrified, with sanitation, in which goods will be produced for the purpose of satisfying the needs of the people; in which machinery will be employed to relieve man from heavy toil, and not for so-called overproduction." In his bravest burst of nationalism, Cárdenas expropriated the biggest foreign oil companies, guaranteeing domestic sources of energy for the new factories that he could only hope national entrepreneurs would found. During his reign the economy did grow. But the growth was less than one percent a year.

In 1940 the prevailing political wisdom was to retrench. In economic activities the incoming president recommended "sensible and patient" behavior. But suddenly and surprisingly, because the Second World War yanked the country into opportunities that Revolutionaries had not foreseen but that were rich and easy, Mexico began to develop. By no official plan the real GNP expanded through the decade by 70 percent, while the population expanded by 27 percent. The entrepreneurs had the initiative, and on their behalf the Revolutionary state held the industrial unions and agrarian leagues in subordination. That the real national income increased through the decade by almost a half, and that the share in profits and rents averaged 46 percent, while the share in wages averaged 24 percent, was a trend

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so sweet as to swell real gross national investment by 230 percent. Under President Miguel Alemán a second generation of nationalist entrepreneurs emerged, sharp, smooth and self-confident, ready to take foreign backing and still make their own decisions. Most noteworthy was their promotion of manufacturing, which almost doubled the volume of the country's industrial production. Despite inflation, devaluation of the peso, and slippage in real wages, the bonanza was on.

Through the 1950s the government had its economists give "technical" advice on development. In the abstract, the *técnicos* insisted on the welfare of all classes. "In practice," said the president in 1959, "there is no possible conflict between private enterprise and the state." The results of the collaboration were impressive. Despite repercussions from two American recessions, more inflation, another devaluation and major strikes, the real GNP expanded through the decade about 20 percent more than the population. Of the increased national income the share in profits and rents still averaged 45 percent, which swelled real gross national investment by 108 percent. The volume of industrial production again almost doubled.

In 1962 the government finally committed itself to devising a plan for development. Through the last decade the real GNP expanded annually about three percent faster than the population. Financiers and proprietors still thrived, and wage-earners still slumped. Real gross national investment rose 100 percent again. And the volume of industrial production more than doubled. By 1970 Mexico's economic growth is so spectacular that the Minister of the Treasury has to deny that it is miraculous.

II

As the development has been a surprise, so are many of its consequences. Now featured in the economy, for instance, is a significant American investment—around $1.5 billion, probably 12 percent of total investment in Mexico (which is double the proportion of all foreign investment in Latin America as a whole), and mightily packed into the country's mightiest corporations (like Asarco Mexicana, Celanese Mexicana, the Dupont complex, Union Carbide Mexicana). Also obvious is the concentration of wealth. Probably two-thirds of the private capital in the country is at the disposal of five percent of the entrepre-

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neurs. Almost half of the national income goes into the hands of one-tenth of the nation's families. These are virtual barons of the realm—Manuel Espinosa Yglesias, Miguel Alemán, Bruno Pagliai, Carlos Trouyet, Antonio Ruiz Galindo, probably 50 others not quite so magnificent but still bullish, all quick and heavy powers. And they put their wealth proudly on display, in their shiny Mercedes, their viceroyal mansions, their glorious weddings, their glamorous parties splashed in glossy color in the Sunday photo section. Meanwhile probably 75 percent of Mexican families live on $120 a month, or less; and sick of Revolutionary rhetoric, tired of grease and grit, craving room and rest and meat, they have turned bitter. To a nationalist convinced of the need for national independence and national harmony, this is a disturbing trend.

But even if the change in the Revolution was inadvertent, even if it is ultimately disturbing, the entrepreneurs now dominant in the country are determined to keep it in effect. Certainly they cannot dictate events. Since their interests vary, at least as they express them in the National Confederation of Chambers of Commerce, the Confederation of Industrial Chambers, and the National Chamber of Manufacturing Industries, they do not concentrate their pressure—they confederate, but do not concentrate. From another angle they must consider American interests, commercially and financially. Since Americans still do around 65 percent of Mexico's foreign trade, and since they now have big stakes in the country's biggest businesses, Mexican entrepreneurs shape their strategy in order not to scare them—to annoy them, which is fair enough, but not to scare them. From yet another angle they must consider other Mexican interests, the bureaucracy, the army and the confederations of industrial unions and agrarian leagues. That is, they must behave solicitously toward the political establishment, especially toward the president, who keeps the other major interests in line. Since the Mexican élite remains human, however brilliant its record of control, the entrepreneurs in charge adjust their pursuits in order not to provoke crises—problems, of course, but not crises.

Certainly also they are not deficient in feelings of national responsibility. Condumex, for instance, an Anaconda affiliate, maintains in Mexico City an excellent center for research on Mexican history. The Fundidora de Fierro y Acero helps support the best university in Latin America, the private Colegio de

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México in Mexico City. Companies do even take temporary losses in gestures reckoned in the service of the nation.

But the development in which the big entrepreneurs flourish is a system the big entrepreneurs will defend. On their own initiative and for their own benefit they define the terms in which their compatriots make their living—the competitive strain for profits and wages, the terms of capitalism. And they mean to go on defining them.

Politically they are determined to keep the régime they have, "a licensed democracy." Its canon that politics is administration is a principle they hold devoutly, deflecting public queries from major to minor authorities. Its close constraint on the struggle for office and the debate of issues is a policy they endorse, to confine contests to safe matches and to censor criticism of the country's development. This regulation they see as the strategic key to the nation's sovereignty. Without official controls on politics, Mexico would suffer serious internal conflicts, which would invite American interference, if not intervention. Without repression nationally, Mexico may not remain independent internationally. Government there is an exercise in schizophrenia, and in tragedy. But it is nevertheless resolute.

Typical of the approved politics is the recent amendment of the Constitution, to include single 18-year-olds among the electorate. (Married 18-year-olds already have the vote.) Procedurally the reform was always in official control. Two years ago the president allowed that single 18-year-olds should vote. Congressional committees then dutifully investigated the question. So did agencies in the official party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), and in the house opposition, the rightist Partido de Acción Nacional, the leftist Partido Popular Socialista, and the geriatric Partido Auténtico de la Revolución Mexicana. On official cues, praise resounded for the proposal. And last January the amendment became law. Moreover, the reform will improve official controls. The PRI is now organizing 14-year-olds, to save them from early political deviation and prepare them for electoral conformity. No fuss, no muss, no bother.

Objectionable politics is the kind no superior can "discipline." It ends in repentance, or badly. Reflect on the fate of Carlos A. Madrazo. In 1964 the incoming (now outgoing) president named Madrazo to run the PRI, and bade him, friend of the family, ardent political ally, and past master of intrigue, to re-

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form the party. Madrazo promptly advertised several shocking promises—open party primaries (rather than gubernatorially rigged rituals) to nominate candidates for municipal elections; university students in prominent party posts, to attract youth into the party; a Commission for Honor and Justice, to expel racketeers from the party; the formal registration of party members, to indicate how much patronage each sector of the party deserved; the collection of individual financial pledges, to build the party's own resources and release it from reliance on official subsidies. In prospect was the removal of the PRI from official control, the construction of an independent party. Even more shockingly Madrazo acted to fulfill his promises. At once he outraged the establishment and embarrassed the president, and in 1965 had to resign. But he would not properly retire. Continuing to politick publicly around the country, flattering the youth, bewailing economic inequities, finally fishing for a following among student rebels in 1968, Madrazo became a trial to the régime. He died in a suspicious plane crash near Monterrey last year.

III

Illegitimate politics, persistent politics without official license, always ends in disaster. The grimmest lesson is from the movement that broke out in 1968. Reported abroad as a student riot, described officially as a seditious conspiracy, this was at heart a civic movement for civil liberties. It had no particular martyr, champion, hero, boss, chief, sponsor or organization, only the solidarity of indignant citizens. Starting in Mexico City as a student defense of the universities against police intervention, it quickly matured into an offensive campaign of wide popular appeal against the government. Through the grand avenues of Mexico City—Insurgentes, Reforma, Juárez—not only students but also their parents, their teachers and many tens of thousands of office workers, housewives, shop workers, professionals and petty merchants marched in massive demonstrations to protest official abuse of civil rights. Militants demanded revocation of two articles in the Penal Code, 145 and 145A, which provide a sentence of two to 12 years for anyone convicted of spreading ideas that "tend to produce rebellion, sedition, riot or insurrection." Ordinary demonstrators demanded simply that the Constitution have the respect of men sworn to respect it. Out of the

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uproar the forbidden question came clear—If Mexico could afford the Olympics, could it not afford free politics? But the answer remained no, because free politics would introduce strategic risks that the nation's entrepreneurs would not admit—in an open régime their American rivals could press harder for advantages, while their native critics could press harder for redistribution of income, or even structural reforms. These dangers the government recognized in denouncing the demonstrators as tools of the CIA and the communists. All summer long in 1968 it tried to contain them, politically and forcibly. In a crisis just before the Olympics it had to crush the movement. And on the rainy evening of October 2, in Tlatelolco Plaza in Mexico City, the army surrounded a rally of 10,000 and machine-gunned the crowd, killing probably 50, wounding probably 1,000, arresting 1,500.

Official harassment still continues. Since the Tlatelolco massacre at least five small rallies of the movement in Mexico City have been violently dispersed. A few student leaders have been suspiciously murdered. Many others have gone into hiding, and at least three have gone into political exile—one ironically in Spain, another in Chile and another in the Uruguayan embassy. The poor souls that the police have in jail suffer special persecutions. When 81 of them in the Lecumberri Street prison in Mexico City carried on a hunger strike last winter, to protest their detention for more than a year without bail or trial, the warden had other inmates assault them. If they are not strictly "political prisoners," as the government insists, they are in a purgatory not far from the hell of those who are political prisoners in Greece or Brazil.

IV

The president due in December, Luis Echeverría, is a perfect paladin of the established régime. In 1945, as a sober, intense 23-year-old law student, one more bright young Mexico Cityian on the make, with no inheritance or connections to speak of, he married into a big political family wholeheartedly provincial and nationalist in the old Revolutionary style. A year later he was recruited into the PRI by its chief, and put through basic training for a modern career of national service. In 1954 he was awarded the third-ranking office at the Ministry of Education, from which post in 1956, after "communist-inspired riots" at the

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National Polytechnic Institute, he helped arrange the army's occupation of the school. In 1958 he graduated to undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, where he helped his superior, Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, arrange the routine PRI victories in congressional and state elections, crush a "communist-inspired" strike among railroad workers, and gather intelligence on Fidelista movements. In 1963, when Díaz Ordaz moved up to become president from 1964 to 1970, Echeverría moved up to minister of interior. There he had the responsibility for arranging the routine PRI victories, as well as the smashing of two big "communist cells," the military or police occupation of several state universities, the closure of a major leftist (Fidelista) magazine, the crushing of the 1968 movement (which involved military occupation of the National University and the Polytechnic), the imposition of the official script in TV and radio newscasts, and the correction of two PRI bungles of gubernatorial elections. Of the various presidential hopefuls last year, he was certainly the toughest, the handsomest, the canniest and the most discreet. Now that the army is feeling its oats, his civilian mastery of the mysteries of internal security makes him politically more attractive. Although Echeverría had never run for elective office before, he projected a fine charisma during the recent campaign.

The new president will probably direct a new political drama. Therein the bureaucracy is likely to play the villain, in an act of contrition for its suspected complicity in the 1968 movement. The army and industrial unions are likely to have sympathetic but only supporting roles, since they already received their rewards last year—a lavish military raise and an expensive Labor Law. Impoverished farmers are most likely to star as the deserving innocents. "If the vote of the people favors me and I am elected President of the Republic," the candidate said last fall, "I will not be able to sleep at night during the six-year term unless I have the certainty of having done that day something for the agricultural progress and the welfare of the peasants." Intellectuals he has tried to reassure that he will bear no grudge against their criticism. But on the strategic question of public action he has let slip no hint that he will mollify the official fury against objectionable or illegitimate politics. If in school, as he believes, "It is Revolutionary to study, . . . counter-Revolutionary not to study," then in matters of state it is Revolutionary to take orders for granted. By all signs the presidency of Eche-

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verría will be more vibrant and vigorous than the past administration, but no more liberal.

V

Economically Mexican entrepreneurs are determined to seize more initiatives in the boom. Their main concern is American investment, that it keep flowing in but that it not flood them. Speaking for the nationalist entrepreneurs, Echeverría has prescribed that foreigners who are technologically and financially necessary for development should have a "completely secondary" part in it. The formula for native primacy, however, is still only "Mexicanization," a conversion not compulsory but negotiable.

A classic case is the sulphur industry. Because of increasing American and European demands for the mineral, sulphur beds along the southern Veracruz coast were opened in the mid-1950s. As the demand went on growing, the Veracruz field became yet another Mexican El Dorado. Production expanded from 89,000 tons in 1954 to 1,650,000 tons in 1964. The profits of the successful were fat and steady, probably 15 percent to 25 percent a year. But for Mexican entrepreneurs the industry had two faults. It was an entirely American business, organized under the Pan American Sulphur Company (PASCO) and the Gulf Sulphur Corporation. And it was almost entirely for export, requiring Mexico's new chemical and fertilizer industries to import most of the sulphur they needed. In 1954 Mexican entrepreneurs started staking their claims. Through the government they first pressed PASCO, which did four-fifths of the business, to "Mexicanize." And in 1967 PASCO sold 66 percent of its stock to Mexicans. Shortly the Mexican demand for sulphur had a full Mexican supply. Then the pressure mounted on Gulf Sulphur, reorganized as the Gulf Resources and Chemical Corporation. Last year Gulf Resources was ready to sell 66 percent of its stock to Mexicans; when it could not get the price it wanted, it pulled out. Now the sulphur industry in Mexico is predominantly a Mexican business. The transfer was not, as Senator Russell B. Long complained here in defense of PASCO and Gulf Resources, "a subtle form of expropriation." PASCO, which was paid $66,000,000 for the stock it sold, only had to diversify its interests; on the 34 percent share it retained in the industry, it enjoyed a higher rate of profit than before. But the transfer was a form of nationalization, the enforcement of a

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Mexican entrepreneurial claim to benefit most from the resources on Mexican soil.

From other Mexican classes that might restrain them and reform the boom, pushing the state into so much production that the public sector devours the private, Mexican entrepreneurs have little to fear. With support from foreign loans the state does invest heavily in the economy, to the extent of 40 percent to 50 percent of total investment. The government, for instance, bought almost two-thirds of the stock that PASCO sold in 1967. But official investments, as the director of the biggest public investment bank never tires of explaining, are "fundamentally channeled into infrastructure"—to encourage private enterprise, not to displace it. The gross production of the private sector is three or four times that of the public sector. If Echeverría believes, as he says, that it is "those who live by their own labor . . . above all others, who are entitled to enjoy the fruits of the nation's progress," the entrepreneurs know that the progress goes "upward and onward" as they themselves above all others prosper. Indeed in the present economy, where labor is not at a premium, they prosper only as many others languish.

The Revolution having changed, and national capitalists having confirmed their claim to rule, they now knit Mexico firmly into the patterns of international capitalism. The only mortal danger to their régime would come from a rupture of the international finance and trade that are its matrix. Only then would the old grievous struggle strengthen in the country. Only then would the heritage of revolt have new partisans, ready for more fighting in the hope for justice. Until then the modern Mexican Revolution will go on in a flashy calculus of stability and growth, balance and development.

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ENTANGLING ALLIANCES

By David Fromkin

ALLIANCES, we had always felt, were not our sort of thing. They would involve us in obscure quarrels and sordid rivalries which were none of our concern. They seemed to be both undesirable and unnecessary in view of our special geographic and political circumstances.

"It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliance with any portion of the foreign world": it was George Washington's Farewell Address to us. The inaugural pledge of Thomas Jefferson was no less clear: "Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations—entangling alliances with none."

It became more than a policy; it became an expression of a national point of view about ourselves and our place in the world, a view which contrasted the simple virtues of our Republic with the subtle and complex qualities (some said corruptions) of Europe. From 1789 until the Second World War, excepting only our relationship with Panama, the United States refused to enter into treaties of alliance with anyone. In the 25 years since the end of the war, however, in a dramatic reversal of national policy, we have allied ourselves with half the world.

Was this wise? There has been a growing national sense of unease about the extent of our commitments, and more than a suspicion that we were imprudent to disregard the counsel of those who founded the Republic. There has been a feeling that we may have taken on too much in the way of military obligations abroad, especially in Asia. There has also been a sense of bafflement and frustration in trying to ascertain exactly what these commitments are which have sent our young men into the jungles and bogs of Annam and Tonkin, Laos and Cochin China.

After entering into the multilateral treaty which created the United Nations (the United Nations Charter), the United States negotiated three groups of alliances. The first—the Rio Pact—was contracted with the states of Latin America in 1947. The second—the North Atlantic Treaty—was contracted with the states of Western Europe in 1949. The third was the series of treaties with respect to Asia and the Pacific (including the SEATO treaty) which were contracted in the decade 1950–1960.

Our alliance relationships are not, of course, as tidy as this

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outline into groupings makes them seem. In addition to the three series of treaties described above there are some special cases: for example, a treaty with Liberia, reflecting historic ties; a treaty with Panama, because of the canal; a treaty with Pakistan, a remainder of which would become the CENTO Pact.

The Department of State informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1967 that in sum all of our treaties created alliance relationships with 42 countries. The count can never be really exact, because there is an ambiguity about the current status of some of the national signatures: Cambodia, for example, signed a Protocol to the SEATO treaty but subsequently indicated a lack of interest in receiving whatever protection the treaty might afford. Whether one counts Cambodia as a treaty ally or not, therefore, is open to question.

These, then, are our treaties of alliance. Were we wrong to conclude them? Was it because of them that we found ourselves pulled into the quicksands of Southeast Asia? Will they draw us into other conflicts we may not now foresee? What can or should we do about them?

II

Treaties of alliance are overvalued. In the century or more before 1941 the United States and Great Britain had no treaty of alliance, but acted as allies none the less. Where identity of interests exists between the parties, a treaty usually is not necessary; where it does not exist, often a treaty is not kept.

The first question to ask about any alliance commitment—that is, a commitment to go to war in given future circumstances—is: Why make it? In public as in private life, it is best to reserve decision until the event is known. The only thing we know with certainty about the future is that we do not know what it will bring. Therefore any advance commitment to take future action —especially the most extreme type of national action, going to war—should be contracted only with the utmost reluctance and only where there is an overwhelming necessity for doing so. As Palmerston once told Talleyrand:

> We have no objection to treaties for specific and definite and immediate objects, but we do not much fancy treaties which are formed in contemplation of indefinite and indistinctly foreseen cases. We like to be free to judge of each occasion as it arises, and with all its concomitant circumstances and not to be bound by engagements contracted in ignorance of the particular character of the events to which they are to apply.

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This gives rise to the standard which should be applied in reviewing commitments to defend allies against future attack: such commitments should be terminated unless it can be clearly shown they are vital to our national interests.

In this discussion, I shall divide our alliance commitments into three categories, which I shall call (1) de jure commitments; (2) apparent commitments; and (3) de facto commitments.

1. By "de jure commitments" I mean the category of promises which are binding at law and for the nonperformance of which, should we consent to be sued before an appropriate international tribunal, we would be held in default.

Contrary to what appears a widespread misapprehension, there is no outstanding de jure commitment by the United States, whether by treaty or otherwise, to go to war in defense of any foreign nation or nations whatsoever.

It is often and erroneously said that the NATO treaty pledges us to automatic defense of an attacked ally (see, for example, the caption of *The New York Times* diagram of "U.S. Commitments Abroad" of Thursday, February 19, 1970). This is not the case. Testifying in 1949 on behalf of the administration before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate in support of ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, Dean Acheson, then Secretary of State, stated: "This naturally does not mean that the United States would automatically be at war if one or the other signatory nations were the victim of an armed attack." Appearing as a private witness in support of the treaty, John Foster Dulles similarly stated: "Certainly the treaty does not impose any automatic duty to declare war."

The language of the North Atlantic Treaty seems stronger than it legally is. It states (Article 5) that "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all . . . ," and the Parties pledge that in the event of such attack each signatory shall take "such action *as it deems necessary,* including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area" (emphasis added). It is evident that a signatory of the treaty may deem it unnecessary to take action of any sort to meet such an attack. Legally speaking, no signatory of the treaty is therefore bound by Article 5 to take any action whatsoever. The Rio Pact with our Latin American allies uses similar language with similar legal effect;

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it makes explicit (Article 20) that ". . . no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent."

It may well be that the most significant legal impact of the Rio and North Atlantic treaties will be felt in constitutional law. It is a constitutional principle that the President of the United States is empowered to repel enemy attacks on us but requires a Congressional Declaration of War in order to take other or further measures of war. If it is now agreed by treaty that an attack on a Latin or NATO ally is deemed an attack on the United States, then it can be argued that the President is empowered without Congressional authorization to send us to war in such case; and the significant legal effect of the Rio and North Atlantic treaties would be to transfer from the Congress to the President the constitutional power to declare war, in so far as European and Latin American events are concerned.

The treaties with our Asian allies are somewhat more cautious in tone. The bilateral treaties (with Japan, the Philippines, Nationalist China and South Korea), the ANZUS pact[1] and the SEATO pact[2] (much discussed because, by Protocol, South Vietnam falls within the purview of the provisions here described), recognize merely that an armed attack on a signatory in the relevant geographical area would be dangerous to the peace and security of the others. Each signatory declares that in the event of such attack it "would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes." The action each party might take is unspecified. Explicit reference to "constitutional processes" indicates an awareness that even should an incumbent President of the United States of America determine that going to war was the proper response to the common danger, the ultimate determination would be made by the Congress.

There is no pledge in these treaties that the United States will go to war. Neither is there such a pledge in the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos (July 23, 1962), in which we pledge (Article 4) nothing stronger than consultation. This Declaration is essentially an undertaking to respect the neutral character of Laos and the particular policy of neutrality outlined in 1962

[1] Security treaty between Australia, New Zealand and the United States (1951).

[2] South East Asia Collective Defense Treaty (1954). Signatories were the United States, Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and the United Kingdom. Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam were included by Protocol for some purposes, but Cambodia and Laos subsequently disclaimed the benefits of the Protocol.

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by the Laotians; should anyone endanger that neutrality, we agree to consult with other signatories about the situation.

Senators and others who seek the explanation of our foreign military involvements in treaty provisions are looking in the wrong place. There are no treaties which require us to go to war. We have no legal commitments to send troops to defend foreign countries.

To some extent, in thinking so, we fall victim to a semantic confusion. Administration officials will often say troops have been sent abroad "under" or "pursuant to" a given treaty without adding, as they should, that sending troops is not, however, *required* by the treaty in question.

2. By "apparent commitments" I mean those obligations we believe ourselves to have undertaken, or which others believe us to have undertaken, even though no de jure commitment has been undertaken. These may become political, as distinct from legal, commitments.

One finds something of the same sort in the law of contracts. Although our traditional American authority, Professor Williston, emphasized objective criteria in determining the validity and proper interpretation of contracts, the other leading view, which stemmed from Professor Corbin and found its most advanced exponent in Professor Sharp, stressed subjective criteria, arguing that determination of these issues should be consistent with the legitimate expectations of the parties.

It is useful to apply the perceptions of the Corbin-Sharp school to the area of treaty commitments, because what people in fact expect is politically more significant than what they have a legal right to expect. Apparent commitments are actually of inordinate importance in the real world of international affairs.

Apparent commitments are contracted by treaties like ours, which seem to commit us but legally do not. If we consider an attack on any European ally to be an attack upon us (as we say we do in the NATO treaty), surely anyone would assume we mean to go to war in the event of such an attack. Again, when we agree with Liberia that "In the event of aggression or threat of aggression against Liberia, the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Liberia will immediately determine what action may be appropriate for the defense of Liberia," it sounds very much as though we regard ourselves as responsible for the defense of Liberia, even though all we

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commit ourselves to do is make a determination: *i.e.* think about it. That is the trouble with our many and far-flung treaties: they promise nothing, but suggest everything.

Statements by members of our administration; executive agreements with foreign countries; communiqués after international conferences—if carelessly phrased, these too can seem to commit the United States to all sorts of actions throughout the world, even when legally they should have no such effect.

The tendency of all these apparent commitments is to push us into actions we are not legally bound to take. In terms of domestic politics, a President must be in a strong position indeed to refrain from armed intervention in defense of an ally whom the public considers us obligated to defend; he becomes a President who lost a war for us. Overseas, too, a President runs the risk that other allies will desert our cause if we seem to abandon a treaty obligation to meet force with force, even though legally there is no such treaty obligation.

Again, we may find (as Sir Edward Grey did with France in 1914) that an ally has made military dispositions on the basis of our supposed obligation to go to war; to leave such an ally to defend itself dooms it to defeat. No more than Sir Edward do we want to have foreign ambassadors "wait to learn if the word 'honour' should be erased from the English dictionary."

In sum: to the extent that we find ourselves drawn into wars, it is not because of legal obligations, but in spite of the limits we have placed on our legal obligations.

3. By "de facto commitments" I mean such material dispositions as make it practically unfeasible for us to refrain from action. These are usually, though not always, military dispositions.

A prime example is our maintenance of substantial American armed forces in Europe. An attack by Warsaw Pact countries against Western Europe would necessarily strike at American armed forces, and we would perforce be at war. This, rather than the language of the North Atlantic Treaty, binds us to defend the West—a fact that is very well understood by our European allies.

As with apparent commitments, it is difficult to assess the extent of our de facto commitments. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was unable to gauge the depth of the military involvements described to it in 1967 by the State Department: ". . . U.S. military installations in some 30 foreign nations added

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an unknown number of nations to the list of those that the United States might feel obligated to defend."

We have no de jure commitments to send troops abroad. But sending troops abroad creates de facto commitments. How do we know the extent of such commitments? Only by knowing what will happen in the future. How can we know what will happen in the future? We cannot.

III

Precision is the aim of legal draftsmanship, in the formulation of a treaty as in the formulation of any other legal document. Elegant discriminations are not merely possible—Professor Morgenthau tells us that Sanskrit has 16 different words designating distinct types of alliance—but desirable, because each party must understand the treaty terms and obligations with exactitude if the legitimate expectations of the other parties are to be fulfilled. Clarity is especially needed in the key provisions: (1) the extent and duration of the commitment; (2) definition of the commitment; and (3) *casus foederis*. Judged by this standard, our treaties of alliance are thoroughly inadequate.

1. Our treaties are exact in describing the geographic areas to which their provisions relate. However (apart from the NATO treaty), they are largely silent about their duration. That is, they precisely delineate their limits in space but not in time.

This is not to say that our alliance commitments run forever. While each treaty must be interpreted individually, in the case of treaties of alliance it is "not difficult . . . to establish that the parties did not intend a perpetual duration, and therefore that the treaties contain an implied power to denounce upon reasonable notice."[3]

It cannot be said that duration provisions are *de rigueur*. Some alliance treaties have them, others not. The postwar military pacts between communist countries are mostly 20-year treaties; the NATO treaty, too, provides a right of denunciation by any signatory after 20 years. In times past, alliances have been permanent or temporary, depending on the nature of the case. It would seem better practice, considering that world conditions change, to contract only for a set term of years; treaties can, after all, be renewed if the parties desire.

[3] Arnold Duncan McNair, "The Law of Treaties." New York: Columbia University Press, 1938, p. 373.

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2. With respect to definition of our commitment, the treaties are vague, and fail to specify what action, if any, is required. Testifying in 1967 before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, the then Under Secretary of State, Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach, said:

> . . . the underlying framework concerning collective security in the past 20 years has been a series of treaty obligations and legislative provisions—the United Nations Charter, coupled with treaties with 42 countries. . . .
>
> Let me emphasize the constitutional quality of these commitments. By their nature, they set only the boundaries within which the United States will act. *They cannot and do not spell out the precise action which the United States would take in a variety of contingencies. That is left for further decision* by the President and the Congress (emphasis added).

If, however, the treaties fail to specify what action the signatories are committing themselves to take, what is the point of having treaties? The question is fundamental, for the ambiguity at the very center of these treaties accurately reflects an ambiguity in policy.

On the one hand, neither the Senate nor the President has been prepared to bind us in advance to go to war in future circumstances under conditions of which we can now know nothing. On the other hand, the then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator George of Georgia, declared in 1955 when approving the SEATO treaty that it "is inspired by the conviction that a potential aggressor may be deterred from reckless conduct by a clear-cut declaration of our intentions."

There is, if not an absolute contradiction, at least a tension between the desire to reserve judgment and the desire to spell out in advance what our future actions will be. They can both be done, but it requires careful consideration of how and in what context statements about future actions are made.

Treaties are the wrong instrument to use in carrying out the particular policy of deterrence indicated by Senator George. They would be appropriate only if we were following a policy of deterrence-through-certainty: a policy of publicly, clearly and definitely indicating in advance where we are prepared to fight, in order to keep other nations from invading such areas in the mistaken belief that we will not defend them. Within its own terms such a policy makes good sense, for it prevents other countries from blundering into war with us. To work, such a policy requires that we succeed in persuading others that we will really do what we say: contracting and publishing clear and unequi-

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vocal treaty commitments is the way to do this, for the solemn and binding character of such commitments compels belief.

The problem is that the United States is not prepared to do what is necessary for such a policy. It is a political fact of life that our Senate will not commit itself in advance to declare war conditioned on future circumstances and happenings. Therefore we must resign ourself to the conclusion that, desirable as the policy of deterrence-through-certainty may be, it is not a policy which we are able to follow because we are not prepared to pay the necessary price for it.

It is also evident that we do not intend to pursue the contrary policy, the traditional European policy of deterrence-through-uncertainty, whose ambiguities are sometimes called a cause of World War I. This is the policy of keeping the enemy from acting by keeping him unsure where, when and how we will react. Clearly we do not pursue this policy, for we publish our intentions to the world.

Our actual policy is to state our intentions so that all will be aware of the risks inherent in attacking particular areas of the world which it is likely (though not certain) we will choose to defend. There is much to be said for this policy but not much to be said for the way we carry it out.

Our policy is to deter aggression by publicly clarifying our intentions, but we employ an inappropriate form of communication which obscures them. Instead of using treaties we should be using the forms normally employed in communicating governmental thinking, such as diplomatic notes, statements by the President, and Senate resolutions. These are inherently credible, for they represent current policy and they do not pretend to be what they are not; they are not masquerading as commitments.

Using treaties to communicate intentions, however, as we now do, defeats our purpose; it leads to misunderstanding. Treaties, like any other legal documents, are documents of definition and therefore of limitation. Of necessity they indicate not merely what we are obligated to do but also what we are not obligated to do. Use of the treaty format therefore emphasizes that we do not undertake any legal obligation to defend our allies; and this can lead to the belief that in fact we will not defend them, which may not be the case at all.

It can also lead to the contrary misunderstanding: the belief that we definitely undertake to defend them. Treaties have tra-

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ditionally embodied binding commitments and are intended and generally understood to embody binding commitments. Therefore statements of mere intention, when placed in the form of a treaty, appear to imply legal commitments we are not making.

If we are not prepared to decide in advance when we will go to war, we ought not to have treaties which purport to be treaties of mutual defense or alliance. Such treaties begin by fooling others, who mistakenly think we have agreed to defend them; they end by fooling us, when apparent treaty commitments generate political pressures which impel us to defend foreign countries despite the lack of any legal treaty commitment to do so.

3. *"Casus foederis"* is a technical phrase used in international law to designate the circumstances which bring a treaty obligation into play. For example, if we agree to assist A should he be attacked by B, an attack by B upon A is the *casus foederis* giving rise to our obligation to come to A's assistance.

The *casus foederis* in treaties of alliance, though phrased with precision, sometimes must be phrased with delicacy. Though alliances from most ancient times have frequently specified the countries they are aimed against, it often seems more diplomatic to not name names. Thus Germany, Italy and Japan in 1940 made reference to the United States in a treaty provision as "a Power not at present involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese War." Similarly, the military pacts between communist countries are normally directed against Germany and Japan or their allies (which is supposed to mean us).

Our own treaties of alliance are vague with respect to the *casus foederis*. Only in the SEATO treaty do we make it clear whom we propose to defend foreign nations against ("only . . . communist aggression"); for the rest our loose phraseology reads as though we were concerned to protect everyone against everyone else. Again, this is a vagueness which accurately reflects a vagueness in policy.

There are four mutually inconsistent American policies with respect to *casus foederis*. Quite apart from the fact that at least two of them (A and D) are politically and militarily absurd, it is interesting to note that the two relevant policies with respect to *casus foederis* (what we say and what we do) are reflected in none of our treaties; while the two policies which are reflected in our treaties run counter to both what we have done in the past and what we say we will do in the future.

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Policy A is reflected (SEATO aside) in almost all of our treaties. It pledges us to do something against armed attacks from any source against any of our allies. Article 43 of the United Nations Charter may go further; read broadly, it may pledge us to send troops to maintain peace anywhere and everywhere in the world.

Policy B is reflected in the "Understanding of the United States" appended to the SEATO treaty. It pledges us to act against armed attack only where it constitutes "communist aggression" against our SEATO allies.

Policy C, which is not reflected in any of our treaties, is the policy which the present administration states that it intends to follow. It was outlined by President Nixon in his first annual foreign affairs message to Congress, submitted on February 18, 1970, entitled United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace. In this message President Nixon asserts that the communist world is no longer monolithic and implies that we will respond to different communist countries in different ways. He also suggests that American resources must be conserved for use against the major and vital dangers threatening us. Therefore, with respect to Asia and the Pacific, he asserts that "We shall provide a shield *if a nuclear power* threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital" (emphasis added). In all other cases, President Nixon limits our role to providing aid, not armies. Thus his policy is to send troops only in case of attack by the two communist superpowers, China or Russia, and not in case of attack by any other communist nation.

Policy D, which also is not reflected in any of our treaties, is the policy which the United States has actually followed in practice under every administration since World War II. Russia and China have invaded several countries during this period of time. Russia invaded Czechoslovakia and Hungary; China invaded Tibet and India. These were important areas: Czechoslovakia, for example, for its industry, and Tibet for its strategic position. We did not intervene in any of these cases. On the other hand we *have* gone to war against North Korea and North Vietnam.

This policy is exactly the opposite of the policy enunciated by President Nixon. In practice the communist invasions we have not opposed have been those of Russia and China; we have

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intervened only against their satellites, that is to say, against only those communist nations which constitute no material threat to our security and whose defeat would not substantially improve our position in the world.

Thus with respect to *casus foederis* it can be seen that our treaties as such are defective—they are misleading, and vague to the point of meaninglessness—but since we do not follow the policies they reflect, our predicaments in the world are not caused by them. The fault, if fault there be, lies elsewhere.

IV

A review of our alliance commitments has shown that we have no legal obligations to defend our allies, but that we do have substantial political and military commitments to friendly nations throughout the world.

In Europe, we have made our most solid commitment: our troops are stationed there indefinitely. This seems to represent a commitment which, in conscious consensus, we deem necessary.

In Latin America our far-ranging political commitment probably is an accurate reflection of a special concern and position in matters which affect our own hemisphere. They are the other aspect of the Monroe Doctrine.

In Asia and the Pacific, however, our treaties fail to reflect accurately our current intentions. President Nixon intends to defend our allies in that area only against armed attack by a nuclear power; but the treaties give the impression that we will defend them against others too. At the very least, therefore, even if our government deems it inadvisable to revoke or revise our other treaties of alliance, these should be revoked, or else they should be revised so as to eliminate all reference to action by us or use of our armed forces, if we are not to be politically burdened with responsibilities we are unwilling to assume. A Resolution of the Senate could appropriately express a present intention—not a commitment—to meet force with force should a nuclear power attack one of our allies in Asia or the Pacific.

This would perform a useful function in curbing the inflated expectations aroused by our present Asian treaties.

In evaluating our remaining commitments around the world, the criteria set by the Nixon administration are as follows: "We will view *new* commitments in the light of a careful assessment of our own national interests and those of other countries,

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of the specific threats to those interests, and of our capacity to counter those threats at an acceptable risk and cost" (emphasis added). This does not go far enough. These sensible criteria, which President Nixon proposes to use only in contracting new commitments, also must be applied, as Professor Morgenthau has pointed out, to the review of existing commitments.

How can this be done? How do we know the width and depth and implications of the commitments arising from our present situation and policies? How can we ascertain their extent in order to limit them in accordance with the President's criteria?

Senator Percy has proposed the issuance of an annual list—a sort of balance sheet on the liability side—of national commitments. It is an interesting suggestion, but nonlegal commitments are a question of perception rather than accounting: they have to be sensed rather than enumerated. Senator Ervin, more realistically, has proposed that the Senate assert a constitutional right to determine when and whether troops may be sent abroad. This surely would focus attention on the more obvious commitments we contract, and require conscious decision before each such commitment is made. The problem of political commitment remains unsolved, however, and no legal measure will answer it.

Recognition that the problem is not a legal one—is not, therefore, a problem merely on the surface of things—troubles us with questions about the nature of man and political society which most of us prefer not to face, but which we have to face in order to formulate effective policies. In all likelihood those who blame our legal treaty commitments for our involvements in tangled world affairs hope their allegation is true. It would make things easy; treaties, unlike passions and problems, can simply be revoked.

But the forces which draw us into the tides of international policies are of the real world; they are not mere pedantries or legalisms. The causes of our involvement are more complex, the cures more uncertain, than words or phrases or clauses in the *corpus juris*. Our fall from grace—if we have fallen from grace—is not due to our treaties of alleged alliance. The problems we face are not legal. They are practical problems, and can be solved only through prudent, experienced judgment combined with a good bit of luck. The law and the treaties, in this respect, are genuinely of no importance. The alliances did not entangle us; either life itself did it, or we did it to ourselves.

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CHINA: PERIOD OF SUSPENSE

By L. La Dany

SEEN from a certain distance, China—we speak of the China Mainland, the People's Republic of China—looks to some like the sleeping beauty now waking up to the modern world; to others she may look like a monster preparing to swallow Asia or half of the world. Many see in Mao the symbol of all that is new and fresh, the man who dared to destroy his own establishment and let loose the red guards as rebels.

Seen from close at hand, China looks very different, neither a sleeping beauty nor a monster—and where are the red guards?

It is now fashionable to say that Peking is returning to normality in external relations. There are indeed some signs of greater pragmatism in dealings with other nations. The absolute worship of Mao as the head of world communism is no longer the condition sine qua non for friendly relations with China that it was, or seemed to be, during the cultural revolution. Yet even this principle was never applied in full rigor. Even during the cultural revolution, Rumania, with its relatively independent attitude toward Moscow, was always admitted to the favors of Peking without passing any examination in Mao worship. On close scrutiny, one could see that the fundamental condition was not positive acceptance of Mao as a world leader but something negative—nonacceptance of Moscow. Relations with the European communist countries other than Rumania and Albania were distant before, during and after the cultural revolution, and they are still distant. The only exception was made in favor of Dubček's régime in Czechoslovakia, and that not because the Dubček régime was taking a more liberal path but because it seemed to be weakening the authority of Moscow.

Geographical nearness puts relations with North Vietnam and North Korea into a different category. During the cultural revolution relations with Pyongyang were definitely bad, and Peking did not hide her disapproval of Hanoi's sitting down with the enemy at the negotiating table in Paris; Vietnam, however, was an arena in which Peking could compete with Soviet Russia.

The restoration of closer relations with North Korea was one of Chou En-lai's masterstrokes. A prominent emissary from Pyongyang arrived in Peking at the very last moment, half an

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hour before midnight on September 30 last year, the eve of the National Day. Chou En-lai, who was entertaining foreign delegations at dinner that evening, dashed to the airport to receive him. On the following day, the Korean stood next to Mao in the parade. In spring this year the North Koreans turned down a request from Soviet Russia for coöperation in a committee with the Japanese (who are coöperating closely with South Korea). A few days later Chou En-lai arrived at Pyongyang, and a communiqué was issued which, though carefully avoiding mention of the Russians, with whom Pyongyang does not want to break her ties, contained a common declaration against the United States, and especially against what was called Japanese militarism and Japanese imperialism.

The other masterstroke of Peking, due undoubtedly to Chou En-lai, was the "capturing" of Prince Sihanouk, whose honorific reception in China stirs up memories of similar honors paid many years ago to the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. With Sihanouk in the hands of Peking, China entered the geographic and political scene that Hanoi claims as its own.

For Peking, this was a pragmatic policy. It reflects her foresight and her worries about what may happen in Asia after an American disengagement. These moves, north and south, are also serious blows to Russia, and prevent the establishment in Indochina of a communist régime unfriendly to China.

In many other ways, however, Peking's foreign policy is far from pragmatic. Take its relations with the non-communist Asian countries. There is hardly any Asian country that would not welcome normal relations, or at least some kind of modus vivendi, with Peking. Yet Peking, instead of pursuing an elastic policy, is rigidly abusive whenever it speaks of the heads of states, whether of India, Malaysia, Singapore, Burma, Indonesia or Japan. The only countries in Asia (besides the two communist countries) with which Peking maintains any semblance of friendly relations are Pakistan and Afghanistan. The main interest of Peking in Asian countries lies in fomenting subversion and revolution. Not much of a secret is made of this: reports on the revolutionary activities of the pro-Peking groups in India, Burma and Thailand are regular features in the *People's Daily*.

The slowness with which the normalization of foreign policy is proceeding is exemplified in the history of Peking's diplo-

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matic representatives. In 1966 all ambassadors but one were recalled to Peking, and no successors were sent to fill their posts until last year, after the party congress. Even then ambassadors were sent only to countries considered friendly, altogether 20 out of 47; the other embassies are still headed by chargés d'affaires. Peking seems to be aware that this is not normal and avoids revealing it to the public at home. The root of this is indecisiveness in Peking. China has no minister of foreign affairs, an embarrassing situation for foreign embassies in Peking when occasions arise demanding contact with the minister. During the cultural revolution, Premier Chou En-lai lost many of his friends, cabinet ministers whom he tried in vain to save. But his right-hand man, his foreign minister, Ch'en Yi, survived. In 1969 Ch'en Yi ceased to carry out the duties of foreign minister. For a time it seemed that Li Hsien-nien, another veteran of the revolution and a former minister of finance, would take the post; but the position of Li Hsien-nien remains uncertain. The curious vacillation of Peking's foreign policy between pragmatism and "people's war" and her inability to name ambassadors abroad or even to appoint an acting foreign minister mirror the unsettled situation at home.

II

The situation inside China is utterly different from that of a few years ago, and observers of the China scene have the feeling that the methods used before the cultural revolution are no longer valid. The reason is not the scarcity of information coming out of China; information was almost as scanty in some periods before 1966. The reason, not grasped by all, is that the country is no longer the unified country it once was. A few years ago it was enough to study the directives issued by Peking; it could be assumed with fair certainty that orders from the center would be carried out in the provinces. This is not true today, when Peking is ceaselessly complaining about lack of implementation, about "words not followed by deeds." It might be thought that now, with the military in charge of the administration of the country, discipline and strict unity would have returned; but this has not happened. Today it is necessary to follow the attitudes and the development of each of the 29 provinces and equivalent administrative areas. They react in different ways to orders from Peking.

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To understand why this is so, some of the consequences of the cultural revolution must be examined more closely.

To begin with, the Republic has no president. Legally Liu Shao-ch'i could be replaced only by the National People's Congress. The last congress meeting was that held in 1964 and no new people's congress is in sight. Last year a cable was sent to Vietnam signed by the aged and decrepit Tung Pi-wu. Tung is one of the two vice-presidents of the Republic, but he signed the cable as "acting president." This, however, was not repeated. The next time he was designated as vice-president only. The other vice-president, Soong Ch'ing-ling, widow of Sun Yat-sen, is still alive and appears occasionally, but she performs no official acts.

On the National Day, October 1, 1969, a list of the names of those present was published. Many on the list were unknown persons. They were described as men in responsible positions in the State Council (the Cabinet) and the Party Central Committee itself, as "military representatives, responsible cadres, and representatives of mass organization" without distinction and with no indication of who is in charge of what.

Three important bodies—the police, the prosecution and the courts—took Liu Shao-ch'i's side in the cultural revolution. The president of the Supreme Court committed suicide; his colleagues disappeared from the political scene. Since 1966 no report has appeared on the functioning of the prosecution or of the courts, if they are still functioning at all. It is known that the leaders and most of the staff of the police were disbanded and that the police force was taken over by the military. There is no sign of any unified nationwide organization of public security. The new public security organs have different names in different provinces, though all are auxiliary military forces under the control of the regional military authorities. These differences seem to indicate that, even within the military, unity is imperfect. Further, a great number of formerly flourishing organizations have perished.The People's Yearbook used to carry a long list of national organizations—organizations of students, of youth, of women, and specialized organizations for science and culture. None of these exist today.

There is a curious political vacuum in Peking. Most of the orders that appear are concerned with a single subject, the pursuit of those opposed to the new order, *i.e.* the political purge,

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which since 1967 has been called *"tou-p'i-kai"* "fight, criticism, change." In April 1970, on the first anniversary of the Ninth Party Congress, it could still be said, in the leading article of *Red Flag,* the official organ of the Central Committee, that the petty bourgeois were deliberately confusing the distinction between the proletarian and the bourgeois class. It said that they wreck what is known as the revolutionary discipline, they want freedom, and, worst of all, these men, the class enemy, do their best "to split the revolutionary ranks and wreck the proletarian dictatorship."

The pursuit of the "class enemy" is being taken seriously; last winter news of public executions was broadcast in China. People in Hong Kong, though more interested in watching dollars and cents than in watching the mainland, could not fail to notice a public execution that was carried out in April just across the British border. It is nevertheless a constant theme in Peking that the local authorities are loath to continue the purge, that they even condone the misdeeds of the class enemy. The regional authorities are being encouraged not to relax what in classic communist terminology is called "class vigilance."

It is very odd to find that although the military took over the civilian administration in the beginning of 1967, even now, three years later, the fight against resistance is still the main theme of the régime. Resistance does not mean armed bands hiding in the obscure corners of the country, though there have been rumors of such bands in mountainous areas. The "enemy" who are the main objects of the great pursuit are to be found in the newly established administrative organs, the revolutionary committees themselves.

There are revolutionary committees at every level, from villages up to provinces. At first these revolutionary committees were described as temporary organs, but they have become permanent administrative bodies. The heads of revolutionary committees in most of the provinces and in all important counties, factories or other organizations, are normally soldiers; where the head is a civilian he has at his side a military representative or a military aid-group. A revolutionary committee consists of three elements: soldiers, former party cadres, and representatives of the revolutionary mass organizations that came into being during the cultural revolution. The three do not blend well.

The former local party leaders are usually awkwardly placed.

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Many of them have suffered at the hands of the red guards; a great number of the cadres are still in reform schools and their future is bleak and uncertain. Even those who have been reëmployed are now subordinate to ignorant soldiers. These men, formerly leading local cadres, are little inclined to take an active part in the new administration. The constant complaints raised against them are that they drag things out, refuse to take decisions and sabotage higher orders, that they are scared, afraid to act, afraid to take a stand. In the years before the cultural revolution they carried out faithfully all orders coming from above; later they suffered for this fidelity. Now they are afraid that if there is another change they will be blamed for having carried out the orders of the present régime. Recognition that a change may come is in the air; the ominous phrase, *"pien t'ien,"* "change of heaven," crops up not infrequently. This ancient phrase was always symptomatic of imperial decline and of expectation of the change in the mandate of heaven that would lead to the fall of the reigning dynasty.

The representatives of mass organizations in the revolutionary committees are even more unstable elements. Many quarrelling, and now illegal, mass organizations have contrived to survive, though it is hard to guess how. When their leaders are taken into the revolutionary committees they consider themselves representatives of their groups and use such little power as they have to strike at rival organizations. These organizations were to have been suppressed in the second half of 1968. Millions of students, former red guards, were sent to the villages, to disappear in the endless loess of the gray countryside of China, and the unrest today is found chiefly among young industrial workers.

We are badly informed about the present alliances among these refractory youths; there have been many transformations since the formation of the rebel groups three years ago. According to some reports, when they are suppressed they reappear again in a different form. Their existence is known only from what is written against them. It is alleged that they are asserting their power and resisting the reconstitution of the communist party. A report of January 18, 1970, from Honan quoted them as saying that if they were not taken into the new party organization they would have recourse to passive resistance and "raise the red flag to oppose the red flag." A Shanghai broadcast on January 11 said: "In our ranks there are still comrades who say:

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'We wrought the victory of the revolution; we took over power without the leadership of the party'."

III

The ruling body in the revolutionary committee is therefore the military, though in a communist country the party should be the paramount power. Ever since the second half of 1967 the official policy has been that the communist party, destroyed by the cultural revolution, must be reconstituted. The party organizations within the armed forces were never destroyed. On the contrary, it was they, the forces of Lin Piao, that destroyed the civilian party machinery, the basis of Liu Shao-ch'i's power. To a great extent this was the essence of the cultural revolution. The communist party, however, is now to be reconstituted.

In April 1969 a National Party Congress was convoked despite the fact that the party organizations no longer existed in the provinces. Not till the end of last year did the reorganization of the party begin effectively, starting from the lowest cells. The next step should be the reëstablishment of the party committees in the 2,000 counties. Hunan province, in this respect a pioneer province, has 11 (out of 86) counties that have established their county party committees. Heilungkiang held a great celebration when its first county established a party organization this year; but the other 62 counties in the province did not follow suit. Heilungkiang, on the Russian border, was the scene of the March 1969 Sino-Soviet border clashes.

The reconstitution of the communist party is then a slow process. Not a single province has yet a provincial party committee, although in several provinces the first nuclei of the communist party exist in the revolutionary committees. Since the provincial revolutionary committees are led by the military, it may be assumed that the military leaders of the revolutionary committees are in these party nuclei. Several reports have said openly that in the countryside the military are in charge of reorganizing the civilian party.

It is difficult to imagine how this situation will evolve. In principle, the communist party should be above the military. But will the military yield power to a nonmilitary party organization? It may be argued that once before, in 1949, the civilian communist party grew out of the military. However, the situation in 1970 is very different from that of 1949. During the cul-

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tural revolution the party organizations suffered an all but mortal blow. The new Marxist doctrine and even the selection of the Thoughts of Mao come from the military, and a great effort is now being made to put the whole nation on a military footing, something unheard of in the early fifties.

Village organizations, as well as schools and factories, are expected to copy the methods and habits of the army administration, and a number of organizations have been divided, military style, into battalions, companies, platoons and sections. If this spreads, then China, with or without the communist party, will become an ocean of military barracks. In fact, this militarization of the civilian population has not gotten very far in most places. Orders are still being issued in China but they are not being carried out. Neither the militarization of the country nor the reconstruction of the communist party is going ahead with the expected speed.

The provinces appear to respond in different ways to the orders—"combat calls" as they are now called—of Peking. The responses are so different that the Peking press prefers to say nothing about some major events in the provinces, so that the reader of the national press may not have any chance of detecting that Peking's orders are not being carried out.

Before and after the National Party Congress of April 1969 several provinces held provincial party congresses of a kind, gatherings of party members from the provincial revolutionary committee; but half of the provinces have held no provincial party meetings at all. Provincial congresses of other kinds have been held, congresses of activists, or, to use the official title, "provincial congresses of activists in the living study and living use of the Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung." Again only about half of the provinces and of equivalent areas have held such meetings, usually mass meetings of thousands of selected soldiers, workers and peasants; the middle class and the better-educated people are not considered politically reliable. These provincial activist congresses were modeled on similar congresses held in the army.

To the provincial congresses of party activists the army has added a new type of congress described in jargon as the congress of the "four-good and five-good." This phrase goes back to the early sixties when Lin Piao introduced emulation among army companies for preëminence in four qualities, and among soldiers for preëminence in five—the first of both the four and the five

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always being excellence in the practical application of the Thoughts of Mao. It has been decided that this method, long in use in the army, must now be applied to the civilian population, but so far, despite much talk about the four-good and the five-good, only two provinces, Kiangsi and Hunan, have held four-five-good congresses, and even these were held jointly with the activists' congresses.

The distinction between an activist and a five-good man is subtle, but it exists. To grasp it, recourse must be had to the esoteric magic of the China watchers (a tiresome nickname: most of the "watchers" can only read about China and listen to it; what they cannot do is to watch). This esoteric science reveals that the "living study and living use of the Thoughts" emphasizes the Thoughts of Mao, whereas the four-five-good is the invention of Lin Piao himself and is a direct tribute to him. The obvious inference is that slowness in introducing his formula is a symptom of passive resistance.

Lin Piao is the successor-designate and his name is written into the new party constitution. After living in profound obscurity for many years before his triumphant emergence in 1966, he now seems impatient to take over, without waiting for the mantle to fall upon him, or upon somebody else, upon the death of Mao. Expressions of loyalty to him, or their absence, are important indicators for the future.

The China student scrutinizes various manifestations of loyalty in the provinces. Some provinces, for example, exalt Mao and rarely mention Lin Piao. Other provinces praise Lin Piao ostentatiously. Others again divide their homage equally and always mention the two names together. This is interpreted as showing that there are different grades of loyalty in the various provinces, and that the regional leaders, mostly men from the military, may differ in their political alignment, some of them being outright supporters of Lin Piao, and others under the guise of wholehearted devotion to Mao resisting Lin Piao's ascent to full power. All this may seem over-subtle, but the regional leaders cannot be expected to take an open stand pro or contra. The contrasting actions of the provinces, the variety of speeds in implementing directives from above, the slowness of the whole process of consolidating the new régime, are facts that cannot be denied and should not be ignored.

To his scrutiny of these hard realities the scrutinizer may add

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an examination of eloquent symbols. Who, for instance, is now being described as exercising command of the People's Liberation Army? The formula in use for a time was that the PLA had been founded by Mao and was under direct command of Lin Piao. In connection with the celebration of the National Day last year, a significant change was made. The new formula was: Under the direct command of Chairman Mao and Vice-Chairman Lin. There has been no official explanation of why or under whose influence the change was made. It is revealing, however, to find that the new formula has been introduced in some provinces and not in others, and that there are provinces which use the two formulas indifferently. These formulas are mere words, but they are words of extreme importance since they refer to the army, which is the ruling political body in the nation.

Another revealing symbol is "The Bandits' Stronghold," the most vigorously pushed play in the present repertoire. This play was heavily rewritten in preparation for the 1969 National Day. The hero, an already idealized soldier, was idealized much more thoroughly, and press comment left no doubt that this hero, the embodiment of all currently recognized virtues, symbolizes Lin Piao himself.

Symbolic language of this kind, using words, pen or brush, has always been common in China. It was used before the cultural revolution, when Liu and some of his now ousted colleagues were the objects of praise in the language of art. A criticism of an historical play was the bugle call for the battle that ended the career of P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking, and rudely ushered in the cultural revolution.

IV

The present situation in China makes the indecisiveness of her foreign policy intelligible. The impression given is that of a moment of suspended silence. What the outcome will be no one knows; but the silence is painfully evident. A deep silence has long been reigning over publishing houses, which now publish neither books nor magazines; over former editors and writers, who are at work as farmers in the countryside; over the film industry, which has not turned out a single feature film for years; over all churches and temples of all religions, which are closed or are being used for other than religious purposes; over the universities, which have not yet resumed teaching; over the pro-

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posed reform of writing, which has fallen into complete oblivion; and even over Marxist philosophy, which is not being discussed now.

This feeling of suspense is intensified by sustained preparations for war. It is unlikely that Peking wants war; but ever since the invasion of Czechoslovakia she has felt that she must be ready for any eventuality. War preparation is also an excellent means for imposing military discipline and draconian economic measures at home, and it enhances the position of the regional military leaders. The official doctrine now is that all must be ready for invasion, for a deep penetration of the enemy into the body of China, and that therefore, in order to be able to resist, each province must build up a compact economic system of its own that will be able to function if the other regions fall.

This internal situation in China must be borne in mind when any government is forming its China policy. While it is normal to want to have friendly relations, or at least some contact, with every country, it is especially desirable to have such relations with China, to draw her into the family of nations and end an abnormal and explosive situation. However, there is no easy solution at hand. The problem of the Republic of China in Taiwan cannot be bypassed. Normal dealings with Peking are extremely difficult, and, as the examples of Britain's and West Germany's trade with China show, not even profitable. To this must now be added the fragile political situation inside China, where the "red flag" is still opposed to the "red flag," where the ruling military are meeting wide and stubborn opposition among the ever-growing younger generation and where the regional leadership is hesitant in executing Peking's orders. The difficult questions faced by foreign offices are whether it is wise to make friendly gestures toward a group of leaders whose authority may prove ephemeral, whether the good image created in China in the past would not be lost by precipitate action today, and whether anything would be lost by waiting to see how the internal situation will evolve in the coming years.

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THE NEW AFRICA

By Guy Hunter

THE problems which would beset post-colonial Africa were hardly recognized as the continent emerged into congeries of independent states ten years ago. Perhaps too great familiarity with detail made it hard for the colonial powers to see the problems clearly; too little familiarity with the realities made it hard for the United States; for both, and for the Africans themselves, belief in the sovereign power of freedom blinded them to the risks and tests which freedom entails.

But the problems lying in wait (which had much in common, also, with those of the new Asian nations) were not long in coming. The most dangerous of them was the legitimacy of the political system—how to establish the authority and sovereignty of a constitution so that it should be unquestioned even if governments ruling by it should change. Unlike uncolonized Ethiopia —or, in Asia, Thailand—the modern countries of tropical Africa had no traditional rulers to whom power could be naturally entrusted. Universal suffrage, for largely illiterate populations, was used as the legitimizing tool.

The economic problems derived from the dual economy created by colonialism—the small, largely Westernized "modern sector" of sophisticated production and consumption, versus the huge hinterland of somewhat disturbed rural life, tribalism and ancient cultural tradition. There seemed to be only a choice of emphasizing this dualism by further development of the modern sector through close economic relations with the West, or of trying to escape neo-colonialism by sacrificing economic growth.

Certain ideological and moral dilemmas have also been deeply felt by African leaders who wanted to avoid the materialistic capitalism of the West, escape the horrors of the nineteenth-century industrial revolution, and invent an economy which put social services ahead of the production of material goods (which in the West had financed the Welfare State). The resulting variants of state socialism have often placed upon thinly manned governments and communities which are weak in commercial skills the major burden of generating wealth, a function which in the West was largely performed by private enterprise. In some cases

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the emphasis on social expenditure has preëmpted resources urgently needed to expand the productive base of the economy.

Apart from purely economic and ideological issues, the dual economy has posed a more profound problem for national integration—the synchronous development of economic, political, social and moral elements in the society. One obvious symptom of social disarray is seen in the growing imbalance between educational output and employment, the frustration of unemployed graduates which at Independence already showed among primary-school leavers and was later to overtake first the secondary schools and then even the liberal-arts graduates from universities. And at a deeper level, this lack of integration shows itself in the huge divergences in attitudes, values and cultural continuity between the modernized and the traditional sectors. Here the educational system is obviously critical, and here the high-level manpower planners inadvertently widened the gap still further. As I wrote in 1962:

> To abstract from the whole Western system just those elements designed to produce engineers or geophysicists (rather than the whole, which is designed to produce citizens and men) could be to fall into a grave mistake. For what is in issue in Africa is the growth of new nations, new societies of men, not merely the construction of new economies. . . . It would be unwise to assume that merely by "planning" and massive expenditure on a technological education any African country can turn itself in two decades into the reality, rather than the façade, of a developed modern society. The real growth must have time to spread its roots deep and wide in the life of the community, aided by an education which fully replaces the old tribal training as a preparation for modern citizenship.[1]

There is a real dilemma here. To build into one and the same school system an education with a strong element of cultural continuity and a real relevance to the conditions of a slowly modernizing rural life, and a curriculum designed to produce the small but vital technical and administrative leadership with which to replace expatriates, has proved beyond the wit of politicians and planners and of their foreign advisers; it remains an unsolved and even more pressing problem today.

Finally, there was and is the problem of transfer of technology. Developing nations have been urged, and have been eager, to borrow both technology and institutions developed in and for a wholly different social and economic environment. But, as

[1] I include this quotation, written in 1962, partly to avoid the obvious accusation of hindsight, and partly because it still expresses accurately the situation today.

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H. S. Frankel has pointed out: "Technical knowledge, the machine, and capital goods in general never exist in the abstract but always in the relatively fleeting form suited to the momentary situation and to that complex of unique problems to which they have been adapted. That is why they cannot readily be transferred from one situation to another." The dangers of transferring technology were fairly obvious; as to institutions—trade unions, universities, county councils—they were less quickly or clearly seen.

In a sophisticated age, so well stocked with analysts and critics, it is surprising that in face of this range of fundamental problems African independence was greeted first with such high expectations, and later with such disappointment and disillusion when the cracks began to show. There were critics, especially among the settlers and administrators who knew Africa best. But their voices were neglected, partly because they were seen as self-interested; partly (and very rightly) because they so often addressed themselves not to problems but to persons—to the alleged incapacity of Africans as such. If we turn now to the record, I think it can be demonstrated that it has been the problems rather than the persons which have made this decade a grueling experience—and yet still a hopeful one—for Africans and their well-wishers alike.

II

That the first independent governments should have been formed by "one man, one vote" elections was inevitable, because independence parties demanded it, because there was no other acceptable method, and because the colonial powers could not deny democratic ideals. That such a method should be satisfactory as a continuing form of government was highly improbable. As Dr. Lucy Mair has said: "Conferred from above on a populace which is not aware of any desire to manage its own affairs, democracy can never be anything but a mechanical system, to be manipulated by a few individuals for their own ends, while the majority remain indifferent to its proceedings." The result has been faction; and worse still, too often tribal, communal or racial faction, since such loyalties are the easiest and strongest foundations on which factional leaders can build support.

Certainly in Africa the leaders who succeeded in the first elections recognized the dangers, and their early years have been

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spent in constant appeals for national unity and condemnation of tribal and communal faction. (Discrimination against expatriates and aliens was an allowable safety-valve, since they could not threaten any government's political position.) Perhaps half-consciously, some leaders also saw that elections would not give "authority" (in Hannah Arendt's sense of instinctive reverence for the *auctor* or founder of a national tradition), and that without authority, which democracy in new countries lacked, neither constitution nor government would be secure. It was thus that, in a great number of African and Asian states, the single charismatic leader, backed by a single national party, animated by some overtly expressed national philosophy (Nkrumah-ism, Nyerere-ism, Kaunda-ism, Senghor-ism in Africa; Gandhi-ism in India; Sukarno-ism in Indonesia; U Nu-ism in Burma) can be seen as an attempt to found a tradition around which authority would form and grow. Government would then be legitimized, not so much by votes as by its succession from the founding fathers and their philosophy.

If we look at a few African states, we see that Nyerere, Kaunda, Sékou-Touré, Houphouet-Boigny are perhaps on their way to achieving this result. Kenyatta, too identified by tribal background, may not succeed in passing on his national authority. Obote in Uganda, having reached power by political skill and sustained it by armed force, has only just adopted a national philosophy in his "Move to Left" proclamation of October 1969. Nkrumah overdid a cult of personalism and economic ambition, and crashed. The old Belgian Congo never had a start. Nigeria, lacking a dominating central figure, staggered through some years of compromise among three national loyalties and is now in political ruins. There are parallels in Asia: Sukarno, like Nkrumah, overplayed his personal hand and ignored the warnings of economic disaster; U Nu in Burma, perhaps too gentle and betrayed by bad economic advice, had not the strength to maintain his role; Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia for a long time achieved, with fascinating skill, a marriage of the "authority" of monarchy and the mythology of development, but now also seems to have fallen from the razor's edge.

The failure of some of the first leaders—and West Africa particularly is strewn with failures—has been due not only to their lesser skill or to tribalism: it is certainly in part due to failure to control the greed of their henchmen in the modern

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sector. Without a tradition to control them, ministers, businessmen and some officials gave way to an orgy of corruption, intrigue and repression (bitterly described by François Fanon as neo-colonialism), which was enough to discredit all authority and leadership, however charismatic.

When authority fails, force, the oldest authenticator of governments, returns. We are still in the phase of military takeovers (two took place while this article was being written). Sometimes the General attempts to create a "Founder's" tradition, as Mobutu may be doing, and as Ayub Khan attempted in Pakistan. Sometimes, as in Ghana or Sierra Leone, the military phase is a pause for reconstruction: Ghana's new democratic experiment, thoughtfully designed, will be of extreme interest. Pakistan faces this third phase with extreme anxiety and little hope.

This political analysis is made in terms of authority rather than of the pressures on governments, simply because these pressures, from tribal groups, from intellectuals, from rivals, from half-educated unemployed, were always certain to be strong. The critical issue is the strength of government to contain them while some unity and authority are building. Indeed, it is perhaps surprising that some of the successful leaders, such as Nyerere or Kaunda, have not insured themselves by a greater armed force: the East African military revolts, trivial as they were, showed what a perilously narrow margin of security they have.

If this analysis is correct, there are clear implications, at least for Africa. First, that classical democracy, as such, was an unsuitable form of government for most emerging nations; in most countries, it has not succeeded and there may be more failures to come. Second, that perhaps the best hope of stability for Africa may be in those countries where a national leader, protected by adequate armed force and supported by an ideology carried widely through the country by a single party, is in power long enough for authority to grow around him, around his memory as founder, and around a set of ideas which succession governments adopt. It is perhaps in this way that a national consensus, vital to the working of a democratic system, could grow.

III

A dual economy, reflecting the contrast between colonial ad-

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ministration and investment on the one hand, and the indigenous economy on the other, was bound to exist in Africa. The early independence policies of industrializing and building a top-quality modern infrastructure, which were reinforced by foreign aid, widened the gap still further, gradually substituting an African élite for a European one. The result has often been described in terms of modern capital cities (surrounded by shack towns), trunk roads, airports, tourist hotels, a few modern factories and at least one superb university structure in each country. The rapid growth of (usually) more modest primary and secondary schools and of the provision of teachers for them has been the biggest contribution of the aided modernizing process to a better balance in society.

The difficulty of escaping from this situation has been underemphasized; perhaps the briefest glance at history will make it more clear. When Europe entered the industrial revolution populations were small and grew at a moderate pace—the highest rate in a decade in Britain was 1.4 percent per annum (1820–30). There was therefore a good chance of absorbing the extra manpower into rapidly growing industries. Besides, between 1600 and 1900 northern and western Europe conquered or penetrated Canada, the United States, South America, Africa, much of the Near East, India and Burma, Indochina, Malaya, Indonesia, the Philippines, the Pacific islands, Australia and New Zealand—that does not leave much of the rest of the world save for Russia, China and Japan. The growing industrial nations had a decisive technological superiority. It was therefore not necessary for British industry to await the expansion of consumer demand within the nation's own agricultural community, for the markets of a conquered world were open. Public expenditure on education and social services was small (primary education did not become universal until the 1880s in Britain, long after the main technical expansion had taken place). Nationhood had been established for centuries.

Contrast with this story that of Africa. Population growth has preceded industrial development, and at two and one-half to three percent per annum. There is no new world to expand into; there is no technical superiority to wield in existing markets; industry must wait upon the growth of consumer demand from among the vast bulk of rural population—in the 1960s Tanzania was classified as 95 percent rural, five percent urban; education

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and social services have come before industrial development on a large scale; national unity is barely 10 years old.

This list of contrasts is, to my mind, staggering. It faces Africa, and to a lesser degree most other developing countries, with a situation which is unique in modern history. With no large external market for manufactures, and without the ability of a Britain or a Switzerland to import raw materials, apply special skills and reëxport them, the foundation of African economies had to be laid in primary production—lucky were those with oil or copper—using agricultural or mineral exports to purchase equipment for industry. But industry in turn was limited to the internal market, and low productivity and low incomes in the massive agricultural sector narrowly limited chances for industrial expansion or for the growth of small-scale processing, commerce, distributive and technical services from which a more solid economy could grow. The small modern sector typically was burdened with overvalued exchange rates (favoring imports of sophisticated machinery and élite consumption goods), excessively high differentials between urban and rural earnings, a stagnant agriculture and a growing menace of unemployment. The mineral-rich countries (Zambia, Nigeria and the oil countries of North Africa) find it even harder to unify the high-reward mining economy with the subsistence hinterland.

It is this situation, not confined to Africa, which has led to rich cash-crop exports alongside miserable subsistence agriculture and to the paradox of widespread malnutrition and even hunger alongside complaints of limited demand for agricultural output. In Latin America it has led to the dreary sequence of development expenditure in the industrial sector—inflation; crisis; retrenchment; stagnation; development expenditure—a sequence sadly familiar to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In Asia, with a longer tradition of craft industry, metalworking and commerce, the duality has not been quite so marked, although even in India the neglect of food production gave a sharp lesson in 1966.

In short, the attempt to industrialize from the top downward by borrowing sophisticated techniques, while 60 to 70 percent of the population remained in a stagnant rural economy, represents an attempt to enter the twentieth-century world industrial economy before the domestic foundations have been properly laid. The worst symptom is unemployment, which will be the

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dominant problem of Africa in the 1970s; the way on is—*"reculer pour mieux sauter"*—to return to a really thorough development of the traditional agricultural sector, accompanied by a development of the processing, supply and consumer goods industries and services which a successful and modernized agriculture demands.

Unemployment is best illustrated by some simple figures on population growth, rural-urban distribution and salaried employment. When a two and one-half percent population growth is applied to a 75 percent rural population, the resulting increase in absolute rural numbers will far exceed the natural growth (two and one-half percent on 25 percent) in towns; it will exceed it even if growth *plus* immigration to towns adds up to six percent per annum. Thus, in the sharpest contrast to Western experience, the rural areas in Africa and Asia will have to give a livelihood to greatly increased absolute numbers for a generation or more. Even with a seven percent per annum growth in gross national product, in modern experience salaried employment seldom increases faster than two to three percent per annum. Thus, the towns will not be able to absorb their own growth; and the country will face ever-mounting pressure on land and jobs.

These grim calculations have been accepted only slowly. The first tendency in Africa, under the pressure of the foreign exchange drain in the modern sector, was to reëmphasize export crops, until markets began to be filled and the threat of unemployment sharpened. The second main response was to create very expensive settlement schemes; East and West Nigeria, Tanzania and Kenya have felt very sharply the cost and the small economic result (although in Kenya the political gain was worth the cost). Only in the last year or two has real attention moved to enriching, diversifying and commercializing internal food production, with its possible gains not only in nutrition but, above all, in employment. Hopefully, a highly intensive agriculture, with doubled farm incomes, could create a hum of construction as well as commercial, distributive, processing and servicing activity which could bring a substantial volume of wasted human and technical potential into productivity and start to build the economy from below.

The idea of the "green revolution" and the importance of agriculture are beginning to grow all over the developing world,

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and there have been remarkable successes in India, Pakistan, Taiwan, Mexico and at scattered points in Africa and Latin America. But there is still a long way to go before statements about the priority of the agricultural sector are borne out by priorities in resource-allocation: in physical investment, personnel, training, education, market incentives. How many countries still are content with one field extension officer to 1,500 or 2,000 farming families? Indeed, in Mexico and in India there are clear dangers that the green revolution will simply add a small group of the larger and more powerful farmers to the modern sector, leaving the other three-quarters of the rural economy relatively worse off.

IV

A dual economy has meant a dual educational system—full Westernized education for the lucky few who are destined for the modern sector, a bare taste of education (also Westernized) for the multitude destined to stay in the rural economy. Again, this seemed inevitable at the start. The demand for full equality for at least some few in the newly independent countries implied equality in educational "standards," which was often confused with content. Africa certainly was not to be fobbed off with rural polytechnics instead of universities. After the decline of the fashion for high-level manpower studies aimed exclusively at the modern sector, the pendulum has swung back to a revived concern for an education more related to environment, to national cultural tradition and to economic and educational needs at the lower and middle levels of society. It has proved hard to translate this new approach into practice, whether in syllabus or in structure. For one thing, the association of education with superior employment has had time to be deeply engraved in the minds of parents and pupils alike. But above all, an education really suited to the rural environment in which the great majority of Africans and Asians live can become both acceptable and genuinely functional only when that environment begins to offer real opportunity and to require skills and knowledge on a large scale, which an education revised both in content and structure could provide. It is useless to dream of a revolution in education without a revolution in the economy. While opportunity lies only in the Westernized top of the dual economy, education will remain in thrall to that small sector. It will produce first enough

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and then too many graduates, and the surplus will then emigrate to greener pastures in the developed countries.

Thus, education, employment and rural development are an almost metaphysical three-in-one. Perhaps the most forceful statement of this trinity in Africa was made at the Kericho Conference in Kenya in 1966; it was followed up by the Kenya government and the university with a series of a dozen pilot schemes of integrated rural development, scattered in contrasting environments all over Kenya, the first of which are now emerging from the planning stage into action. The Indian "block development" system, older and covering an immense area, moves in the same direction, though with less consciousness of the critical issue of employment for the mass of school-leavers.

Both the need for employment and the need for social integration require the growth, from below, of a bridging middle to the dual economy, and an educational system consonant with it—more demotic, more practical and based on those elements of tradition capable of survival in the twentieth century. It is mainly on the Left—in Tanzania, in Cuba—that such ideas are being given practical expression: the Right would be well advised to take heed. The growing body of unemployed young school-leavers exasperated by a flick of irrelevant education, and the continued existence of "two nations"—these are beyond question the two major dangers from now on.

V

Developing societies, especially in Africa, are necessarily borrowing societies; we have seen them borrowing political forms, technology, institutions. The peculiar nature of this borrowing process is worth a closer look, for the light which it can throw on the whole development process described here.

If we look at an African country of five or six million people —say Uganda—its economy has much in common with that of Britain in about the seventeenth century when its population was also five million. It may seem absurd for Uganda to borrow twentieth-century techniques and social forms, the outcome of 300 years of subsequent social and economic change. Yet, while there is much to be learned from the steps by which Britain was transformed from an agricultural and craft society to an industrial one, it is equally mistaken to suppose that these steps must be simply repeated. The environment of 1650 Britain was Eu-

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rope in 1650; the environment of Uganda is the 1970 world. Developing countries have a single great advantage, as latecomers in this environment; the sciences, which Europe had to find, are there for the taking. If development which took Europe 300 years is to be achieved in 50, this great accelerator must be borrowed and fitted somehow into the local social structure.

In fact, some technologies *can* easily be borrowed; radio, electric power to drive an illiterate peasant's tubewell, bicycles, typewriters, sewing machines, the truck and the DC3 find a ready use in rural areas from China to Peru. Some, however, will not fit; high-speed mass production machinery requires conditions (mass market, skills, prices of labor) which disqualify it for use in totally different economies. The degree of suitability for the environment may well be one criterion for the transfer of technology. (The problem of adapting technology is largely a market problem. As the Japanese have shown, if there is a market for small tractors, small tractors will be produced.) But it should be emphasized that technology is not science: the latter is not vitally connected with the environment that houses it; it is true for the world, and from it technologies adapted to social circumstances can be borrowed.

Clearly, the borrowing of social institutions will be far more difficult. It has also been far less studied. Why were trade unions, with their social reference to nineteenth-century European history and traditions shouting to high heaven, introduced almost forcibly into Africa? Why has the Rochdale Coöperative model been exported to three-quarters of the world, as though it was a philosopher's stone for all sorts and conditions of men? Why has the cohort of consultants and aid agencies continued to stamp British, French or American institutions on developing countries? A reasoned theory of the growth and appropriateness of institutions, and the changes in them which should accompany the uniquely rapid process of change in developing countries, is still to be found.

To put this abstract argument into concrete terms, it is possible to find rational criteria for the types of institution likely to succeed (or fail) in the development of small-holding agriculture, which occupies such a vast mass of Africans and Asians. For example, even the most fervent devotee of private enterprise can hardly believe that commercial firms can pioneer the distribution of fertilizer to tens of thousands of scattered villages, mostly

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inaccessible by hard road, when demand is infinitesimal and credit nonexistent; yet at a later stage of growth they may be easily the best agency. Even—one would think—the most patriotic American could not believe that the American model of university extension (developed for literate farmers, on sizable farms, with good access roads, supported by a trade press and aggressive commercial selling) would work for illiterate villagers on three-acre holdings requiring the simplest advice; yet 20 years from now this method might become appropriate. Why should county councils, served by poorly paid officials, manned by small-time politicians and village magnates concerned with private power or gain or the smashing of political rivals, prove a suitable choice of institution for improving the lot of small peasantry? What are the conditions in which coöperatives normally succeed, and the conditions in which they almost invariably fail? There are plenty of examples of both in Africa, yet the tool is still used, without rational discrimination, alike in promising and in totally unpromising circumstances.

If we look at the record of African countries over the last 10 years, we thus see them seeking desperately to contain the demands of economic growth and alien technical change within a social and political structure partly borrowed, partly invented, seldom reinforced by indigenous tradition. Alas, the tools chosen for this process, far from being closely adapted to local circumstances and stages of growth, have usually been "blanket" choices —of coöperatives, district commissioners, universities, development corporations or whatever—largely reflecting ideology, or fashion, or the home practice of the consultant who advises. In the 1970s the technical means of agricultural advance in the tropics will at last be widely available: now far more thought is needed on the administrative and institutional patterns through which the contribution of science—the one great accelerator—can be made effective in the unique combination of seventeenth-century society and twentieth-century technique.

VI

There is not much that the West can do to help the developing nations with the crisis of political authority at the center, or in the choice between the authoritative commissioner, elected council or party machine in local administration, except to avoid giving bad advice or chanting our own political hymns. But we

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can, through well-judged aid, help cure the evils of the dual economy, particularly in the agricultural sector; help with population control; and refrain from selling our own educational system to countries which need a radically different one.

We can also recognize, in relation to the transfer of technology and institutions, that the path of social and economic development in Africa (and elsewhere) will be unique, and will require its own social inventiveness. Indeed, development is becoming, and must increasingly become, a path chosen by developing countries for themselves. Patronage, aid with ideological or political strings, the "selling" of Western techniques and institutions will be increasingly resented, at least by those nations which have the political will to break the deadlock which a rich, Westernized modern sector and a stagnant rural economy are imposing on their society. Aid-givers will have to talk less, listen more and think more creatively if they are to find channels to help bring about widespread, indigenous, self-sustaining growth.

Finally, there is a growing coalescence of ideas, politically to the Left, which have been generated in very different circumstances in the developing world and in the rich, white world. From Asia and Latin America they come as protest against the old establishment of landlords, merchants, corrupt industrialists and politicians; from Africa, as rage against the new establishment of Westernized African privilege and self-seeking. In all three the figure who is seen to lurk behind the local enemy, blocking the door to social emancipation, racial equality, economic independence is the white capitalist or "racialist" or "imperialist," whether in Washington (and Vietnam), London (and Salisbury), or even Moscow (and Prague). From the developed world comes an answering cry of protest, not only from idealist and anarchic youth, not only from racial and social minorities, but from a growing group of normal adult men and women oppressed by the blemishes of our own system—by injustice, poverty amid riches, materialism, destruction of the environment, bureaucratic arrogance, lack of participation. The radical experiments of a Cuba or a Tanzania or a Zambia may seem far away from such concerns. But they strike a common chord of protest, and this is a protest upon which civilization itself depends for its renewal generation by generation.

Growing violence in our world is a sign that this protest is not

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being heeded fast enough. The West cannot afford, for its own health, to be ranged among the old against the young. John F. Kennedy, whatever he was in fact, was *seen* by the outer world as one who listened to the protest, and his death was widely mourned accordingly. General de Gaulle, in the heartland of rich Europe, was swept away because he heard it too late. We cannot afford to look at the developing world, of Africa or Asia or Latin America, without sympathy for those forces in it which, whatever their faults, nevertheless stand for renewal; for the same forces are also within our gates; we too need renewal. Perhaps the growing awareness of the blemishes of our own system will also help us to look less dogmatically at developing countries, especially in Africa; to realize that their problems are not those which we thought we had solved 100 years ago, and that our old solutions will not suit them; and to show more patience and generosity at least to those new nations which are sincerely seeking a new political and economic formula for their future.

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CANADA'S ARCTIC IN THE AGE OF ECOLOGY

By Trevor Lloyd

THE far north has been slow in joining the modern world. It is just three hundred years since the Hudson's Bay Company was granted a charter in London to "trade into Hudson's Bay" and the Muscovy Company had been active in northern Russia even earlier. Both were incidental dividends of the search for a practicable direct sea route from western Europe to the Orient. This objective has still not been achieved, for there is as yet no normally operating international seaway either by way of the Northwest Passage across the top of North America or through the Northeast Passage north of the U.S.S.R., although the latter is used fairly regularly in summer by Soviet vessels. The 1969 voyage of the U.S. tanker *Manhattan* from the Atlantic to the north coast of Alaska and back dramatized the persisting need for such a short northerly passage. It also emphasized that ice, which made the route impassable for centuries, remains a formidable obstacle.

Contemporary activity in the North—particularly in the North American Arctic—renews the concerted assault on the region that has until now always failed. There are many who believe that the present attack cannot but succeed because the economic need is now urgent and the technology required has been mastered. This has of course yet to be demonstrated in commercial terms, and success may still elude us.

There are many possible definitions of the area loosely referred to as "The North." Best known but rarely accepted as satisfactory is that region lying north of the Arctic Circle, which parallels the equator at 66°30′N. latitude, about 1600 miles from the North Pole. The line has no particular meaning geographically except as marking the southerly limit of the midnight sun. Within the circle are lands as diverse as the ice-capped plateau of Greenland and the commercial soft-wood forests of northern Sweden. Seas well to the north of the Circle off western Norway are ice-free throughout the year, but in similar latitudes in East Greenland the waters are barely navigable even in midsummer, and are almost equally hazardous off Baffin Island.

A more useful limit to the North is that favored by clima-

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tologists who use the extent of summer as the primary criterion. Excluded from the Arctic by these definitions are those areas whose temperature for the warmest month rises above 50°F. (10°C.). The region enclosed by an isotherm linking all such places includes the whole of Greenland, Canada north of a diagonal line from the Labrador coast northwestward to the mouth of the Mackenzie River, the coastal areas of Alaska north of the Alaska Peninsula, and a comparable strip of northern Siberia and northern Europe. A notable feature is the relatively



large area of northern Canada which is truly Arctic and the analogous narrow zone in northern U.S.S.R. Within this Arctic region, trees are absent; it is a land of tundra, rock and ice fields. Such a restricted definition of the North is too limiting for economic and political purposes, so in practice the margin lies farther south and includes extensive areas of boreal forests in, for example, Siberia and the Mackenzie Valley of Canada. From a practical point of view another physical line may be

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selected which can be defined precisely and shown clearly on maps, and which also has economic and developmental consequences. This is the southerly limit of "permafrost," a condition under which the ground a few feet beneath the surface does not thaw even at the height of summer. The depth to which the freeze extends varies and may be as great as 2,000 feet. Almost one-fifth of the earth's surface is subject to this condition, including much of Alaska and almost half of Canada and the U.S.S.R. Although unfamiliar to engineers and builders a generation ago, permafrost now plays a decisive part in much northern planning and is a critical factor in decisions now being made about conveyance of northern petroleum by pipeline.

In administrative terms there are no simple and clear definitions of the North. Much of southwestern Alaska has a mild, maritime climate and is far from being Arctic. Nevertheless, most of the state has undoubtedly a "northern" character. In Canada, there are two federally controlled territories—Yukon and the Northwest Territories, both lying north of the sixtieth parallel of latitude. The provinces of Quebec and Newfoundland and Labrador also include significant northern sections. Greenland is administered as an *Amt,* or province, of Denmark, but has considerable local authority, more than does a territory in Canada. There is no specifically northern administrative unit in the U.S.S.R. nor has there been for more than 30 years. The whole of the North lies within the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic.

II

For a decade or more following World War II the northern sector of the globe took on the appearance of a highly sophisticated armed camp. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were sufficiently strained to assume the likelihood of bomber and later missile attacks by the most direct courses across the polar seas. As early as 1946 it seemed possible that United States military bases, or those operated jointly with Canada, might be located in the Canadian far north. They would have been complementary to the defense build-up then proceeding in Alaska—referred to some years later as "The Gibraltar of the Arctic." As matters turned out, no such defenses were established in Canada, the nearest such being the large base at Thule which came into use in the early 1950s. Joint U.S.-

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Canadian weather stations were opened, however, on the northern Canadian Arctic islands, and did not come under exclusive Canadian control until 1970. A direct consequence of Canada's location between the U.S.S.R. and the United States was construction (partly at U.S. expense and manned in part by that country) of a series of three interrelated, more or less parallel radar detection screens, the best known being the most northerly, the Distant Early Warning Line, lying close to the northern limit of the Canadian mainland. It also extended to the west across Alaska and eastward across Greenland. Subsequently the significance of the DEW Line declined and many of its minor links and intermediate stations were discontinued. The reduced fear of Soviet bomber attacks and the rise in significance of ballistic missiles called for a modified detection system which was limited to installations in Alaska and at Thule.

During the late sixties it became apparent that from the viewpoint of air power the Arctic no longer held strategic priority. Nevertheless it was learned as late as January 1968 that bombers armed with nuclear weapons were still being used on routine missions over the far north. The occasion was the near-calamitous accident to a B-52 bomber near Thule. This led to a Danish ruling that no planes carrying atomic weapons could fly through Greenland air space. The same is understood to apply to Canada. The Thule affair was caused by fire aboard a patrolling bomber which resulted in the plane and four bombs crashing on the sea ice not far from the Thule base. During the following eight months an international group of experts from the United States and Denmark took precautions to remove all trace of atomic contamination, which was particularly necessary because the local Eskimos depend upon hunting sea mammals for their livelihood. The accident brought home to the people of Greenland the hazardous consequences of their strategic location and strengthened public concern over the presence of defense installations in their midst. It also drew attention to the risks of pollution of sea water from atomic sources.

Apart from a few hundred defense personnel at Inuvik and Alert in Arctic Canada there has been a minimal display of military activity there in recent years. This has been in keeping with government policies since World War II to avoid as far as possible the use of northern Canada for offensive military purposes. Aircraft have continued to patrol the far northern

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skies using available airfields, but there has not been a specifically northern defense command. Following the review of Canada's foreign policy and defense obligations in 1969, which led to some reduction in commitments to Europe, there was a certain amount of public advocacy by defense specialists of a more active role for the military in the Canadian Arctic, usually advanced in terms of strengthening sovereignty in the area. The outcome seems likely to be limited to opening a regional task force group headquarters at Yellowknife, some increase in northern training for land forces, and an upgrading of the air patrol activity over northern coasts and waters. This may in fact be mainly an endeavor to relieve the United States of any continuing obligation that may exist for this kind of operation. There has been some public advocacy in the United States of a new northward-oriented defense policy in the light of a possible increase in commercial use of northern waters. It is most improbable that Canada will regard any stepped-up economic activity in the North as an excuse for undertaking or allowing others to undertake new military adventures there. Defense aside, the present attraction of northern Canada—and of northern Alaska and Greenland also—is due largely to the possibility of exploiting natural resources there. Added to this is a genuine concern for the welfare of the native peoples—Indian and Eskimo—who make up about half of the local population. There is a new-found urgency about preservation of the physical environment. Finally, Canadians appear determined to provide effective administration of the whole of their northland and to occupy it to the extent that seems necessary and practicable.

The search for resources has long been the driving force behind northern adventures. The Norse in Greenland sought timber on the Canadian side of Davis Strait, and a succession of Europeans came there for whales, seals and fish. The initial English occupation of northern Canada was a result of the fur trade. And fur proved until recently to be an adequate basis for the simple Eskimo economy under which semi-nomadic trappers traded through scattered posts. Today this is insufficient to support an acceptable living standard, even when supplemented by sale of stone carvings and other handicrafts. It may continue possible for small groups of Eskimos and Indians to eke out other income by drawing on fur, fish and game, but to most northerners such renewable resources will gradually

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become merely a support for recreation and occasional seasonal hunting. The rising population with growing demands for a higher living standard can no longer be thought of as an indigenous group dependent on the vagaries of nature. They are now well on the way to becoming an integral element in North America's industrialized society.

Fishing is another matter. It is well established in some high latitude areas including the Davis Strait banks off Greenland; in fact commercial fishing is now the main support of the whole Greenland population. Forestry and agriculture are out of the question in the true Arctic and somewhat marginal even within many miles of it. Although much of the subarctic forest of Siberia and northern Europe supports, as it does in Canada, a large-scale production of pulp, paper and sawn timber, equally good or better stands are available farther south.

If only for sociological reasons, farming is unlikely to keep pace with the rising demand for fresh food and dairy products by the growing northern population. Where a generation ago such produce was grown on the spot in the Mackenzie Valley and elsewhere in northern Canada where reasonably good soil existed, all food is now imported by truck or air. Most of the gardens of the Mackenzie, renowned among northern travelers, are no more. The reason is lack of gardeners, and the townsman's conviction that the store is the only place to obtain foodstuffs.

Fresh water is a renewable resource that is attracting increasing attention in the drier parts of North America where the supplies have been polluted or depleted. The landscape of much of the far north includes a rich variety of lakes, ponds and rivers and gives an impression of providing a reserve of water which might become available for use elsewhere. The impression is misleading. Precipitation over much of the North is low, although evaporation is also low and the permafrost beneath prevents the water from draining away. While information is still incomplete, it suggests that the northern water reserves can contribute little or nothing for export southward.

It is to the nonrenewable resources that government and industry are looking to provide an economic basis for northern development. There are minerals without doubt, possibly very extensive supplies indeed. They include many metals as well as oil and natural gas, and nonmetallic minerals such as sulphur and asbestos. The seemingly insatiable demand for such re-

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sources has at last brought an intensive search even to the most extreme corners of the North—including the Canadian Arctic islands and remote Peary Land in Greenland. The mining and petroleum industries which a generation ago mastered the world's deserts have now turned to the unfamiliar Arctic and seem likely to be as successful there. Occurrences of oil have nothing to do with the present distribution of world climates and there is no reason to believe that even the most frigid Arctic terrain may not in time become a production site. Finding the precise locations is largely a matter of accurate geological mapping and thorough geophysical prospecting, together with the command of adequate financial resources. It has long been recognized that the sedimentary basins known to exist in the North of Canada and Alaska would include oil.

Problems now facing the oil industries in the North are in part technical—location, drilling methods, transportation to external markets and so on. Lack of familiarity with the climate and terrain has already raised many problems which will have to be solved, and soon. Most of the ground where drilling takes place is tundra, devoid of trees and underlaid by permafrost. The sparse vegetation contrives to insulate the underlying permafrost from summer melting and it must be retained if the local ecological complex is not to be destroyed. Much of the surface is in summer so soft as to be impassable.

In a less-informed age the methods followed in extracting minerals were left largely to industry. Pollution of the air and local waters, disfigurement of the landscape by waste dumps and creation of ramshackle mining camps were the price to be paid for progress. There is now growing evidence of a change in attitude on the part of governments, spurred by an aroused public opinion. This is occurring not only in North America but also in the U.S.S.R. and in Greenland.

III

The government of Canada advanced plans in mid-1970 to apply land-use regulations in the North, appropriate to the conditions there. The new regulations which will amend the Territorial Lands Act are being based on an analysis by ecologists, geographers and other scientists of the special susceptibility of some types of surface to permanent damage. Thus once the Arctic tundra has been removed by excavation or altered by the move-

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ment of tracked vehicles or by activities incidental to mining, construction or oil drilling, it may remain scarred for generations. Growth is slow in the low temperatures, soils are deficient and the presence of permafrost accentuates the damage. Under the new regulations, all industrial and related activities affecting the natural environment will be licensed and the user held strictly to account for damage done to the land. The objective of the government as explained by the responsible Minister, Jean Chrétien, is "to gain the benefits which the North can provide without leaving a trail of waste and destruction behind."

Alaska is faced with comparable hazards from plans to build a road and pipeline from Prudhoe Bay on the Arctic coast to tidewater on the Gulf of Alaska. Conservationists and the experts of the U.S. Geological Survey are concerned about the consequences to the landscape of widespread destruction and the passage of enormous quantities of oil at temperatures of about 160°F. through the planned 48-inch pipeline. The U.S. National Environmental Policy Act is being cited as a possible constraint on the projects.

Public concern about conditions under which resources in northern Canada may be exploited extends far beyond the mere preservation of the physical environment. It is particularly evident with relation to petroleum. Any oil or gas produced in northern Canada will be available for export to overseas markets or the United States. The major oil companies now active in Canada are owned and controlled outside the country—in the United States or Western Europe. Hence the overall planning of their exploration and production activities tends to be made independently of Canadian national or local interests. While certain controls are possible at the national level, through Acts of Parliament or rulings of the National Energy Board, there is considerable public concern that the overwhelming proportion of the oil leases now being explored is held by non-Canadians. One interesting exception to this is a comparatively new company, Pan Arctic Oils Ltd., which is Canada-based and owned in the country—with 45 percent of the interest held by the government. There remains of course the ultimate control that all the lands now being explored for oil in northern Canada are Crown lands and disposable only under terms and conditions acceptable to the government. It should be emphasized that while the government of the Northwest Territories based at

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Yellowknife took over responsibility for most administrative matters on April 1, 1970, natural resources remain a significant exception still under the direct control of Ottawa.

Government concern over the wise use of northern resources is based in part on a desire to see that wealth and work derived from them shall bring some direct benefits to residents of the North, including the majority who are of native (Indian-Eskimo) origin. Long delays in providing adequate education and social services have meant that many local residents lack sufficient basic education to perform any but the most menial tasks. Even when taught specific mechanical or other skills they are still far from being really competitive on the local labor market. Government policies seek to guarantee a high proportion of local employment to northerners, and industries must formally ensure that this is done. However, almost all the more skilled jobs and all the professional tasks are performed by outsiders usually in the North only temporarily.

There has not arisen—at least in Canada—a formal claim on the part of Indians and Eskimos to ownership of any land where resources may be found. There are limited Indian reservations of which title belongs to the local occupants, but there have never been any Eskimo reservations or treaty arrangements concerning Eskimo lands. There is no particular reason why wealth from natural resources which may reach the Eskimos needs necessarily to be earned by them through manual or other labor. It is conceivable that some type of trust fund might be accumulated on their behalf from revenues derived from mineral royalties. Of course, very expensive school and social service facilities now made available reach the native people in effect free of charge.

The situation in Alaska is rather different; since settlement is not as sparse as in Canada, political awareness among the native peoples is more advanced, and the powers of the state are greater than those of a Canadian territory. The two situations, however, are bound to have repercussions on one another.

While public interest is at the moment focused particularly upon petroleum, metallic minerals are not unimportant and may in the future become really significant. The first gold mine was opened in the Northwest Territories as long as 30 years ago at Yellowknife and is still in production, along with several others in the same area. Nevertheless, there has been remarkably little activity in the intervening three decades, although exploration

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has gone on apace. A typical example of the slowness with which production may follow discovery is a lead and zinc mine a little south of Great Slave Lake at Pine Point. Known early in the present century, this mine has been in production for only a few years. It has already made very large profits based on extremely high-grade ore and has done so in the three-year tax-free period customary for new mines in Canada. The mine and concentrator, together with the newly built community, have not yet had a major impact on northern economics, since the final production of the metals from the ores is carried out by the parent company far away in British Columbia. This particular mine may well become a test case of the ability of northern industries to carry on their processing with minimum damage to the surrounding countryside and to house their staff in attractive and comfortable communities. Here as elsewhere in the North, the provision of the usual amenities of ample good water and the disposal of wastes provide a continuing challenge to technology.

Other new mining ventures in the Canadian North include the Anvil lead-zinc mine in a remote part of the Yukon and a new large asbestos development far off to the east in Arctic Quebec. However, the greatest challenge, apart from petroleum in the far north, is presented by a large and rich occurrence of iron ore in northern Baffin Island. This will call for quite elaborate local facilities and for shipping the product out through seas heavily infested with ice.

All these new industrial opportunities present the same problem—of creating, in relatively isolated parts of the North, satisfactory communities to house the technical and administrative staffs essential to modern business. Mining camps are no longer the answer; the need is for modern townsites, in contrast to the rather primitive accommodations still available to many Indians and Eskimos. As that sort of distinction can no longer be tolerated, the authorities are speeding the integration of northern groups into the new industrial society.

The early dependence of the North upon an economy based on wildlife—hunting and trapping—has left an interesting residue of conservation legislation going back many years. In effect, most of the Northwest Territories have for almost 40 years constituted a wildlife preserve within which strict game laws have been enforced. Maps showing the extent of this preserve indicate that its borders cover far more than the land itself, including waters

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between the Arctic islands and a good measure of the open ocean to the northwest and east of the islands. This legislation is particularly interesting in the light of recent Canadian action to avoid the risk of damaging wildlife or the physical environment through pollution involving both land and sea.

IV

The new legislation, which seems certain of passage during the summer of 1970, is in a sense an extension of the earlier policies which date back to recommendations originating with the Royal Commission on Reindeer and Muskoxen of 1919. The essential distinction is that the newer enactments are enshrined in acts of the Canadian parliament rather than ordinances of the Northwest Territories. The 1970 legislation includes three distinct bills dealing with the matter—C 202, an act to prevent pollution of areas of the Arctic waters adjacent to the mainland and islands of the Canadian Arctic; C 203, an act to amend the Territorial Sea and Fishing Zones Act; and C 204, an act to amend the Fisheries Act. This legislation is interrelated with other antipollution measures such as "the Canada Water Act" and "the Northern Inland Waters Act."

For our immediate purpose it will be sufficient to comment on the two bills C 202 and C 203. The latter simply substitutes a 12-mile territorial sea for the three-mile one previously in effect. In doing so it utilizes methods of delineating the limits that were laid down in the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone. As far as the Arctic is concerned, the new law effectively closes off the passages between the Arctic islands, so as to remove any doubt there may have been about their being Canadian waters. This effectively places all access to the Arctic Ocean through the Canadian Arctic islands under Canadian initiative. The apparent exception is M'Clure Strait at the western extremity of the Northwest Passage but it is in practice impassable to ships because of the enormous accumulation of Arctic ice that at all seasons of the year passes into it. The new legislation, which amends that passed in 1964, applies to all Canadian coasts the 12-mile seaward limit long adopted by many other countries, including the U.S.S.R.

Of far greater significance both in Canada and abroad are the provisions of bill C 202, which is specifically concerned with pollution control in the northern seas. The Preamble makes it

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clear that action is imperative because of "recent developments in relation to the exploitation of the natural resources of Arctic areas, including the natural resources of the Canadian Arctic and the transportation of those resources. . . ." It emphasizes Canada's obligation to see that exploitation of natural resources and navigation of the Arctic waters take "cognizance of Canada's responsibility for the welfare of the Eskimo and other inhabitants of the Canadian Arctic and the preservation of the peculiar ecological balance that now exists, in the water, ice and land areas of the Canadian Arctic." The legislation is thus consistent with and in a sense an extension of that which established the Arctic Islands Preserve in the 1920s.

Essential parts of the legislation define the "Arctic waters" to which new regulations are to apply as being limited by the sixtieth parallel of north latitude and the one hundred and forty-first meridian west (an extension of the Canada-Alaska boundary) and a line running 100 miles from the nearest Canadian land. An equidistant line is to apply between Canada and Greenland where the 100-mile limit is not applicable. Also included are waters above the continental shelf and other submarine areas where Canada controls mineral exploitation.

Within the waters so defined the deposit of waste of any type is prohibited. In addition provision is made for the control over any structures to be erected in the waters. Perhaps the most significant provisions are concerned with control over the passage of shipping through the Arctic by the establishment of shipping safety control zones from time to time. Within such zones, regulations may apply governing the construction of any vessel using the area, the provision of any navigation aids on it, the engines, the manning of the ship, cargo carried, provision of maps and charts, etc. This is clearly intended to ensure that no unsuitable vessel may enter Arctic waters where on account of ice or other hazards it may be damaged and so cause pollution. It is understood that the 1970 voyage of the American super-tanker *Manhattan* was undertaken in accordance with the provisions of bill C 202.

There is provision in the legislation to exempt ships of other governments from the direct application of the regulations. While the Canadian government expressed its readiness to defend the new 12-mile limit before the International Court, it informed the U.N. Secretary-General that Canada would no

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longer respect the authority of the Court over disputes involving pollution in waters off her coasts.

The legislation received unanimous consent at its second reading in the Canadian House of Commons. However, a formal protest was received by Canada against the new legislation from the United States, on the grounds that Canada had no right to control pollution in Arctic waters outside the territorial limits. The protest was rejected. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Mitchell Sharp, offered to coöperate with other states in working out international agreements along similar lines, and he also expressed willingness to discuss with other governments the details of any regulations which might be put into effect under it. In public discussion of the new policies, the government has emphasized that it had tried and failed to secure prior international acceptance of its views and was introducing the legislation only because of the urgency of preventing a disaster which under Arctic conditions might well be beyond remedial action. Speaking in the House of Commons on April 16, 1970, Mr. Sharp gave comments on the U.S. objections. He said: "We cannot abdicate our responsibilities in a matter of special importance to us, and we cannot abandon our right and duty to protect our territory. Given this fundamental and irreversible position on our part, there remains nevertheless a wide range of possibilities for bilateral and multilateral coöperation which could advance the cause of environmental preservation in the Arctic waters in harmony with the interests of all concerned."

The immediate occasion for the new legislation is, of course, the discovery of oil in northern Alaska at Prudhoe Bay and the possibility that it may be transported to markets by way of a seaway through Arctic Canada, along with the discovery of oil also on the Arctic coast of Canada. There is also the possibility of further oil being found in the Canadian Arctic Islands and even of other minerals such as sulphur. Quite apart from transport of any oil that may be located is the expected increase in sea traffic because of the intensive mineral search going on there. The highly dramatized voyage of the *Manhattan* in 1969 and its return to the eastern Arctic in early 1970 emphasized the real possibility of regular movement of large oil tankers through Arctic waters at all seasons of the year. This, together with the great hazard from ice and the still limited knowledge and experience in handling such vessels in Arctic waters, raised the pos-

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sibility of disaster on a large scale. During the 1969 summer, two oil barges were crushed in the ice of the Northwest Passage and served as a demonstration of the consequences of such oil spillage in very cold ice-filled seas.

Whether the Northwest Passage can become a regular shipping lane for tankers is still far from certain, but shipping of one sort or another seems certain there. Canada will be called on to provide the essential icebreaker service, aids to navigation, ice reconnaissance and the communications network needed to ensure safety of navigation to all. So the Northwest Passage seems likely to follow the Northeast Passage as an addition to the world's seaways. The new Canadian legislation is predicated on this taking place and attempts to forestall any serious calamity in Arctic waters because of oil. It is the hope of the Canadian government that other countries responsible for Arctic seas will before too long produce corresponding regulations.

V

What is the state of the far north likely to be in the foreseeable future in light of the dramatic discovery of oil in the Arctic and the almost inevitable exploitation of rich mineral deposits there? Many assume that the production of mineral resources in large quantities must necessarily lead to a rapid growth in northern settlement and a "filling up" of the so far empty northlands.

This seems most improbable. North Americans are familiar with the opening up of the West and the flooding of the empty farmlands with European migrants. Yet even there, today, especially on the Canadian prairies, there has been a reversal in the flow, with a withdrawal from the remoter farmlands to small towns and larger cities. That urban trend seems irreversible, and there is no reason to believe the situation in the North will be different. Hence we must regard northern Canada as a special case of a universal trend—toward urban living, based upon advanced technology with labor-saving industry as the economic basis. The scattered semi-nomadic native population is rapidly congregating in towns, attracted by schooling for children, medical services for all and an assured living from either wage labor or public support. Simple efficiency demands that governments concentrate their efforts in a few major centers where really first-class educational and other social services can be provided. So in northern Canada, Yellowknife, the capital city, grows in size

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and municipal splendor; Inuvik, the new city in the far northwest, and Frobisher in the southeast, follow suit. There may ultimately be perhaps a half-dozen other towns of some significance. That is all, except for possible isolated mining communities to which the working staffs will commute from the centers where their families live. Isolated geographically, northern communities will be in close electronic contact with each other and with the south. Their residents, the new urban nomads, highly specialized in their trades or professions, will regard the North as a way station in a career that may carry them to and fro across the nation. Some northern dwellers there will be permanent, but their children may remain in the North or move on. The same rules will eventually apply to the native peoples, who within a generation will not be distinguishable by education or occupation from other northerners.

One important feature of the new Canadian North is that it is likely to have a profound effect on the character of Canada as a whole. While even fairly recently it seemed probable that Canada's destiny lay in merging economically and politically with the United States, two factors now seem to make this improbable. The one is the noteworthy resurgence of French-Canadian culture likely to spread to other parts of Canada, giving the whole country a bicultural aspect. The other becomes daily more significant—the opening of the North and the impact this is likely to have on the younger Canadians, who will be its most active advocates. This last frontier concept is not merely a play on words, for it does provide the highly articulate and technically competent younger Canadians with a region to make their own. In doing so they may well alter quite radically the traditional view of Canada as a narrow strip along the northern margin of the United States, dependent on its culture and to an extent on its markets and its technology. There may be a new Canadian emphasis on the North, and Canada's international contacts may increasingly be with the other northern lands of Europe and with the U.S.S.R. This is the real message in the mineral exploitation now going on in the Arctic and the new legislation aimed at containing it.

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COVERING THE FOREIGN NEWS

By Harry Schwartz

SPARKED by Vice President Spiro Agnew's critical remarks last fall, there has been much discussion of the news media in recent months, particularly as regards their objectivity, their concentration of ownership and the like. These questions must be regarded as important regardless of one's political views. They deserve even more probing and wider examination than they have received to date. But to confine the debate to the issues raised by Mr. Agnew is grossly inadequate, for there are other equally or even more fundamental matters that need airing. How large are the resources this nation devotes to keeping itself informed on current events? How are they distributed by the media as a whole and by the major media separately as among major areas of attention? Are changes in the amount or distribution of these resources required to create a better-informed citizenry capable of making more intelligent decisions? It is strange that in this land of numerous and wealthy foundations so little effort has been made to provide a comprehensive overall picture of the organization and operation of the news media and an evaluation of how well they perform their functions. This article is intended to serve as a contribution to the needed larger discussion.

Domestic news, of course, usually dominates the media quantitatively. For most Americans, events in their local communities, their states, and finally in the United States as a whole are normally of greatest interest. A time of war is the great exception to this generalization. The young Americans fighting in Vietnam make that story of primary importance for this country's media, an importance enhanced by the violent domestic controversy about that struggle. There are other special foreign situations that from time to time command major public interest here: a war in the Middle East, a major purge in the Kremlin, the opening of a world's fair in Montreal or Osaka, the Olympic Games in Mexico City. But these are the exceptions. Even in this age of instantaneous communication, supersonic airplanes and ballistic missiles, most foreign developments are of secondary interest to domestic news for most Americans—and correspondingly for the majority of citizens in other countries.

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This has one advantage for anyone interested in American journalism (using that term in the widest sense to cover all the media). Foreign news coverage is a smaller and more manageable area for examination than domestic news coverage. Thus most individual newspapers, magazines, radio stations and television stations do not have foreign correspondents of their own. They rely for their foreign news on the wire services and—in the case of network-affiliated radio and television stations—network correspondents. Most newspapers and stations that have no foreign coverage of their own defend this lack by arguing that their readers have relatively little interest in such news. The corollary of that lack of interest is lack of knowledge—sometimes quite an appalling lack of knowledge. Little more than a decade ago, for example, a sample study by *The New York Times* found that a substantial proportion of Americans did not know then that West Berlin was separated from West Germany by about 100 miles. Many who were aware of this fact, moreover, confessed they had learned it only a few days earlier when President Eisenhower appeared on national television to discuss the Berlin crisis and, with pointer in hand, indicated this geographic reality on a map. In the mid-1960s, a Council on Foreign Relations study found that a significant percentage of the American people did not know that Mainland China is ruled by a communist régime.

Americans who want to be well informed on foreign affairs can be, of course. They have available not only the diverse and abundant reports of the best domestic newspapers and magazines and of the electronic media, but also a large fraction of the information available to the rest of the world. Foreign publications—from *The Economist* and *Le Monde* to *Pravda, Granma* and the *Peking Review*—can be freely bought here or received by subscription through the mails. Short-wave broadcasts from numerous foreign countries can be heard clearly here; their reception is not jammed and is determined only by the quality of the receiver and by atmospheric conditions. At any given time, moreover, numerous Americans are abroad in many countries as tourists, businessmen, soldiers or—in the case of Cuba recently—sugar-cane cutters. Books on foreign affairs are turned out abundantly by domestic publishers, and most books published abroad in English or other languages can be easily imported.

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And the supply of lecturers on foreign affairs—Americans and foreign nationals both—is always abundant.

II

These considerations suggest a look at the total mechanism by which the world's supply of foreign news is collected and disseminated.

Quantitatively, the largest single factor in this activity consists of the major world news agencies—the Associated Press, United Press International, Reuters, Agence France Presse, Tass, Novosti, Prensa Latina, Tanjug, Ceteka, the New China News Agency, etc. These have the largest numbers of correspondents and their reports—distributed through newspapers, radio and television—reach the largest audiences. All of these collect news in many countries and sell it—or distribute it at little or no charge, in the case of some communist agencies—in many countries. The largest news agencies distribute their dispatches in several languages and compete on an international scale. Some of these agencies are purely commercial organizations concerned primarily with making maximum profit. Tass and other communist news agencies are servants of the governments which own and control them, and which by no means put profit considerations first. These state-operated agencies are propaganda instruments, and the news they disseminate publicly reflects the policy objectives of their masters. They are really more analogous to the United States Information Agency, the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and other Western organizations which collect and transmit news abroad with government political purposes in mind. These latter organizations, it should be noted, also employ numerous correspondents around the world.

The resources employed by the large news agencies are substantial, but it is difficult to get really comparable and unambiguous data. Recently, an Associated Press spokesman said that his organization had a total of 1,000 full-time reporters, editors and photographers stationed abroad. In addition, it employs numerous stringers—*i.e.* part-time correspondents. In 1969, the AP had 30 reporters, photographers, etc. in Vietnam alone. A United Press International spokesman estimated that his organization had 850 full-time foreign news personnel, plus 1,486 stringers. A Reuters spokesman said his agency had 3,000 full-

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time correspondents in the field around the world plus 800 stringers. A mechanical addition of the figures would suggest that the three agencies employ over 2,000 full-time correspondents, plus several thousand stringers. These figures are useful as a rough guide to the magnitude of these agencies' effort, but much more detail is needed for analysis of any complexity.

A second major source of foreign news is the aggregate of print media, newspapers and magazines. One measure of the quality of a publication is the amount of money and manpower it devotes to collecting foreign news. In this country, the most extensive foreign news staffs are those of *The New York Times, The Sun* (Baltimore), *The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times* and *The Wall Street Journal* among newspapers, and of *Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report* and *Business Week* among magazines. *The New Yorker's* foreign reportage has been outstanding for many years, while *Harper's, The Atlantic, The New Republic* and *The Nation* devote much space to foreign affairs. There is no need here to elaborate on the role of this magazine. Many specialized newspapers and magazines have one or more foreign correspondents. *Science,* for example, has a foreign editor and prints regular reports on foreign scientific developments, and *The New England Journal of Medicine* prints frequently, if irregularly, a London letter titled "By the London Post" written by a British doctor. The New York Times News Service and the Washington Post-Los Angeles Times News Service sell their correspondents' reports to other newspapers here and abroad. Some information on the magnitude of these publications' efforts is available. Some months ago *The New York Times* had 39 full-time foreign correspondents and about 75 stringers. A recent issue of *Time* indicates that the combined Time-Life News Service has 47 full-time correspondents stationed in 27 different foreign cities. *Newsweek* last April 20 listed 24 correspondents in 12 foreign bureaus. *Business Week* recently reported that it had seven foreign bureaus and named eight persons associated with them; the magazine also had the use of reports of the McGraw-Hill World News Service, which includes 20 correspondents stationed in 12 foreign cities. Presumably all these magazines also have stringers whose numbers and locations are not published.

Numerous newspapers and magazines outside the United States maintain foreign correspondents. One need but think of the

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London *Times,* the *Daily Telegraph,* the *Guardian,* the *Daily Express, The Economist, The New Statesman* and the *Financial Times* in England; *Le Monde, Figaro, Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Spiegel, Stern, Pravda, Izvestia, Borba, Politika, Rude Pravo* and others on the European continent. In Asia, the Japanese newspapers lead the way, competing furiously in foreign coverage as well as other fields. Australian and New Zealand newspapers are very alert to foreign developments. The best South American newspapers attach great importance to foreign news coverage. *Le Monde* and the *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* attempt to circumvent the language barrier by publishing weekly and monthly collections respectively of English translations of some of their articles. Additionally there are specialized news services covering particular areas or subjects, as well as specialized publications presenting translations of foreign newspaper and magazine material; in this country, for example, there exist *Atlas* and *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* and in the Soviet Union, *Za Rubezhom.*

Third, there are the somewhat similar foreign news collection staffs of the electronic media. All major American and foreign networks maintain extensive staffs of correspondents and photographers outside their countries. The Columbia Broadcasting System and Westinghouse Broadcasting have sufficiently extensive news services—including foreign staff—to operate all-news radio stations, and undoubtedly the National Broadcasting Company and the American Broadcasting Company could do the same if they wished to. Moreover, the existence of communications satellites and the fact that there is a brisk international market in television film assure that news footage of an event like an Apollo launching is quickly and easily available to anyone around the world who wants it. Based on personal experience, I would guess that outside this country the British, Italian and Japanese broadcasters are the most enterprising in the foreign news field and invest the most resources in the task.

Finally, of course, there is a whole host of other miscellaneous sources. These include an army of free-lance writers in many countries (and their free-lance photographer fellow-spirits), anxious to sell material abroad. Then there are thousands of businessmen working outside their native countries and regularly preparing reports for their home offices on political and economic developments from Jiddah to Hong Kong to Santiago

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and points in between. Traveling academicians are almost everywhere in the world gathering material for scholarly studies, and sometimes also for popular newspaper and magazine articles. The United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service and its foreign opposite numbers make much information available by recording, translating and publishing the contents of foreign broadcasts.

In the absence of better data, I would record the very impressionistic estimate that around the world about 10,000 people are employed full-time, or full-time equivalent, in gathering, editing and interpreting foreign news for private and government media of all sorts. This estimate includes photographers for newspapers and television. On the assumption that associated costs—for salary, office space and supplies, travel and communications—average between $50,000 and $100,000 per full-time worker, this suggests that between 500 million and one billion dollars are spent annually for foreign news and picture coverage. Of this the largest single share—which may reach or exceed half the total—is probably accounted for by the spending of U.S. private and public agencies in the news collection and dissemination field.

III

The substantial sums spent on covering foreign news are allocated very unequally as between different parts of the world, at least by American publications. This can be seen immediately if a geographic breakdown is made of the distribution of the correspondents maintained by three leading American news organizations: Time-Life, Newsweek and Business Week-McGraw-Hill. Of the 99 foreign correspondents named in these magazines' mastheads recently, 47—almost half—were stationed in Western Europe. In Asia, including Vietnam, they had 20 correspondents, a little more than one-fifth the total. Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (including Vienna, which is a good monitoring spot for this area) had eight correspondents altogether, the same number as Canada. There were four correspondents in the Middle East and four in Africa below the Sahara, although one magazine listed no permanent correspondent in either area. Latin America had seven correspondents and only one magazine maintained a correspondent in Australia.

Judging by these data, those responsible for foreign coverage

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on these magazines believe that Western Europe deserves as much effort as almost all the rest of the world outside the United States put together, while Latin America deserves less than 10 percent of their resources and Black Africa requires less than five percent. Since all these publications are quite successful in the marketplace, their editors must have an accurate estimate of the distribution of their readers' interest and attention. But this allocation of reportorial resources—which is presumably more or less proportional to space devoted to these different areas—suggests also that Americans get relatively little news about events in Latin America and Africa, though they are relatively well informed about what is going on in the area between London and Bonn.

Apparently neither American business interests in Africa nor the growing interest of U.S. Negroes in the lands of their ancestors has yet had great influence on the volume or patterns of African news coverage. Since Americans got over being scared about Castro, coverage of that area—including Cuba itself particularly—has gone back to its traditional siesta pattern. Some people have argued that the minimal coverage of Latin America reflects an American press bias against reporting repression in friendly military dictatorships. But this argument forgets that, unfortunately, coverage of friendly democratic countries is also minimal, reflecting the fact that except in times of crisis most Americans have little interest in Latin America. Areas where there are relatively few American correspondents—Eastern Europe, the Arab countries of the Middle East, Black Africa and Latin America—are regions where resident reporters have to lead peripatetic lives. They travel from country to country frequently in response to the changing news scene, and also to try to keep au courant with developments over their diverse and far-flung territory.

IV

Some problems of coverage go beyond such factors as the number of correspondents available in a given area. Thus Moscow has a relatively large resident group of foreign, including American, journalists. Usually, however, these reporters are confined to the Soviet capital and can report only what appears in the Soviet press or what they themselves see and hear in the Soviet capital. No American news enterprise has had a corres-

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pondent in Peking for many years, but coverage of some sort is obtained from there by using Canadian and French news services. In addition, many news organizations employ "China watchers" resident in Hong Kong, where they study the Peking press and Peking radio broadcasts, as well as interview travelers and refugees who have left China. An even more special problem is posed by Hanoi, whose resident correspondent population is mainly from other communist countries. Normally such little news as the American press prints from Hanoi comes from North Vietnamese broadcasts or from the Agence France Presse correspondent in that city. On occasion, of course, Hanoi has permitted brief visits by American correspondents who it believed would write material useful for its propaganda war against the United States. Occasionally American correspondents have been permitted to visit Ulan Bator; perhaps the least accessible communist capital for American correspondents—besides Peking—has been and is Pyongyang. Castro has blown hot and cold on American reporters in Cuba, and last year expelled the last professional American correspondent in Havana.

It cannot be assumed automatically that there will be good reporting from a country or an area if only correspondents are permitted to go there. The quality of foreign correspondents and their product varies enormously. Some reporters abroad are talented writers, perceptive observers, well connected at many levels of the society of the country they are covering, fluent in the native language, and expert on the history, culture, politics, economics and mores of the country. Such paragons, unfortunately, are not the majority. At the other extreme, there are many correspondents who find themselves thrust into a country where something important is going on, but where they do not know anyone, do not know the local language or local political situation, and where they may never have been before. In such a plight—there were more than a few such unfortunates visible in the Prague press corps in 1968—an unhappy correspondent turns for help wherever he thinks he can get some. He visits the American and other friendly embassies for such briefings as they are willing to give, paying the price of being influenced by the diplomats' personal or national orientation toward the local situation. He hires an interpreter, a native who immediately becomes an encyclopedic source of information and misinformation about the local scene as well as a provider of translations.

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He haunts the bars frequented by other correspondents in hopes of picking up information—or at least exciting rumors that he can attribute to "informed sources"—from his more knowledgeable colleagues.

Particularly difficult, even for the well-prepared correspondent, are the problems he faces in a communist or other dictatorial country whose rulers are very sensitive to what is printed or broadcast about them abroad. Sometimes there is formal censorship, as in Russia under Stalin. Usually, however, the pressures are more subtle. An occasional expulsion of a correspondent drives home the lesson that if one wants to stay in the country one had better not write anything too displeasing to the local powers. And if one wishes to make a long-term career of being a correspondent in such a country there is the constant fear that one's visa may not be renewed or that a reëntry visa may be cancelled while one is abroad. So one has reason to be particularly careful about what one reports. The alternative is to experience frequent and long-continued refusals of visas. This writer, for example, has applied almost annually since the late 1940s for a Soviet visa, and—with two exceptions—has been refused each time. In 1955 he obtained a visa by appealing to Khrushchev directly at a time of détente categorized as the "spirit of Geneva." In 1968, he obtained a visa, for a few days, by getting a seat on Pan American's press inaugural flight from New York to Moscow, an occasion Moscow did not want to mar by publicity about a visa refusal. Arriving in Moscow, he applied immediately for an extension of the visa, but was turned down within three hours, perhaps an all-time record for speed in the Soviet bureaucracy. Soviet officials have told this writer that his visa problems would vanish if he became a "progressive journalist." Lincoln Steffens was cited as one to be emulated.

Moscow is perhaps the most brazen capital in terms of having officials who use the granting or withholding of visas as a means of trying to influence foreign news coverage, but it is by no means the only practitioner in the field. Moreover, of course, many Moscow correspondents have honorably resisted the pressures there, and some have been expelled as a result. But even in countries where visas are not a problem, there are many attempts to influence journalists. The "coöperative" or "reasonable" reporter may get exclusive interviews with high officials or other rewards for his "understanding attitude," while his "unreason-

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able" colleagues will be out in the cold. Such practices are, of course, not wholly unknown in Washington and other centers of domestic news coverage.

Some newspapers have discovered an effective way of bypassing the kind of pressures exerted in Moscow and similarly minded capitals. This is by the device of maintaining a specialist outside the country involved, one who reads his target's newspapers, listens to its broadcasts, interviews visitors recently in that country and so on. Some of the most perceptive writing on the Soviet Union, for example, has been done by Victor Zorza and David Floyd, two expert English Kremlinologists. But men like these two have the handicap of not being able to write under a Moscow dateline, and many editors have the impression—obsolete in this age of rapid communication—that a Moscow dateline, or its equivalent for other capitals, is essential to give credibility to their coverage. Ideally, of course, a newspaper, a press association or a television network ought to have both resident correspondents in the country involved and specialists elsewhere who can write free of the pressures to which resident correspondents are subject.

V

News media do not normally hire correspondents because of their expertise on a particular foreign area. Such experts are usually of an academic turn of mind and their tastes and temperaments are often—though not always—uncongenial to the demands of journalism. Moreover, most news organizations do not like to hire a man with any explicit or implicit commitment to keep him in one place for his entire career. Rather they look for the versatile good newspaperman, someone who has proved himself in local reporting as a colorful and interesting writer. It is assumed that, having proved his ability to report local news, he will do a good job abroad, especially if prepared by a few months of language study and some side reading or instruction on the area. These aids are not always provided, however. And since the flow of news is unpredictable, it is not at all surprising on occasion for a newspaper to assign an East European expert to Cairo or Tel Aviv, or a London correspondent to Prague when unexpected newsbreaks compel improvisation.

I do not want to overemphasize the negative in this area; there are many excellent correspondents, and there are many cases

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where reporters enter an unfamiliar country at a time of crisis and do far better jobs of covering the situation than might have been expected. Nevertheless, there is a strong case for giving correspondents more training before sending them abroad, and for letting them work for extended periods in an area so that full benefit can be obtained from the knowledge they develop by covering a country or a group of countries for a substantial number of years. It might be useful, also, to forge stronger links between the worlds of journalism and of scholarship. It ought to be as honorable and prestigious for an academic specialist on Africa, say, to work a sabbatical year as a reporter on that continent as to get a fellowship to travel there and write a book about some aspect of African affairs. But no perfect solution is possible because there are simply too many countries in the world, and there are too many constraints on the resources the media have available for foreign coverage.

A word needs to be said about other pressures on a correspondent. These pressures are different, of course, for a *Pravda* correspondent and for a reporter for, say, the Baltimore *Sun* or the London *Times*. Nevertheless, regardless of politics, a correspondent's standing in the world of journalism depends on what he gets printed in his newspaper or transmitted over his radio or television station back home. A *Pravda* correspondent must write within the confines of the party line and with an eye to the opinions of the local Soviet ambassador. The Westerner, especially if he represents an important newspaper or network, will find himself being wooed or pressured by those who want to influence the content of his dispatches. If he is in a free country, both opponents and supporters of the régime will seek to influence him, to put him under obligation or to reward him—as noted above—by providing an occasional scoop or exclusive interview. Meanwhile, the correspondent has his eye on his master, his editor at home, who decides whether his copy or his tape or his film shall be used or "spiked," *i.e.* thrown away. The editor makes his wants known either by requesting specific stories, or by sending caustic or laudatory comments about stories that have been filed by the correspondent. And the latter, of course, takes careful note of the treatment accorded the stories he sends—observing which are put on the front page, which are buried inside, and which are simply scrapped—and is guided by the preference pattern implicit in these choices.

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How are choices made between different items of foreign news? The potential amount of foreign news on any day is vast, coming as it does from more than 120 sovereign states and from a whole host of international organizations ranging from the United Nations and UNESCO to Comecon, NATO, the Warsaw Pact Organization, the Common Market, etc. Yet on a typical day even a newspaper which emphasizes foreign news will usually have less than 20 columns (15,000 words) for foreign news, while a typical half-hour show on radio or television will devote less than half its time (and much less than 15,000 words) to foreign developments. What determines the choices that are made?

For most Western news media, the governing considerations arise from the fact that they are commercial enterprises seeking to earn profits. All other conditions being equal, profits depend upon the size of the audience—a newspaper's circulation, a television program's rating. Hence those who make the choices take it for granted that they must select from the available wealth of material those items that will most attract readers, listeners or viewers. But attraction is a multi-dimensional concept, since news may attract readers because it is important or entertaining or coincides with their prejudices or deals with someone they know. Moreover, Western media are normally caught in a competitive situation, so that those who direct them are very sensitive to what their rivals are printing or broadcasting.

The competitive situation guarantees that major news will be covered by all general media. When a Khrushchev falls, when a bloody major battle takes place in Vietnam, when an Apollo 13 encounters near-disaster in space, virtually all media report such developments. But most foreign news is much less obviously important. How does one choose in New York or Chicago or Los Angeles between news about another strike in northern Italy, a new oil find in Libya or the resignation of the foreign minister of the Central African Republic? These are representative of the many news items which editors have almost complete freedom to print or broadcast or to ignore. The fate of such secondary news becomes a chance process, depending upon the tastes or whims of the individuals making the choices. What this means, of course, is that the reader or listener has little opportunity systematically to follow events in a country he is interested in so long as nothing particularly dramatic or exciting is happening

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there. This explains why so many revolutions take place in Africa and Latin America with most Americans having had little inkling before the event. On the other hand, of course, editors do try to present situation reports from time to time on countries that have been out of the main flow of news. But the timing of such "roundups" or "takeouts" is irregular. And since their space is limited there is no guarantee that all the significant factors in a particular country will be identified and their importance for the future spotlighted. The basic problem, again, is that we live in a large and very complex world, while news media resources of money, space and time are very limited. The span of attention and the time of the audiences they serve are also very limited, of course.

VI

Criticism of bias in the news has a long history and, no doubt, a long future as well. On any controversial issue that rouses strong emotions, partisans of one view or another tend to be discontented with news reports that deviate even slightly from their opinions. To recognize this is not to deny that correspondents, editors and publishers are human beings and have their own opinions. Yet the commercial news media know that their most precious asset is the public's confidence in their integrity and fairness, and by and large they strive to justify that confidence. In any case, in a country like the United States there are many alternative sources of news prepared and edited by many different groups of people. The diversity of news media and the competition among them are the public's best safeguard against slanted news, provided, of course, that citizens take advantage of the rich diversity of news sources and news interpretations available to them. Yet the possibility that some individual reporters or some particular publications or radio or television stations try to adjust their presentation of the news to their own predilections can never be wholly ruled out. Moreover, the proliferation of syndicated columns and the increasing popularity of "news analysis" articles show there is a public demand for more than the bare facts, for an attempt to get at the meaning of the news. Some reporters, seeing strong opinions expressed in columns or interpretive pieces by their colleagues, sometimes wonder why they must hide their own opinions. This is undoubtedly one source of the demand for what some now call "advo-

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cacy journalism," coverage of a sort that an older generation usually dismissed simply as biased reporting.

The widespread response evoked by Vice President Agnew's charge of press bias gave warning that a significant fraction of Americans—on the Left as well as on the Right of the political spectrum—distrusts the media. This is a warning the media can ignore only at their peril. And the problems involved are particularly acute in the foreign news field because most readers, listeners and viewers have little opportunity to find out for themselves at first hand what is happening abroad. In self-defense, the media need to give more public evidence that they are alert to the threats of bias and inaccuracy in reportage, and are ready to punish those guilty on either count.

There may be some useful ideas in the field of medicine that can be adapted to journalism. In every first-class hospital, for example, surgeons know that their work is under the scrutiny of a tissue committee which will demand an explanation when the pathologist reports that an excised appendix or kidney or gall bladder was perfectly healthy and should not have been removed. And many patients know, of course, that they have the right to file a malpractice suit against any physician who they believe has treated them improperly or incompetently. No doubt many managing editors—and their radio and television opposite numbers—think of themselves as one-man tissue committees, and some will even boast of how many incompetent reporters they have fired. But what if the offender is a star—the anchorman on a nationally televised news show or a widely syndicated columnist or a correspondent who has won the Pulitzer Prize?

Perhaps the best solution would be for news media to be as critical of each other openly as they are of elected and appointed public officials. It is hard to understand, for example, why so many television news shows and documentaries are reviewed by television critics who possess no specialized knowledge of the subject and whose normal task is to criticize the entertainment values of television programs rather than their factual accuracy and balance. Similarly, television and radio might probe more frequently at the print media, using competent people to praise or to criticize newspaper and magazine reportage and commentary. If such serious, mutual appraisal were a normal public phenomenon, Mr. Agnew's comments would not have made such a stir.

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Almost certainly these problems will become more difficult in the years ahead if the nation's present polarization continues and deepens. Already some young reporters find it hard to understand why "the Establishment's" point of view on a controversial issue must be reported as fully as the opinions of its critics. Many of tomorrow's newspaper, radio and television people will come from the ranks of the passionate young collegians who today feel so strongly about the iniquity of the Vietnam war, the "police persecution" of the Black Panthers, and the martyrdom of Che Guevara. Can there be such a thing as objective news if millions of Americans think of themselves as opposing other Americans across the barricades, each faction convinced it is the sole proprietor of all virtue and truth on disputed issues? Can there be communication across the barricades even if the latter exist only in reporters' and readers' minds?

VII

If one turns, finally, to the forces likely to shape foreign coverage, one finds conflicting and contradictory pressures at work.

First, there is a paradox. The development of communications satellites has tied the world together as never before. Direct television broadcasts between continents—or from the middle of the Pacific Ocean to the rest of the world, as when Apollo 13 splashed down—are now routine. Newspaper reporters can now regularly and reliably file their stories by phone to their home offices in the United States from London or Moscow or Tel Aviv or Tokyo. Simultaneously, however, costs of foreign reporting—like everything else—are rising steeply, while, in the United States, media income and profits have been hurt by the mini-recession of early 1970. For economic reasons, therefore, the pressure mounts to have fewer correspondents stationed abroad, to substitute foreign nationals—who can be paid much lower salaries—for American citizens as correspondents, to widen the number of foreign countries a particular correspondent is responsible for covering, and to rely more on covering particular important situations by temporarily assigning correspondents from the U.S. home office. Technical factors have opened the way for excellence of coverage on a scale never known before; economic forces operate in the opposite direction.

Second, technical revolutions now on the horizon hold the promise—or threat, some will say—of completely altering the

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media as we know them and sharply altering existing means of being informed about the world outside the United States.

One such technical revolution now visible is the communications satellite capable of broadcasting directly to home television receivers. Present communications satellites transmit relatively weak signals that must be picked up at special national reception points and rebroadcast to homes at higher power. This gives those in control of ground reception stations the power to decide what will and what will not be rebroadcast of the signals transmitted by a satellite. But within the next decade, more powerful communications satellites will probably be able to broadcast directly to homes; the political implications of this development are staggering. The Soviet Union, for example, could broadcast visual transmissions of its view of the world news to homes everywhere, and so, of course, could the United States, and probably after a time other countries as well. Events in the Middle East and Eastern Europe have long since taught the world that short-wave radio is a powerful political medium; direct television has the potentiality of being much more powerful for political and propaganda purposes. By 1980 there may be a national debate in this country about whether direct Soviet television transmissions—or, later, direct Chinese television transmissions—should be jammed, and the Supreme Court may some day have to decide whether the safeguards of the First Amendment have political or geographical limits when tested by technology beyond the wildest fantasies of the men who framed the Constitution. At the least, these foreign-initiated direct television broadcasts open the possibility of the curious viewer seeing many more of the world's events as they happen, directly and in real time, than is now the case.

Additionally, of course, the future of the newspaper as we know it is in doubt, particularly if unions continue to impede modern technology while demanding continually higher wages. By 1980 the process of replacing newspapers by home facsimile receivers may have begun. Such receivers could connect each home with a computer containing encyclopedic reports on events throughout the world in the past day, week or month. A businessman with investments in Iran could set his receiver to give him all the news about that country, and then receive each morning as full an account of Iranian events as he would get if he were living in Tehran. Or a basketball fan could, in season, set

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his receiver to get reports and commentaries on basketball competition all over the world. Correspondents might then work for computer memory banks, rather than for specific newspapers or stations. But who would control such a computer and decide what should or should not go into its memory bank and its printouts? Can there be competitive computer services of this kind, or is such service inherently monopolistic like the supply of telephone service or electricity in a given community?

Whatever the changes ahead, foreign news coverage presupposes interest in what happens beyond a country's borders. On this score the most ominous sign is the increasing isolationism in the United States, the recoil from foreign involvement and the ever-rising concern about domestic tensions and troubles. A young reporter I know recently turned down a choice foreign assignment. "The action's now in the United States," he confided to me later. "Everybody's bored with Vietnam and nobody really cares about the Europeans or the Russians any more. It's the blacks, the college radicals, and the dope addicts that people are worried about, and the way to make a reputation in the 1970s is to cover those stories. I'd be crazy to go abroad." If my young friend is right—although the explosion that followed President Nixon's move into Cambodia makes it doubtful, for the time being at any rate—the future of foreign news coverage is bleak indeed, regardless of technology or economics.

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IRONIES OF INDIA'S GREEN REVOLUTION

By Wolf Ladejinsky

FOR nearly five years the "green revolution" has been under way in a number of agriculturally underdeveloped countries of Asia. Its advent into tradition-bound rural societies was heralded as the rebuttal to the dire predictions of hunger stalking large parts of the world. But more than that, those carried away with euphoria at the impending changes saw in them a remedy for the poverty of the vast majority of the cultivators. They were correct in assuming that the new technology stands for vastly increased productivity and income to match. However, the propitious circumstances in which the new technology thrives are not easily obtainable and hence there are inevitably constraints on its scope and progress. Apart from this, where it has succeeded, the revolution has given rise to a host of political and social problems. In short, the green revolution can be, as Dr. Wharton correctly pointed out in *Foreign Affairs* in April 1969, both a cornucopia and a Pandora's box.

This is seen very decisively in India's experience. There, extravagant anticipations have been replaced by a more sober and meaningful appreciation of its accomplishments and of the possibilities for expanding the scope of the technology beyond its current narrow limits. It has become obvious that many more farmers must be drawn in to share the benefits of the revolution. The polarization of income between the rich and the poor farmers and the erosion of the position of the tenantry which has been accentuated by the increases in productivity should not be part of the model of the new agricultural strategy. While self-sufficiency in foodstuffs is indeed a welcome—and likely—prospect for India, concern is rising that for all its technological feasibility it may fall short in helping solve some of the grave problems of a good many village poor. (The views expressed here and elsewhere in this article are, of course, those of the author alone.)

Indian political and economic problems are currently as numerous and grave as usual, but for once food shortages do not claim the headlines. The first two years (1965–66, 1966–67) of the new agricultural strategy were dried away by some of the

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worst monsoon failures recorded. Three years later, with favorable climatic conditions accompanying the new agricultural technology, the food position of India is "comfortable." In 1969–70 output of foodgrains was a record 100 million tons, or 11 million tons more than in 1964–65, which was the best year before the revolution. Since agricultural development *is* the basis of the country's economic growth, this is a very significant gain. The annual rate of growth so far is closer to 2.5 than the anticipated five percent, giving rise to doubts about the attainment of the projected 130 million tons in 1973–74—the last year of the Fourth Five-Year Plan. But statistical trends do not tell the whole story of the program's effectiveness.

Despite the serious social and technological limitations of the new agricultural strategy, one thing is clear: the wheat revolution is a reality, way beyond any expectation. Second, where the ingredients for the new technology are available—new high-yielding varieties, concentrated doses of fertilizers, assured sources of perennial irrigation—no farmer denies their effectiveness. Third, agriculture in the late 1960s has benefited from a guaranteed minimum price for wheat and a general improvement of terms vis-à-vis other sectors. Fourth, the desire for better farming methods and a better standard of living is growing not only among the relatively small numbers using the new technology, but also among countless farmers still outside looking in. This mental attitude, though too seldom supported by the necessary resources, cannot be overemphasized. At long last, in India too the power of ideas to bring about change is being demonstrated. To those concerned with purely physical entities of economic growth, a psychological change of this sort is not subject to numerology and is probably of no moment as a developmental factor. But it cannot be denied that a new, if unquantifiable, factor of growth has been introduced. Finally, the progress in agriculture is a result of major official and private efforts at several strategic points, which have slowly created a milieu radically different from that of the 1950s and early 1960s. These are considerable achievements, regardless of the growth rate.

II

This said, and viewing the new developments as a technological phenomenon, what stands out at this point is the unevenness of their application and the need for patient attention over a

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considerable period of time in order to achieve basic agricultural changes. Nothing makes this clearer than comparing the progress made with the two pivotal foodgrain crops of India, wheat and rice.

Whereas wheat has been a success story par excellence, rice can claim no such distinction. Between 1964–65 and 1968–69 all the basic indicators of agricultural growth in rice have remained almost unchanged; in contrast, the respective increases in wheat acreage, production and productivity were 19, 52 and 28 percent. But the character of the technological changes is best seen in the hotbed of the green revolution, in the state of Punjab, India's traditional wheat basket. There, an innovation-minded group of farmers has in a few years succeeded in translating larger crops and income into a new way of life. More precisely, they planted 80 percent of the land with "miracle" wheat varieties; increased the number of tubewells for irrigation from 7,000 to 120,000; virtually tripled the consumption of fertilizers within four years—moving, during the last decade, from a mere two to three kilograms per acre to as high as 40 to 60 kilograms in 1968–69—and almost doubled the yield. For this the Punjab farmers deserve much credit, but they were fortunate in a remarkable set of partners: the Ford Foundation, which pioneered and demonstrated the utility of the new "package of practices" idea; the Rockefeller Foundation, with its invaluable work in developing the Mexican "dwarf" wheat varieties upon which the wheat revolution is based; the Punjab Agricultural University, which has rapidly become the center of dissemination for new varieties; and finally, the great effort of the central and state agencies which in a variety of ways helped to provide the inputs upon which the upswing in productivity rests.

At the moment, the same cannot be said for rice, despite significant pockets of progress in Kerala, Tamil Nadu, parts of Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal. Since wheat accounts for 15 percent of the total acreage in foodgrains as against 31 percent in rice, the latter is most important in determining the overall rate of agricultural growth. If rice productivity had shown anything comparable to that of wheat, India would have been self-sufficient in foodgrains now. The principal reason for the disparity in performance is that tested and proved new varieties are still in the making, and that, generally speaking, rice varieties demand a great number of favorable environmental condi-

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tions; they are susceptible to pest and disease, the knowledge of which still is inadequate. The quality of the new strains leaves something to be desired and it markets at a considerable discount. Unlike Punjab, with its successful irrigation program, the lack of irrigation and absence of drainage facilities in some of the major rice-growing parts of the country are serious constraints. In such conditions, with few notable exceptions, the much talked about "miracle" strains from the Philippines and Taiwan have so far met with limited responses. Additionally, the problems of the "new" rice, especially in the eastern belt of the country, extend beyond the technological lag: a much larger proportion of the cultivated rice area is in small holdings whose proprietors lack credit and are often tenants on the land, and these impose limitations of their own. For this very reason, if the improved rice technology could become a reality it would achieve something beyond higher productivity.

Dramatic and speedy solutions to the problems with the existing rice technology cannot be expected. But it would be an error to conclude that they are insurmountable. From the few successes and many more failures much has been learned. The early assumptions about the miraculous performance of the new varieties overlooked the importance of their environment. (Even in wheat, unless the cropping of "Kalyan Sona"—the principal variety—is diversified, there is a danger that rust might affect the entire belt where the variety is grown. Much will depend upon the ability of agricultural science to ward off such setbacks.)

Now, however, Indian research institutions are deeply involved in propagating strains suitable for Indian contexts. They are equally involved in research about soils and water in the huge dry land areas of India. Whatever the time lag, the responsibility for failure to solve these difficult problems quickly in a country as vast as India and as varied in soil, climate and water management cannot be ascribed to the new agricultural strategy itself but only to its vulgarization as a "do-all."

Nor is the green revolution only a wheat revolution, as its critics taunt; this first stage is a spectacular development in itself but more importantly it will serve as a useful organizational testing ground for general changes in agricultural technology. Only a blind enthusiast could have conceived that the passage from traditional to modern agricultural practices would be effected as if by magic—even in the United States hybrid corn

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came into its own after much trial and error, and more than a decade after the initiation of the process.

That the changeover is a long-drawn-out affair, or that coarse grains and nonfood crops have hardly been touched by the transformation, or that the total rate of output is still only half of that anticipated is partly in the nature of things and partly a matter for concern. A monsoon failure to which India is so prone might slow down the progress of the new strategy still further, but it would not be fatal. And the most encouraging part about the recent technological developments is not so much the physical output as the use of inputs, or the willingness of the farmers to invest and take risks. Inputs have been sharply and steadily rising, as in the use of chemical fertilizers, improved seed, minor irrigation facilities, plant protection devices, tractors, etc., and the remarkable degree of monetization of the farm economy and the big array of industrial consumption goods increasingly in demand by the farmers. Another sign of the profitability of modern agriculture is the appearance on the scene of a new breed of farmers made up of a motley crowd of retired military and civil servants, doctors, lawyers and businessmen. Not a few of them have "unemployed" rupees acquired through undeclared earnings, and most of them look upon farming as a tax-haven, which it is, a source of high supplementary income free of any tax burdens.

The breakthrough in agriculture is far from a full-fledged revolution. For the time being, however, Indian agriculture has acquired some muscle. All its benefits cannot yet be estimated, but their gradual and cumulative effects on the purely productive side of the economy are inescapable. That for the time being this holds true only for a minority of India's 60 million farm families does not vitiate the significance of the changes in the making. In some parts of the countryside the new sense of initiative and optimism is palpable. That this is indeed so is attested by islands of progress even in a state like Bihar, which is still characterized by agricultural primitivism and almost unrelieved poverty.

III

Without minimizing the significance of the accomplishments, however, one must say that the revolution is highly "selective," even if its spread effect is not inconsiderable in certain areas.

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Such revolutions must often go slowly under the most propitious circumstances, which are not present in India. It is enough to recall that three-fourths of India's cultivated acreage is not irrigated, and "dry" farming predominates. If for no other reason, vast parts of the country have not been touched by the transformation at all and equally vast parts can boast only of "small islands within." Even in Punjab, with all its advantages, not every small farmer—not to speak of remaining tenants—practices the new technology and much less so in other developing parts of the country. The green revolution affects the few rather than the many not only because of environmental conditions but because the majority of the farmers lack resources, or are "institutionally" precluded from taking advantage of the new agricultural trends. The changes engendered by the new agricultural strategy have brought these and other handicaps into sharp focus at a time when aspirations for betterment are widespread among all classes of farmers, and when most of them need no persuasion that modernization, which stands for bigger crops and higher income, is good for them. Waiting to be part of it and yet not getting there create potentially disturbing social, economic and political issues. And this is the other side of the coin in any assessment of the course of the green revolution.

In typical Indian conditions of great inequality of land ownership, resources and marketed surpluses, income inequality is the normal state of affairs. The seriousness of the inequalities in income distribution may be judged from the Prime Minister's remark that there are only two genuine majorities in India—the young and the poor. It is estimated that in 1969 out of a total rural population of 434 million, 103 million owned no land at all and another 185 million operated less than five acres per family. Taken together they represented 67 percent of the total rural population, and of these an estimated 154 to 210 million lived in abject poverty, or at a level of 200 rupees ($21) per capita per year.

If the widening gap between the benefits to large and small holdings is to be reduced and the scope of the new technology enlarged, the less privileged cultivators must be enabled to secure the highly productive new inputs. Since it takes 10,000 to 12,000 rupees to reëquip a seven- to 10-acre holding, it is not normally within the reach of the farmer unless he can secure coöperative credit. More often than not he can get only in-

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sufficient credit and, on occasion, none at all, for the distribution of credit and inputs in an Indian village reflects a power structure very much biased in favor of the affluent. But whatever the causes, the argument is not against modernization for making the rich farmers richer still, but against the limited scope and that the growing disparity leaves the poor peasants relatively poorer. Many would-be innovators can be likened to tenants who receive land under a reform but nothing else to go with it. They are excluded from the purview of the green revolution altogether, or participate in a limited way at best. For reasons only partly attributable to the new technology, many farmers in areas of great potential are now pointing enviously to better production, higher income and better living "over there" in their neighbors' fields. India can ill afford any growth in social discontent.

The situation of the multitude of tenants is even more difficult than that of the small farmers. In areas where the agricultural transformation is a potent force—Punjab and the Purnea district of Bihar—the accomplishments are marred by its adverse effects on the already troublesome tenurial conditions. Where the new farm practices are in vogue, land values have risen three, four or fivefold, and unrestricted land control has never been more prized. As a consequence, not only have rents risen from the traditional (though illegal under the reforms) 50/50 to as high as 70 percent of the crop, but security of tenure and other rights in land a tenant might claim have also been perceptibly weakened. Now that green-revolution land is practically invaluable, the owners would like to get rid of tenants altogether and resume the land for self-cultivation, making use of the plentiful supply of hired labor which has no claims on the land whatsoever. There are too many tenants or sharecroppers to deal with them summarily without courting a good deal of trouble, but the old squeeze whereby tenants are reduced to sharecroppers and eventually to landless workers is being accelerated as more of the bigger owners become involved with the new technology. The basic provisions of tenancy reforms are less attainable than before the advent of the green revolution.

And the landless farm laborers, though their lot is temporarily improved, are eventually due for a setback. The new type of agriculture is labor-intensive, employing more labor due to double-cropping and other labor-demanding practices it is introducing. Not surprisingly, therefore, it has been hailed as a

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solution of the large problem of unemployment among rural landless. It appears, however, that even in the most advanced state like Punjab this is not as promising as anticipated because the technology is both labor-absorbing and labor-displacing. In recent years, wages have risen sharply, and so to a degree has the number of days of employment; on balance, and despite a steady rise in the cost of living, farm labor in Punjab is somewhat better off. Not so in Purnea, where higher productivity and higher prices have caused a shift in wage payments from kind to cash. This is a distinct disadvantage to the farm laborer, whose wages in kind have insured him a minimum food supply. And looking ahead, additional employment and better wages are not forever, for new farm practices are bringing in a host of labor-saving devices such as tractors and threshers and much in between.

Mechanization in India will never reach the science-fiction dream level where tractors will be guided by remote control. Most "farmer-revolutionaries" are more modest in their expectations, but economy of operation and increasing returns through mechanization are uppermost in their minds. Judging by the scheduled imports and contemplated increase in the domestic production of tractors and other equipment, the advocates of "go-slow" mechanization as a social policy measure have had their last ineffectual word on the subject, certainly for the life of the current Fourth Five-Year Plan.

In short, farm mechanization is as irreversible as the green revolution which fathered it, although much of it will not apply to nearly the same degree in the principal rice areas of India. Events are beginning to catch up with Nehru's lament against farm mechanization as a threat to peasant welfare. Agricultural labor has received none of the organizational and legislative benefits which have helped industrial labor. Even at this early stage of modernization of the bigger farms of Punjab the drive is for more equipment and fewer hands. The estimated 35 to 40 million landless laborers are bound to grow in numbers and their rate of employment in any other field of activity is not promising; thus the outlook is for an overcrowded, low-wage farm market regardless of the scope of the green revolution.

IV

The new technology is not the primary cause of the accentuated imbalances in the countryside. They are the result of all

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the social, religious, economic and political forms which govern the village, and which admittedly are mirrored in the shape which the new technology has assumed. It is not the fault of the green revolution that the credit service does not serve those for whom it was originally intended, that the extension service is falling behind expectations, that the village "panchayats," or councils, are essentially political rather than developmental bodies, that security of tenure is not given to the many, that rentals are exorbitant, that ceilings on land ownership are notional, that even rising wage scales are hardly sufficient to satisfy the basic essentials of the farm laborer, or that generally speaking in those conditions economic necessity and social justice of and for the village poor do not ride in tandem.

To a considerable extent these are man-made issues of long standing. Modernization of agriculture should include a combination of technical factors geared to higher production *and* improvements in the institutional framework to benefit the rural underprivileged. The current emphasis is on productivity, to the exclusion of social imperatives: the first will bring India to self-sufficiency; the second is beginning to yield great vexations. Self-sufficiency will also give rise to a variety of technical and economic problems, principally reduction in counterpart funds to finance parts of the country's developmental programs which will accompany the gradual elimination of foodgrain imports under PL 480. A much more serious matter, however, could well be a lack of effective demand for the increased output resulting from the insufficient income of a substantial number of rural people.

Under the leadership of leftist parties, the village poor are not averse to forcible occupation of land, harvesting standing crops and violent attempts to secure better wages. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the first nine months of the past year 346 incidents of forcible occupation of land (totalling 100,000 to 300,000 acres) with many murdered and injured have taken place in West Bengal alone. That this could be only a foretaste of an enormous "law-and-order" problem is well understood, and the government of India is deeply disturbed by it. In late November 1969 an emergency conference was held on how to place the agrarian reforms back on the rails. The Prime Minister addressed the Chief Ministers of all the states with an unmistakable sense of urgency, saying: "The warning of the

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times is that unless the green revolution is accompanied by a revolution based on social justice the green revolution may not remain green." The Prime Minister wanted the Chief Ministers to "act now when there is still time and hope" to implement the reforms properly as part of the new agricultural strategy, because "no single program so intimately affects so many millions of our people as land reforms." This is the issue and the question is whether at long last the Prime Minister's exhortations will find their mark.

If past performance of the states in legislating and enforcing reforms is any guide to the future, it would be idle to expect smooth sailing for the Prime Minister's modest but useful package of "should-be-dones." In fact, the split of the ruling Congress Party has increased the political hurdles in state legislatures already dominated by the top class of the farmers. The reforms the party could not achieve in its heyday of undisputed authority are much more difficult of attainment now when the bargaining involved and the price paid become crucial to the governing power. It is possible, however, that the conflict of economic and social necessity and the tide of rising tension may force some politicians to rise above politics. Recent legislative enactments in a few states are new straws in the wind, although enforcing them is something else again, and the skeptics may be pardoned if they prefer to wait and see. A positive outgrowth of the new technology is the Small Farmers' Development Agency, which was created to provide some two million farmers with inputs and services which would enable them to share in the benefits of the new agricultural policy. For the first time in the country's agricultural history, members of this particular class of farmers have been singled out for rehabilitation. But in this instance, too, the guiding spirit behind this measure, Mr. B. Venkatappiah, noted that "the Agency will be virtually inoperative in various sectors . . . unless a number of measures are first undertaken . . . in regard to land records and land reforms."

India is not in a position to endow all or most of its frustrated small farmers, tenants and agricultural laborers with suitable means to share in the agricultural New Deal. In the ultimate analysis, the answer lies in the rapid growth of the entire economy *and* a high rate of employment. But to the extent that this lies in the distant future, India, and more particularly the

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states of India, could, if they so politically willed, see the present as an opportunity to remedy the worst features of rural inequities, thereby extending also the scope of the new technology. It must be reiterated that the issue is not one of solving all or most of the problems but of obtaining the minimum of security to mitigate the bias against institutional change and point the way to interdependence between technology and socio-economic reform. In practical terms, it would mean providing a large number of farmers willing to innovate with the wherewithal to dig a well, buy fertilizer, obtain credit. This is part of "distributive justice" complementary with the need of growth, factors which cannot be looked at in isolation. Even failing this, an "explosion in the country"—in the sense of peasant rebellion and chaos—is unlikely, for the kind of poverty that wouldn't be tolerated in many another country is still tolerated in India. On the other hand, it cannot be doubted that the festering existing tensions will grow apace, and an agricultural revolution geared only to new techniques and higher productivity, a model extolled by most students of economic development, will unwittingly contribute to that very end.

Whether events will belie this gloomy assessment remains to be seen. But this much may be ventured. While on the face of it a confrontation between progress and poverty may be inevitable, poverty itself is not an immutable Indian condition laid down for ever from on high. Is it not just possible that, in order for India to maintain social peace and provide a measure of economic contentment, at the critical moment the worm may turn after all, and the miracles of the new technology will find the congenial company of political will and ensuing policies and actions bent on a steadfast attack on rural poverty?

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THAW IN PORTUGAL

By Douglas L. Wheeler

DESPITE the recent waves of tourists who have returned with tales of the beauties and comforts of Lisbon and Estoril, and despite new Luso-American cultural and commercial links, misunderstanding and ignorance characterize much American thought about Portugal. Some observers still believe that this small nation lives entirely in the past. But the fact is that significant changes are taking place there.

In September 1968, Dr. António de Oliveira Salazar, aged 79 and premier for more than 36 years, suffered a severe stroke. As Salazar hovered close to death, the President of the Republic, following the provisions of the Constitution, appointed as new premier, Dr. Marcello Caetano, aged 62, former Professor of Law and Political Science at Lisbon University. His rise to the highest political post in the Portuguese government provoked speculation that perhaps his appointment represented more than just a change in the authoritarian guard. Indeed, since taking office, Caetano has initiated more political reforms in the system than came during the previous decade under his predecessor.

The roots of the transition from the Salazar to the Caetano era go back well before the old premier's stroke.[1] Since 1945, when the authoritarian régime first allowed opposition groups to campaign—albeit under close control—in presidential and national assembly elections, pressures for change have become pronounced. But until the 1960s, troubles for the government were only sporadic. In the past decade, however, the international position of the régime both in Africa and in Europe has come under fire, and the stability of the régime and the cohesion of the leadership groups have been threatened by revived opposition movements.

II

The political history behind the longest surviving authoritarian government in Western Europe is perplexing. When Portugal adopted a constitutional monarchy and a variant of

[1] By early 1970 Dr. Salazar had partially recovered his physical powers. As a semi-invalid he continued to live at the official premier's residence, while Caetano, the actual premier, resided at his own private home in Lisbon.

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liberalism in the Constitution of 1822, the country was poor, backward and burdened with a pre-industrial economy. Derived largely from France and Spain, Portuguese liberalism was a concept understood by only a handful of people in Lisbon and Oporto. Until the first quarter of the nineteenth century, the only cohesive institutions were both traditional and, at least in part, discredited: the monarchy and the Church. Out of the crucible of the Napoleonic campaigns and civil wars between absolutists and constitutional monarchists, the army emerged as the only institution capable of sustained unity and decisiveness. The parliament, established by liberal constitutions, remained largely ineffective.

In the course of the century, then, the army became the final arbiter of Portuguese politics. In pronunciamentos during the first half of the century, it overthrew governments, won civil wars, backed constitutions, sorted out leadership and sent feuding politicians packing. It was the decisive factor in the transition from a monarchy to a democratic Republic in 1910. After brief fighting, the last reigning Braganza, Manuel II, "The Unfortunate," fled to exile in England, the republican-infiltrated army triumphed, and a Republic was proclaimed.

Though there had been a number of civil wars in the last century and a half, there had been no true revolution. The short-lived democratic Republic (1910–1926) foundered amid bankruptcy, corruption, instability in government and violent extremism from enemies on the Left and Right. In 16 years, the Republic had 44 governments. Only one president served out a full term. The dreary republican parade of instant crises and fallen cabinets repeated on a larger scale the last turbulent decades of the monarchy. The same institutional problems which had been present under the monarchy continued largely unchanged under the Republic. As Luis Araquistain wrote in this journal over 40 years ago,[2] the Republic was only a pseudo-revolution, burdened by the traditional militarism and attorneyism which made profound change and sustained democracy impossible.

During the Republic, the forces with a monopoly of power—the army, the Church and the landed oligarchy—withdrew support from the parliamentary régime and coalesced into a counterrevolutionary movement. Allied with senior army offi-

[2] Luis Araquistain, "Dictatorship in Portugal," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1928.

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cers, with the Church hierarchy, with the commercial establishment, and with the *latifundistas* (large landowners) in southern Portugal, were the monarchists, the Catholic students and professors, and the integralists, the only Portuguese group which bears any resemblance to a fascist movement.

On May 28, 1926, the Republic was overturned by a pronunciamento led by three high-ranking officers who stated they were throwing out the politicians to "save the country." When the generals could not cope with the problems of bankruptcy, they appointed a civilian economic expert, Dr. Salazar, to rejuvenate the economy. Beginning in 1928 as Finance Minister, Salazar did more than balance budgets; by 1932 he was premier, had gained the confidence of a coalition of the oligarchs and monopolists, had made peace with the key army commanders and had taken over most of the political power in what became known as the *Novo Estado* (the New State).

Salazar's program for the regeneration of Portugal changed little during four decades. His favorite political terms were "order," "discipline," "unity" and "hard work." Certainly Salazar provided leadership and direction where both had been lacking during the last years of the democratic Republic. One price of his success, however, was that he had to give free rein to the supporting coalition of interest groups, a burden which his successors will have to deal with. The armed forces received healthy portions of the annual budget expenditures throughout a period when Portugal was not in a war in Europe, or, for that matter, in Africa. Besides the outsized army, there emerged another force, a political police, the *polícia internacional e de defesa do estado,* often known as PIDE. By the 1950s PIDE had developed into a disproportionately large force of officers and informers linked with the armed forces. PIDE elements initiated operations in Portuguese Africa beginning in 1958–59. Growing in influence, it terrorized both the democratic and nondemocratic opposition, and by the late 1960s had become a national scandal, almost a state within a state, as Premier Caetano himself has implied.

In other respects as well, authoritarianism has been costly. The *Novo Estado* employed many instruments to depoliticize the people: propaganda, indoctrination of régime-sponsored associations, manipulation of the judicial system, control of public education and censorship. A political moratorium, main-

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tained for 40 years, proved highly effective due to the gap between the élite and the masses. The results include widespread political apathy, an absence of politically informed citizens and a general propensity for equating all opposition with communist influence. Once consolidated, the régime found it easier to remain in power than to return to the democratic "constitutional normality" discussed as a goal during 1926–32. In the economic field also the Salazar achievement is seen to be full of ambiguities. The comparison with neighboring Spain is painful. Economic growth has been slowed by tight credit policies, restrictive customs policies, a corporative system of state-directed employers' and employees' associations, monopolies and a nearly petrified agricultural system.

Under Salazar, the régime was openly anti-liberal, anti-democratic and anti-parliamentarian, a philosophy more popular before 1939 than after. But in the post-World War II era some of the conditions in which the régime had been established no longer existed. The defeat of the fascist dictators by the Allies, the economic recovery of Europe, Portugal's admission to the Atlantic Alliance in 1949 and the United Nations in 1955, and the rise of a younger generation of dissenters in Lisbon and Oporto—all were part of the new era.

While opposition groups were forbidden to form legal parties as such, they could establish electoral groups to campaign in the elections of 1948, 1951, 1958 and 1961. Régime candidates, however, always won. Agitation for liberalization burst forth with each new election. In the 1958 presidential elections, opposition candidate Humberto Delgado won at least 23 percent of the vote. Henrique Galvão, in exile like Delgado, seized the liner *Santa Maria* as a protest against the Salazar régime in January 1961. In January 1962 a group of young officers staged an abortive pronunciamento at Beja, only to be overwhelmed. The reaction of the government was to tighten security at home and in Africa, to step up a propaganda campaign in an effort to improve Portugal's image with her allies and to revise the Constitution of 1959 so as to end direct elections for president. By 1968 the surface atmosphere of tranquility, which had been so carefully nurtured by the régime, was being punctured not by easily discredited extremists but by those moderates concerned with the enduring crises in the home economy and in Africa.

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III

In the postwar era the growth of the Portuguese middle classes became significant. Younger, more sophisticated businessmen and industrialists assumed more important positions; more students chose business-administration careers, fewer chose law and government. Men born between 1920 and 1940 barely remembered or did not experience the much maligned democratic Republic. Younger leaders' perspectives were further enlarged as they traveled outside Portugal and read more widely.

Along with new contacts with the outside world came new profits and more prosperity for the middle classes. Substantial numbers of foreign tourists—especially American, British and French—spent their money in Lisbon. Hotel construction in Lisbon and in the popular resorts burgeoned. In Portuguese Africa, the discovery and exploitation of new reserves of iron, copper, petroleum and other minerals spurred the economy. For the first time, it appeared that Portuguese Africa not only could pay its own way, but could perhaps give Portugal what all colonial thinkers had dreamed of—a massive economic boost to make up for limited resources in Europe.

These traditional dreams, however, were complicated by the heavy expenses incurred in the three guerrilla wars being fought in Angola, Guinea and Mozambique. By 1969, it was clear that in tiny Guinea black nationalists controlled at least half of the country, while in Angola and Mozambique, the richest areas, the European forces were at best in a military stalemate.

Grievances among the middle classes and certain sectors of the upper classes intensified by the end of the decade. The new mineral reserves in Africa were useful in balancing payments in Portugal and stabilizing the currency, and there were some profits for the *Africanistas* (businessmen and settlers with investments in Africa). But the economy was suffering from increasing indebtedness to foreign capitalists, higher taxes, inflation and tight credit. Though the minimal income taxes, perhaps the lowest in Western Europe, were kept down, the indirect taxes in consumer goods, in exports and in other areas increased. During 1960–66, the foreign debt increased 10 times. And though the budget deficit began to level off by 1966, center groups realized that plans for future expansion of the economy at home were being mortgaged to new foreign investors, to the increasing

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war expenses in Africa, and to a continuing monopoly held by supporters of the régime in the banking and export businesses.

V. M. Godinho, recently a Visiting Professor of Economic History at Columbia University, maintains in an iconoclastic book published not long ago in Lisbon that the Salazar régime, reluctant to improve agriculture and to industrialize on a significant scale, fostered the stagnation of the country's economy. As of 1968, less than three percent of Portuguese families had annual incomes of $2,000 or more. He noted that even in the last interview given by Dr. Salazar before his stroke, his attitude toward industrialization remained highly ambivalent.[3]

By the end of the sixties, then, dissatisfaction with economic progress was intense on both sides of the political spectrum, with those left-of-center arguing that Portugal was a victim of an international capitalist coalition intriguing to keep the status quo, and those right-of-center declaring that national independence was endangered by new foreign investment and indebtedness.

One other key symptom of the economic ills was the heavy loss of Portuguese manpower. Estimates vary, but by the late 1960s it was known that over 350,000 Portuguese were working in France. Annual emigration was over 130,000, mainly to Europe, Brazil and the United States. Most emigrants came from the rural areas, where thousands of young peasants could not make a decent living from the poor soil, with low wages, tight agricultural credit, inadequate irrigation and a rigid system of ownership.Though the government tried to control emigration and divert much of it to Portuguese Africa, clandestine emigration to Europe and to Brazil was very heavy.

In short, despite some economic improvements in the foreign exchange position, a favorable growth rate and a steady currency, many Portuguese economists felt that there was a crisis. Above all, the discontent with the economic situation in the 1960s came from the newly emerged middle class and the scions of a new capitalism.

IV

Who exactly comprised the opposition to the Salazar régime? A plethora of splinter groups had survived the death of the

[3] V. M. Godinho, "O Socialismo e o Futuro da Peninsula," Lisbon, 1969. See also "The Comparative International Almanac," compiled by Morris L. Ernst and Judith A. Posner (New York: Macmillan, 1967); and "United Nations Statistical Yearbook" (New York: United Nations, 1969).

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democratic Republic. But by 1939 the communists, anarchists and radical socialists had been destroyed or driven underground; today the communist party remains rather insignificant and its major leaders are in exile. All opposition groups found organizing difficult because of lack of funds, the police-informer network, censorship and the political moratorium. Nevertheless, dissident university students in the spring of 1962 organized to raise a loud protest against the civil-liberties moratorium, and since then there have been sporadic student-police confrontations at the universities.

The right-wing extremists who opposed some policies of Salazar as too liberal were a few students, intellectuals and *latifundistas* who were integralists of *Integralismo Lusitano,* founded in 1914. While the régime has winked at the violent language and anti-Semitism seen in the publications of these elements, Salazar did not allow them much power or prominence in national policy. The reappearance of some of these pseudo-fascist groups in the 1969 elections was provoked by the liberalization moves of the new premier. Of all the right-wing elements, the monarchists enjoyed the least popular support or prospect of success, for unlike Franco, Salazar did not prepare for a monarchist succession. Heterogeneity also characterized the only legal political association, the National Union, founded in 1930. It was not a mass party, and in many areas was only nominally organized. Under Salazar it took on the cast of a movement for true believers, and resembled more a loyal alumni association than a mass party.

It was the center opposition which gained the most ground in 1964–68. Included in this group were university students, professors and writers, some of them descendants of the old Democratic Party founded under the first Republic. Even in the political wilderness, and sometimes suffering exile, voices of dissent would not be stilled. Protest clothed in patriotic garb was often tolerated.

In his first public address as premier, Caetano reassured the *situacionistas,* those who longed for a return to the status quo ante, that he would remain faithful to the Salazar legacy. Significantly, the policy in Portuguese Africa was mentioned first, and the Premier stated that he would defend it against black guerrilla movements as had his predecessor. An emergency situation persisted there, he claimed, and the need for national

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unity as regards the African struggle made an early restoration of civil liberties in Portugal impossible. At the same time, he hinted that there would be changes to keep up with the needs of the present and future. *Opposicionistas* were promised some liberalization.

In his short period in office, Caetano has demonstrated that he will have a style different from that of his predecessor. Personally more popular, more active and liberal than his former "teacher" in the arts of government, he is creating an independent image. Within one year he made flying trips to Brazil, the United States and Portuguese Africa. He has put through reforms including: giving Portuguese women the same voting rights as men; relaxation of press censorship; looser state control of faculty appointments and admissions to the universities of Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra; and more freedom for government-controlled unions. In October 1968 the Premier also released the exiled leader of the Democratic Socialist Party, Dr. Mário Soares, who had been interned on the African island of São Tomé, and who returned to Lisbon to campaign for political support.

Opposition elements in Portugal as well as those in exile complained that Caetano's reforms were farcical. While it is true that in the 1969 elections these opposition groups were hindered by the restrictive ground rules set by the government—speeches were to be confined to inside buildings and the use of radio and television was prohibited—it remains a fact that the 1969 election was the freest exercise of the sort since the fall of the democratic Republic. Positive evidence of change came in the government's actions with regard to the PIDE. During 1969 Caetano first restricted this security force by dismissing informers from the payroll and replacing some leaders; finally, in late 1969, he abolished PIDE as an agency, replacing it with a new, more closely supervised security arm. Right-wing groups were angered by some of these Caetano policies. During the preëlection campaign, some democratic leaders of the opposition grew worried, fearing a right-wing countercoup which might topple the new premier.

Of all the potential opponents of change in the present system, the army commanders are the most powerful; as has been the case since the 1820s, they remain the ultimate arbiter of politics. When Dean Acheson visited Salazar during a NATO confer-

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ence in Lisbon in 1952, he aptly described him as a "dictator-manager" who was supported by the army but did not rule it. As Salazar stated in a speech on May 28, 1962, commemorating the 1926 military coup that ousted the democratic politicians of the Republic: "The army is the last bulwark which in the most serious crises defends the destiny and conscience of the Nation."

The paramountcy of the army as kingmaker and kingbreaker remains a fact of life. The wars in Africa and the NATO connection resulted in strengthening the armament, prestige and training strength of the army as never before. By 1967 over 40 percent of the annual budget went to national defense, nearly 300 percent more than the sum allocated in 1960. Whatever the degree of unity among the top echelons of the armed forces, the new premier was obliged to take their increased potential for intervention in politics into account. And at a critical moment during the 1969 preëlection campaign, army leaders warned of possible intervention, causing opposition Democrats publicly to declare their support for Caetano in order to forestall any military coup. Though some *opposicionistas* faulted Caetano for what they termed his creation of a façade of liberalization for the sake of economic stability, they valued the steps he had made toward important reforms, and his shifting of the center of political gravity from the Right toward the middle.

That incident in the campaign indicated the precarious path the new premier was forced to tread. Though promising a free election, Caetano did not relax all restrictions. In his speeches he stressed conservative points in defining the voters' voices—either peace under his evolutionary policy, or civil war and revolution if opposition members were elected. While allowing for the first time a fairly open debate on the future of Portuguese Africa, he stressed that he offered voters a choice between a "phony independence," as he described the status of independent black states, or economic progress and increasing autonomy under Portugal.

During the election there was some intimidation by the police, and some right-wing extremists belonging to the newly formed Front for National Salvation assaulted some opposition candidates. But whereas in previous elections under the *Novo Estado,* the opposition invariably withdrew on the eve of voting, protesting and claiming fraud and intimidation by the army and the police, this time the opposition parties did not withdraw. The

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election results still seemed an anticlimax to some observers. The National Union deputies received 88 percent of the vote, while the total opposition vote, shared among three parties (two democratic-socialist groups and one monarchist), received 12 percent. Not one opposition deputy won a seat. Abstention of voters was a feature of the election, as high as 70 percent in some areas, and averaging about 40 percent throughout the country; out of nearly 10 million people, only 1.8 million, or 18 percent, were on the voting rolls in 1969. The Portuguese masses remained effectively outside the body politic.

By early 1970 the new government was staffed mainly with Caetano appointees, and began to encourage more debate within the National Union. In 1961–62, Salazar had publicly declared that more debate within the "party" was possible; now Caetano actually used it as part of the political decompression characterizing his régime. What is more, within a few months of coming to power, he had replaced nearly all of the Civil Governors with his own loyalists in each district in metropolitan Portugal. Included among the new appointees were men who had been fired by Salazar during earlier political crises.

With Salazar no longer personally in control, would the right-wing elements, the *situacionistas* who regretted the waning of the Salazar régime, accept the new, younger "dictator-manager"? Could they live with Caetano's policies? Or would they begin a search for a new man to reassume the role of Salazar and relocate the center of political gravity further to the Right? Such questions are difficult to answer, but some candidates for the role might be found among Salazar's followers who left the Caetano cabinet during several changes in 1968–69. They might include the former Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira, who, resigning before the 1969 elections, ran as a deputy and was elected.

V

Portugal remains, in West European terms, an undeveloped country. With only 18 percent of the area of the Iberian Peninsula, with a population of 10 million, or less than one-third that of Spain, Portugal has an imbalanced and semi-stagnant economy. (Unlike Spain, however, Portugal has not received large amounts of American aid since 1951.) But even given the disparity of the two countries in size, population and foreign aid received, and allowing for different standards of currency and

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economic development, one can hardly deny that by many indices of development Portugal is well behind Spain. Thus in units of agricultural machinery Spain in 1966 possessed 180,000 units, Portugal 18,000. Spain was 87 percent literate, Portugal 62 percent, and while Spain's education expenditures increased from 1961 to 1966 by 250 percent, Portugal's increased by 25 percent. The annual per capita income in 1966 was $450 in Spain, $275 in Portugal. At the same time annual expenditures for defense ran twice as high in Portugal as in Spain.

But of all the issues before the nation, that of the future of Portuguese Africa has caused the most anxiety. So closely are the issues intertwined that few know where the problem of Portugal's economy ends and the future of Angola and Mozambique begins. The guerrilla wars there and in Guinea have grown in extent and cost during the past three years. While the metropolitan armies have limited insurgency in some areas, new fronts have opened in others, and Portuguese casualties have not decreased. Now in 1970, over 140,000 Portuguese troops, the product of the largest mobilization effort in Portuguese history, are fighting there; and there is the possibility that a permanent army will be stationed in Africa, an expensive prospect for a developing country with growing economic links with Western Europe.

Caetano's record on overseas questions is hardly reassuring to certain Portuguese elements who want a political solution to the question of independence of those provinces. He was the architect of much of the philosophy and legislation for Africa during his tenure as Minister of Colonies, 1944–45, and as a colonial expert through the 1950s. Although he urged reforms of forced labor conditions in São Tomé and Angola in 1945, he was also the author of a widely read primer on the principles of Portuguese colonialism, first published in 1951. When he became premier he attempted to reform conditions in Portuguese Africa, while at the same time reinforcing the army in Guinea. His visit to all three African territories in the spring of 1969 won him popularity in some settler circles and at least temporarily reassured some vested interests. More foreign investment was encouraged to enter Africa through relaxing restrictions and providing more incentives.

However, the 1969 elections aroused alarm among white settlers. Some groups in Luanda declared that they would not accept any political settlement by "an international body," im-

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plying the United Nations, and that Caetano must take a harder line. Thus an unexpected consequence of the 1969 elections was an increasing politicization of white settler groups, a new development since the Salazar régime had enforced a political moratorium on settler organizations after 1958. Whatever the discontent of some settlers, however, Lisbon's armed forces enabled her to remain firmly in control of the white-minority governments there.

VI

Which way Portugal? A new path toward an increasing democratization, more rapid economic modernization and a constructive approach to the problem of the status of Portuguese Africa? Toward more authoritarianism? A régime of "Greek Colonels" or "Brazilian Generals"?

Salazar's political philosophy, repeated often during crises to encourage stability and discourage dissent, was that any democracy in Portugal was a farce. Party government, he said, had never put down healthy roots; even under the Republic elections were rigged. Above all, the Portuguese were not suited to the demands of democracy because they were too individualistic and overemotional.

This paternalistic view originated in an era when Portugal suffered from chaotic conditions and a lack of effective leadership. However appropriate the platonic formula of a government run by a handful of wise men, with little or no role for ordinary citizens, had been for 1926 Portugal, it hardly seems so today. Certainly younger generations, who never lived through the Republic, see little merit in it, and this view has been at least partially discredited with the changes of the last few years.

Even with the improved condition of the country and the fairly clean slates of the younger political generations, the transition into an era of greater political participation will not be easy. Though not in power, the elder dictator himself lingers on, apparently unaware of his fall from power, a symbol of the heavy past. For some, authoritarian solutions are more than expedients; they have become a way of life. The transition, if it is to be successful, will require favorable conditions both internally and externally.

Western friends and allies of Portugal would do well to listen to the words of the Portuguese democratic opposition who have

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proposed a negotiated settlement for the future of Portuguese Africa. Despite the economic arguments of those who desire the status quo overseas, the continuation of a "military solution" could—without the steady hand of farsighted statesmanship—eventually involve Portugal in costly civil strife at home and a general race war in southern Africa. One of the hopeful signs of the last two years is that the new régime's options in foreign policy are more flexible than in the past, and they are, therefore, more in the spirit of the national interest over the long run than of quick profits in the short.

The tired arguments of those who have long persecuted the democratic opposition suggest that the right-wing enemies of democracy have become less representative among the élite, and more desperate. A successful transition from authoritarianism to a more progressive system will require coöperation, restraint and a fund of good will, all in short supply in a society where "ins" and "outs" can forget at times that they are all fellow citizens. Many institutional problems remain in a country with a bloated bureaucracy, an antiquated school system, rigid social stratification and an electorate somnambulant after four decades of a political fait accompli. In 1928 Dr. Salazar was summoned from the classroom to work "the moral and material regeneration" of Portugal. He did not turn back the clock so much as he tried to hold its hands still. His successors may not be able to do so.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By John G. Stoessinger

with the assistance of William Diebold, Jr., Economics; Fritz Stern, Western Europe; Henry L. Roberts, Eastern Europe, Soviet Union; John C. Campbell, Middle East, North Africa; Howard Linton, Asia; Robert D. Crassweller, Latin America; Frank Wolf, Africa.

General: Political and Legal

BETWEEN TWO AGES: AMERICA'S ROLE IN THE TECHNETRONIC ERA. By Zbigniew Brzezinski. New York: Viking, 1970, 320 p. $6.95.

This is one of the most original books of political and social thought to appear in recent years. The author projects the impact of technology and electronics upon society in the United States, the Soviet Union and other "post-industrial" states. As a study of global society in transition, this seminal work is bound to elicit major controversy and will be difficult to ignore.

ON VIOLENCE. By Hannah Arendt. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1970, 106 p. $4.75.

The central argument of this brilliant essay is that "violence appears where power is in jeopardy," that "every decrease in power is an open invitation to violence."

THE UNCOMPLETED PAST. By Martin Duberman. New York: Random House, 1969, 374 p. $7.95.

This book consists of a number of fairly unrelated essays. The author takes a dim view of history as a laboratory of learning for contemporary political and social problems. His sympathies lean strongly in the direction of the student dissenters.

THE REACH OF POLITICS. By James K. Feibleman. New York: Horizon Press, 1969, 335 p. $10.00.

A potpourri of political and social philosophy converging on the role of the state in human society. The book is impressive when the author deals with the past and the present. When he envisages not only a global but a cosmic superstate for the future, however, one is tempted to reach for one's copy of Machiavelli's "The Prince" to restore a sense of balance.

THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY. By Richard A. Falk. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the Center of International Studies), 1970, 678 p. $15.00.

Even though most of the chapters in this book have been previously published, it is good to have these valuable essays in book form. While one may argue with the author's substantive conclusions in specific cases, it is difficult not to admire his scholarship.

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LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS. By Jorge Castañeda. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 243 p. $10.00.

A careful legal analysis of six types of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions which, in the author's opinion, "produce true juridical effects against which members have no legal recourse."

VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. By Sydney D. Bailey. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970, 275 p. $10.00.

A meticulous vote-by-vote analysis of Security Council Resolutions from 1946 through 1967. The author regards the veto as an integral part of the Security Council and suggests that even if it were abolished from the Charter, a Big Power veto would still exist in the Realpolitik of international life.

DAG HAMMARSKJOLD'S UNITED NATIONS. By Marc W. Zacher. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 295 p. $7.00.

A scholarly and measured defense of the Hammarskjöld administration. The author's analysis of the main political crises is sensible and balanced, but the style still betrays the doctoral dissertation from which the book emerged.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURES. By Delbert C. Miller. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970, 320 p. $11.50.

A first-rate comparative study of "Who governs" in four major cities: Seattle, Bristol, Cordoba and Lima. The theoretical framework and the empirical research are of equally excellent quality.

THE MAJORITY OF ONE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF REGIONAL COMPATIBILITY. By Minerva M. Etzioni. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970, 238 p. $7.50.

Basing her conceptualizations primarily on the relationship between the Organization of American States and the United Nations, the author has produced an original work about the compatibility of regional and global pathways to world order.

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS. Edited by Robert W. Cox. New York: Praeger, 1970, 319 p. $10.00.

A high-level symposium focusing on social and economic agencies and their advances toward multilateral integration.

UN PROTECTION OF CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS. By John Carey. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1970, 205 p. $7.50.

The author traces the efforts made by the United Nations on many fronts to protect individuals from their own governments. The conclusions are both realistic and constructive.

AFRO-ASIAN GROUP IN THE U.N. By D. N. Sharma. Allahabad: Chaitanya Publishing House, 1969, 411 p. Rs. 35.

The author's survey of the major questions of concern to the Afro-Asian group at the United Nations reflects most of the ingredients of the anti-colonial position. He also tends to regard the group as much more monolithic than it actually is.

NONALIGNMENT IN THE WORLD OF TODAY. Edited by Ljubivoje Aćimović. Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1969, 274 p.

A multifaceted view of nonalignment, by a group of leading scholars, predominantly from small and middle powers.

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PEACE IN THE FAMILY OF MAN. By Lester Pearson. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969, 104 p. $3.50.

The 1968 Reith lectures: good common sense but no original ideas.

THE END OF GLORY. By Laurence Lafore. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1970, 280 p. $5.95.

A very well-written and lively effort to reëxamine the origins of the Second World War. While he offers no surprises, the author has succeeded in painting a compelling portrait of Western Europe on the edge of the abyss during the twenties and thirties.

SPACE LAW. By Gyula Gál. Dobbs Ferry: Oceana Publications, 1969, 320 p. $11.00.

A workmanlike and comprehensive monograph.

ATOMHERRSCHAFT. By Dietrich Schwarzkopf. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969, 279 p. DM. 18.50.

An ambitious effort, by a West German journalist, to adjust international legal concepts, diplomacy and strategy to the nuclear age.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK AND ATLAS OF THE WORLD, 1970. Edited by Richard P. Stebbins and Alba Amoia. New York: Simon and Schuster (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1970, 592 p. $19.95.

Greatly expanded and completely rewritten, this latest issue of an indispensable reference work provides detailed information on all of the world's countries and dependent territories plus basic data on the origins, structure and activities of nearly 50 leading intergovernmental organizations. The information is up-to-date as of September 1, 1969, and a special supplement records further significant changes through January 1, 1970. The expanded Atlas section is useful both as an adjunct to the text and as an independent reference source.

General: Military, Technical and Scientific

THE ECONOMY OF DEATH. By Richard J. Barnet. New York: Atheneum, 1970, 201 p. $4.95 (Paper, $2.95).

This is a powerful polemic against the "military-industrial complex" and a "dangerously irrational" defense policy. The author, a former member of the Department of State, is excellent in his dissection of the defense budget but a bit unrealistic in his recommendations for a "program of national conversion."

REBELLION AND AUTHORITY. By Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1970, 174 p. $5.95.

An original and analytical approach to the general problem of insurgency. The authors have attempted to do for the understanding of insurgent conflicts what Thomas Schelling and Herman Kahn have done for the field of strategic nuclear conflict.

WARFARE. By Robert Leckie. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 206 p. $5.95.

This little book about war contains a great deal of knowledge and wisdom. The author rejects the myth of "a world without war" but maintains that, since wars have become less useful to policy-makers because of their greater destructiveness, there might be fewer of them in the future.

THE POLITICS OF WEAPONS INNOVATION. By Michael H. Armacost. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 304 p. $10.00.

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This excellent case study of the Thor-Jupiter controversy illuminates the complex interaction between the political process and weapons policies in the United States. More broadly, the book offers some valuable insights into the relationship of politics to technology.

ARMS BEYOND DOUBT: THE TYRANNY OF WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY. By Ralph E. Lapp. New York: Cowles Book Co., 1970, 210 p. $5.95.

The author argues persuasively that Congress tends to vote for new weapons largely out of fear and ignorance. He also suggests that once a new weapon enters the development phase, it develops a momentum of its own which is difficult if not impossible to reverse.

THE GREAT WEAPONS HERESY. By Thomas W. Wilson, Jr. Boston: Houghton, 1970, 275 p. $5.95.

This book focuses on J. Robert Oppenheimer's "heretical" belief that national security may not necessarily lie in the attainment of military superiority over presumed enemies. The author suggests that the current dilemmas over ABMs and MIRVs may soon vindicate Oppenheimer's heresy.

THE THOUSAND-MILE WAR: WORLD WAR II IN ALASKA AND THE ALEUTIANS. By Brian Garfield. Garden City: Doubleday, 1969, 351 p. $7.95.

This is the first history of the Aleutian campaign, fought against Japan for 15 months in 1942–43, off the coast of Alaska. In the author's view, this campaign was the first American offensive of World War II, "the first to begin, the first to be won." An impressive book about an almost forgotten struggle.

THE ETHIOPIAN WAR, 1935–1941. By Angelo Del Boca. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 289 p. $7.95.

A deeply moving and evocative account. The author's descriptions of the major battles and of the Emperor's appearance before the League of Nations are unforgettable.

DISASTER AT MOSCOW: VON BOCK'S CAMPAIGNS 1941–1942. By Alfred W. Turney. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1970, 228 p. $6.95.

Based in part upon General von Bock's war diary, this is a close study of his campaigns against Moscow, the reasons for their failure, and his qualities as a commander.

IMPLICATIONS OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS. Edited by C. F. Barnaby and A. Boserup. New York: Humanities Press, 1969, 246 p. $7.50.

This well-balanced symposium by an international group of scholars and scientists makes a valuable contribution to the ABM debate. (A Pugwash monograph.)

A WORLD IN FLAMES. By Martha Byrd Hoyle. New York: Atheneum, 1970, 356 p. $10.00.

A crisp yet comprehensive military history of World War II, written in staccato style. An excellent reference work for the general reader who is interested more in what happened than in why it happened.

THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST 1941–1945: A MILITARY HISTORY. By Basil Collier. New York: Morrow, 1969, 530 p. $8.95.

A most impressive military history. Considerable sophistication in political analysis comes as a welcome bonus. The author, a former official historian to the British Cabinet Office, deserves high marks for accuracy and objectivity.

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DAS ATLANTISCHE DILEMMA: AGGRESSIVITÄT UND KRISE DER NATO, 1949–1969. Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR (for the Deutsches Institut für Zeitgeschichte), 1969, 469 p. DM-Ost. 12.

An East German interpretation of NATO: While the Alliance remains the leading instrument of American imperialism, it is being plagued increasingly by "imperialist contradictions" within the NATO camp.

General: Economic and Social

TRADERS AND DIPLOMATS. By Ernest H. Preeg. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1970, 320 p. $6.75.

An excellent history and analysis of the Kennedy Round by a young Foreign Service Officer who took part in it. Disclosing no great secrets, he gives the flavor as well as an authoritative account of the main events and a valuable statistical analysis of the results. The author was the first International Relations Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

THE GATT: LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION. By Kenneth W. Dam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, 480 p. $15.00.

In the course of studying the roles of substantive and procedural rules of law and a kind of "pragmatism" that sets itself against "legalism," Professor Dam gives a very full account of the activity and problems of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

BEYOND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY. By Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1969, 247 p. Gldrs. 28.

Emphasizing the negative, a Dutch political scientist stresses the limits of European integration, the failure of economic coöperation to spill over into politics and security, and the unsuitability of Europe as a unit for dealing with some major political issues.

THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET FOR FOREIGN EXCHANGE. Edited by Robert Z. Aliber. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago), 1969, 272 p. $17.50.

Interesting papers and a summary of conference discussions dealing with the exchange market in a number of major countries and some key issues of international finance.

EUROPEAN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY: A PROGRAMME FOR INTEGRATION. By Christopher Layton. New York: Humanities Press, 1969, 293 p. $6.00 (London: Allen and Unwin).

In place of the usual generalizations, the British journalist and consultant provides facts and analyses about European experience and makes proposals based on the record of success and failure. Nuclear science and power, aircraft, space and computers get the most attention.

SEEDS OF CHANGE: THE GREEN REVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE 1970's. By Lester R. Brown. New York: Praeger (for the Overseas Development Council), 1970, 205 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.50).

Succinct and readable account of the contemporary revolution in agriculture by a former official of the Department of Agriculture. Optimistic in tone, it stresses the problems resulting from increased productivity and makes proposals for dealing with some of them.

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STARVATION OR PLENTY? By Colin Clark. New York: Taplinger, 1970, 180 p. $4.95.

A senior British agricultural economist restates his basically optimistic views about the ability of the world to feed its people. In the process he says something about most other aspects of agriculture as well.

HEALTH AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD. By John Bryant. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 345 p. $10.00.

A physician's diagnosis of the "vast gap that exists between biomedical knowledge and our capability for bringing this knowledge within effective reach of the world's people." The author's prescriptions seem persuasive and realistic.

THE LONELY FURROW: FARMING IN THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND INDIA. By Kusum Nair. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969, 314 p. $7.95.

Interesting case and interview material on the United States and Japan leads to the conclusion that different farmers have different responses to the same national policies.

THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF EAST-WEST TRADE. By Jozef Wilczynski. New York: Praeger, 1969, 416 p. $12.50.

The most comprehensive book yet, by a lecturer at the Royal Military College of Australia. Uneven, probably because of its origin in journal articles.

EAST-WEST TRADE AND THE TECHNOLOGY GAP: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC APPRAISAL. Edited by Stanislaw Wasowski. New York: Praeger (in coöperation with the Institute for Defense Analyses), 1970, 214 p. $12.50.

Interesting papers with detailed material on the state of technology in Eastern Europe and its bearing on trade, economic reforms and coöperation among the Eastern countries and between them and the West.

The United States

THE PAPERS OF DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER: THE WAR YEARS. Edited by Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. and others. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970, 5 v. $75.00.

The editors have done a magnificent job of sifting, selecting and organizing the documents and then presenting them in a logical manner. What emerges is a definitive portrait of Eisenhower the military commander and grand strategist. Many questions about his command abilities and organizational skills are answered in these papers, and many a debate about Eisenhower the General will be resolved by consulting this fine reference work.

CONFIRM OR DENY: INFORMING THE PEOPLE ON NATIONAL SECURITY. By Phil G. Goulding. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 369 p. $7.95.

This is probably the best account thus far available of news management under the Johnson administration. The missing H-Bomb, the bombing of Hanoi, McNamara's fight for deëscalation, the capture of the *Pueblo,* and Clark Clifford's role in reversing Vietnam policy—are all discussed with considerable originality and a commendable sense of balance.

POINTS OF REBELLION. By William O. Douglas. New York: Random House, 1970, 97 p. $4.95 (Paper, $1.95).

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A sympathetic view of dissent by a great dissenter. The Justice inveighs against Vietnam, segregation, pollution and poverty, and exhorts the Establishment to respond forcefully or else risk revolution.

THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: THE NEXT DECADE. Edited by A. Doak Barnett and Edwin O. Reischauer. New York: Praeger, 1970, 250 p. $7.50 (Paper, $2.95).

This volume is the outgrowth of a conference on United States-China relations held in March 1969 in New York. While the editors have done a fine job in organizing the material for publication, the contributions remain uneven. The essays by John Fairbank and Allen Whiting are worth the price of the entire book.

THE VANITY OF POWER: AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914–1917. By John Milton Cooper, Jr. Westport (Conn.): Greenwood, 1969, 271 p. $11.50.

The author of this fine scholarly book argues that the isolationist position that formed during the First World War and lasted until the Second belonged to a particular moment in American history and is not likely to be resurrected in contemporary America.

WILLIAM E. BORAH AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Robert James Maddox. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1970, 272 p. $7.50.

A respectable monograph on the controversial Senator's career. It treats Borah's opposition to the League and his stand on neutrality and analyzes the Idahoan's campaign to recognize the Soviet government.

WALTER HINES PAGE: AMBASSADOR TO THE COURT OF ST. JAMES'S. By Ross Gregory. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1970, 236 p. $8.50.

A carefully researched, probably definitive, biography of the American Ambassador to Britain during World War I. Page is portrayed as an ardent Anglophile whose futile efforts to persuade President Wilson to intervene in the war doomed his embassy to frustration.

THE BUREAU OF THE BUDGET. By Percival Flack Brundage. New York: Praeger, 1970, 327 p. $10.00.

The former Director of the Budget Bureau has produced a scholarly profile of the BOB. The impression that emerges is that BOB's responsibilities far transcend fiscal matters and involve vital issues of national policy, both domestic and foreign. A valuable case study.

JUSTICE: THE CRISIS OF LAW, ORDER, AND FREEDOM IN AMERICA. By Richard Harris. New York: Dutton, 1970, 268 p. $6.95.

A polemic against President Nixon's and Attorney General Mitchell's treatment of the "law and order" issue. The author argues that "the policies of Barry Goldwater and the right wing, which the voters overwhelmingly repudiated in 1964, have become the policies of the government today."

AMERICAN LABOR AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY. By Ronald Radosh. New York: Random House, 1970, 463 p. $10.00.

One of the best of the new "radical histories." The author argues that the American Labor movement from Samuel Gompers onward has always supported official American foreign policy in order to secure for the worker a part of "the great American pie." He strongly recommends the "socialist alternative."

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ARCHITECTS OF ILLUSION: MEN AND IDEAS IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1941–1949. By Lloyd C. Gardner. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, 365 p. $8.95.

A revisionist history of the origins of the cold war. The author sees the United States as more responsible than the Soviet Union for the way in which it developed.

ADVISE AND OBSTRUCT. By Hugh Gregory Gallagher. New York: Delacorte Press, 1969, 338 p. $6.95.

Seven cases of the Senate's role in foreign policy from the Jay Treaty in 1795 to Tonkin Gulf in 1964. The author covers familiar ground in a conventional manner.

THE RECOVERY OF CONFIDENCE. By John W. Gardner. New York: Norton, 1970, 189 p. $5.00.

An essay, strong in both heart and mind, ranging over most of the problem areas that bedevil American society today, with the basic theme the necessity for self-renewal in American life.

NEW REFORMATION: NOTES OF A NEOLITHIC CONSERVATIVE. By Paul Goodman. New York: Random House, 1970, 208 p. $5.95.

The theme of this rather discursive book is that there is in America today a crisis of belief comparable to that of the times just before the Reformation. The author does not engage much in the prescription of remedies. The most moving chapter of the book describes the brief life of his pacifist son.

REBELS IN EDEN: MASS POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. By Richard E. Rubenstein. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970, 201 p. $5.95.

This book argues that political violence in the United States is a tradition and that minority groups have almost always resorted to violence before gaining a measure of power in the political process. A thought-provoking analysis.

THE INFORMATION WAR. By Dale Minor. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1970, 212 p. $6.95.

Both the government and the news media are to blame for news censorship, distortion and manipulation, in the author's view. On the whole an objective, fair-minded appraisal of news management.

AMERICAN NEO-COLONIALISM: ITS EMERGENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND ASIA. By William J. Pomeroy. New York: International Publishers, 1970, 255 p. $7.50.

A Marxist-Leninist analysis of American policy in Asia at the turn of the century.

The Western Hemisphere

ENGINES OF CHANGE: UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND REVOLUTION IN LATIN AMERICA. By George C. Lodge. New York: Knopf, 1970, 411 p. $8.95.

An eloquent plea for the alignment of the United States with the forces of nontotalitarian revolutionary change in politics, religion and society. The proposals for new administrative techniques and structures are helpful.

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A DIPLOMAT LOOKS AT AID TO LATIN AMERICA. By Willard L. Beaulac. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970, 148 p. $6.95.

The personal reminiscences of the author-diplomat add interest to this informal and urbane volume, whose message is the continuing need for aid, administered with understanding and sophistication although not necessarily with a more lavish hand.

POLITICAL POWER IN LATIN AMERICA: SEVEN CONFRONTATIONS. Edited by Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970, 419 p. $7.95 (Paper, $4.50).

The technique adopted here is interesting and difficult, making heavy demands upon the editors' fairness and balance. Seven recent power confrontations—in Chile, Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Cuba and the Dominican Republic—are illuminated by extensive excerpts from variegated accounts and studies, many by observers and scholars in Latin America.

LATIN AMERICA: PROBLEMS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. Edited by Charles T. Nisbet. New York: Free Press, 1969, 357 p. $8.95 (Paper, $4.95).

The problems considered are population, agriculture, inflation, exports, industrialization and growth. The essays are competent and sometimes directed to technically cognizant readers.

DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS IN LATIN AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS BY THE UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR LATIN AMERICA. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1970, 318 p. $8.50.

The first two decades of ECLA's achievements are summarized through reproduction of that body's more important studies.

MASSES IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by Irving Louis Horowitz. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 608 p. $13.50 (Paper, $3.95).

Sixteen studies of the social, political and economic characteristics and functions of the Latin American masses. The stress is predominantly sociological, and the tone academic.

REVOLUTION! MEXICO 1910–20. By Ronald Atkin. New York: Day, 1970, 354 p. $8.50.

A colorful account of the dramatic revolutionary decade in Mexico, with well-selected pictures.

GROWTH, EQUALITY, AND THE MEXICAN EXPERIENCE. By Morris Singer. Austin: University of Texas Press (for the Institute of Latin American Studies), 1970, 341 p. $8.50.

Mexican history from 1939 to 1961 is explored in an effort to discern the relationship between growth and equality. The conclusion: the concepts of equality and inequality should be disaggregated. The analysis is technical.

UNREST IN BRAZIL: POLITICAL-MILITARY CRISES 1955–1964. By John W. F. Dulles. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1970, 449 p. $10.00.

An interesting, well-written and elaborate description of Brazilian political factions and struggles, from the suicide of Vargas to the coming of the military government.

THE POLITICS OF BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENT, 1930–1954. By John D. Wirth. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970, 278 p. $7.95.

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A study of economic policy-making during the Vargas era, with particular reference to steel, petroleum and foreign trade. Authoritative but blessedly free of didacticism and jargon.

CONFLICT AND CONTINUITY IN BRAZILIAN SOCIETY. Edited by Henry H. Keith and S. F. Edwards. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1969, 312 p. $10.00.

Historical essays, each rounded out with a separate commentary by another author, tracing themes in the Brazilian past that illuminate the present. The principal rubrics include the economy, the church and the polity.

CHÉ GUEVARA: A BIOGRAPHY. By Daniel James. New York: Stein and Day, 1969, 380 p. $7.95.

An excellent full-length study of the myth-enshrouded *guerrillero* whom the author sees as "more the apostle of violence than the maker of revolution, more the agent of destruction than the builder of a continent."

A REBEL IN CUBA: AN AMERICAN'S MEMOIR. By Neill Macaulay. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970, 199 p. $5.95.

An American who fought in Castro's Rebel Army describes his experiences and offers his interpretations of the Cuban revolution.

THE LINGERING CRISIS: A CASE STUDY OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Edited by Eugenio Chang-Rodriguez. New York: Las Americas Publishing Co., 1969, 178 p. $6.00.

Essays provoked by the 1965 civil war, some marked by an evident attempt at impartiality, some by visible devotion to the Bosch cause and philosophy.

RESEARCH AND RESOURCES OF HAITI. Edited by Richard P. Schaedel. New York: Research Institute for the Study of Man, 1969, 624 p. $5.75.

Specialized papers, some in English and some in French, provide detailed analyses of demography, language and literacy, nutrition and health, and institutions in perhaps the most unfortunate country in the hemisphere.

Western Europe

DAS 198. JAHRZEHNT. Edited by Claus Grossner and others. Hamburg: Wegner, 1969, 590 p. DM.18.

Twenty-six writers from Europe and America present their reasoned and often provocative prognoses of particular aspects of the 1970s. A *Festschrift* of sorts for Countess Dönhoff, a gallant German editor.

BRITAIN IN TOMORROW'S WORLD: PRINCIPLES OF FOREIGN POLICY. By Grant Hugo. New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, 256 p. $5.95.

An inquiry into the theoretical assumptions that help forge British foreign policy. A lucid and important work, in the middle range between the theory of international affairs and the history of diplomacy.

CHURCHILL IN POWER: AS SEEN BY HIS CONTEMPORARIES. By Brian Gardner. Boston: Houghton, 1970, 349 p. $7.95.

A respectful effort at debunking the Churchill legend, emphasizing that after 1940 Churchill was no longer the acknowledged embodiment of a united people. An interesting mélange of wartime opinion, put together by an English writer.

IMPERIAL SUNSET. VOLUME I: BRITAIN'S LIBERAL EMPIRE, 1897–1921. By Max Beloff. New York: Knopf, 1970, 387 p. $8.95.

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An important and well-wrought contribution to literature on decolonization. Beloff seeks the historical background to Britain's decision to enter Europe—a recognition of a changed destiny. This study, by a well-known British scholar, helps to explain the relative ease with which Britain took the end of Empire.

THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND FOREIGN POLICY, 1898–1914. By Zara S. Steiner. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970, 262 p. $10.50.

A model monograph on the civil servants in the Foreign Office: their collective origins, their views and roles, their impact. Written with verve and perspicacity.

ULSTER AT THE CROSSROADS. By Terence O'Neill. New York: Humanities Press, 1969, 201 p. $4.50 (London: Faber).

The often eloquent speeches of Ulster's former Prime Minister who in 1969 resigned, thwarted by opposition within his own party. In an introduction, John Cole concludes that "O'Neill's drive towards liberalism was hindered more by the pusillanimousness of the middle classes" than by the extremists of either camp.

BELGIUM. By Vernon Mallinson. New York: Praeger, 1970, 240 p. $7.00.

A simple introduction to Belgium's history and present predicaments, by a British educationist who has known the country for decades.

THE FOREIGN POLICIES OF FRANCE, 1944–1968. By Guy de Carmoy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, 510 p. $15.00.

A useful survey of the pro-European policies of a feeble Fourth Republic contrasted with the drive to independence under the impulse of Gaullist *grandeur*. By a French scholar and sometime official.

DE GAULLE AND THE ANGLO-SAXONS. By John Newhouse. New York: Viking, 1970, 371 p. $8.50.

A highly intelligent and readable analysis of tripartite policies in the Gaullist era from 1958 to 1969, years which saw a historic drifting apart, due principally to de Gaulle's aim "to liberate France from the Anglo-Saxons."

NOS GUERRES PERDUES: LEVANT 1941. INDOCHINE 1951–1953. ALGÉRIE 1958–1960. By André Dulac. Paris: Fayard, 1969, 209 p. Fr. 18.

First-hand experiences of defeat, by a general who entered St. Cyr in 1925. Over half the book is devoted to the Algerian struggle in which Dulac played an important role. A controversial, eloquent account.

MA PART DE VÉRITÉ: DE LA RUPTURE À L'UNITÉ. By François Mitterrand. Paris: Fayard, 1969, 206 p. Fr. 15.

A mixture of autobiography and political apologia, with some hopes and plans for the French Left, which Mitterrand represented in the 1965 presidential election. The rather vague program may be symptomatic of the present disarray of the Left.

PIERRE MENDÈS FRANCE ET LE NOUVEAU SOCIALISME. By Daniel Salem. Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1969, 158 p. Fr. 16.

Essentially a collection of Mendès' statements, illustrating his gradual elaboration of a new brand of democratic socialism.

KRIEG DER ILLUSIONEN: DIE DEUTSCHE POLITIK VON 1911 BIS 1914. By Fritz Fischer. Düsseldorf: Droste, 1969, 805 p. DM. 39.

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Having stirred up a great controversy on Germany's war aims with his earlier book, Fischer, a leading German historian, is likely to score a similar success with this analysis of aggressive prewar policies. A major work on the still explosive issue of the origins of the First World War.

ONE GERMANY OR TWO: THE STRUGGLE AT THE HEART OF EUROPE. By Eleanor Lansing Dulles. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1970, 315 p. $7.95.

Drawing on personal and family experience, Mrs. Dulles has written an analysis of the German problem, focusing on reunification, in the light of the whole postwar experience.

STRATEGIE DES GLEICHGEWICHTS. By Helmut Schmidt. Stuttgart: Seewald, 1969, 327 p. DM. 19.80.

The present German Defense Minister presents a comprehensive and realistic appraisal of the options open to the Federal Republic in light of the ineluctable conditions of European and world politics. Thoughtful and rewarding.

WEST GERMAN FOREIGN AID, 1956–1966: ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ASPECTS. By Karel Holbik and Henry Allen Myers. Boston: Boston University Press, 1969, 158 p. $7.95.

A concise but fairly full account. Better rounded than most, it is particularly interesting on German thinking about aid and development.

TORMENTED LOYALTY. By Christopher Sykes. New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 477 p. $8.95.

A biographical account of Adam von Trott, a cosmopolitan German patriot executed by Hitler for his links to the conspirators of July 20. An English writer ably evokes the ambiguities of Trott's position and the political climate he found in prewar Britain and America.

FRIENDSHIP UNDER STRESS: U.S.-SWISS RELATIONS 1900–1950. By Heinz K. Meier. Bern: Lang, 1970, 423 p.

A detailed, scholarly account of the surprisingly complicated relations between the two countries, by a Swiss-American historian.

LA SUISSE ET LA CRÉATION DE L'AELE. By Paul Veyrassat. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1969, 238 p. Swiss Fr. 24.

LA SUISSE DANS L'AELE 1960–1966. By Eric Roethlisberger. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1969, 309 p. Swiss Fr. 28.50.

With these two books, Switzerland's participation becomes one of the best studied parts of the history of the European Free Trade Association. Both books are thorough and well informed. Veyrassat systematically lays out the choices Switzerland faced, analyzing the issues and conflicting points of view. Roethlisberger examines Switzerland's adaptation to EFTA and traces the effects on its trade. Both stress the bearing of the EFTA experience on Switzerland's relation to European coöperation in general.

HISTORIAN'S QUEST. By Gabriel Jackson. New York: Knopf, 1969, 234 p. $6.95.

An unorthodox and appealing account of an historian's personal involvement with his subject. This complementary volume to his earlier, widely praised study of the Spanish Republic, offers an autobiographical perspective on contemporary Spain and on the contemporary practice of history.

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SPAIN. By George Hills. New York: Praeger, 1970, 480 p. $9.50.
A useful survey of twentieth-century Spain, set against the background of earlier history.

Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969, 465 p. $15.00.
This interesting volume comprises essays by very competent specialists on the emergence of nationalism in a rich variety of modes in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Hungary, Jugoslavia, Poland and Rumania. Sugar's introductory essay is particularly outstanding.

THE CONSUMER IN THE SOVIET ECONOMY. By Philip Hanson. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968, 249 p. $5.50.
An essay, by a British economist, addressed to the question: "What has been the effect so far of the general pattern of Soviet economic development on Soviet citizens as consumers?"

PATRIARCH AND PROPHETS: PERSECUTION OF THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH TODAY. By Michael Bourdeaux. New York: Praeger, 1970, 359 p. $10.00.
A documentary history of Soviet church-state relations in the renewed tension of the 1960s.

RELIGION AND THE SOVIET STATE: A DILEMMA OF POWER. Edited by Max Hayward and William C. Fletcher. New York: Praeger (for the Centre de Recherches et d'Étude des Institutions Religieuses), 1969, 200 p. $6.50.
A collection of able essays dealing with various aspects of contemporary religious and intellectual life in the Soviet Union.

DIE WELTGESCHICHTE IST DAS WELTGERICHT: BUCHARIN: VISION DES KOMMUNISMUS. By A. G. Löwy. Zurich: Europa Verlag, 1969, 419 p. Swiss Fr. 33.
An extensive study of the career of Bukharin, with particular emphasis on the development of his thought.

KRONSTADT 1921. By Paul Avrich. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, 271 p. $8.50.
A very welcome scholarly examination and interpretation of the sailors' revolt against the Bolshevik government, a critical point in the history of the Revolution.

MON ÉVOLUTION DU TOLSTOÏSME AU COMMUNISME 1891–1921. By Jules Humbert-Droz. Neuchâtel: La Baconnière, 1969, 439 p. Swiss Fr. 36.
This first volume of memoirs by a Swiss former communist, for 10 years secretary of the Communist International, covers his early years, his conversion to communism and his entry into the Comintern. A significant source for the early history of the movement.

SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE. Edited by Paul L. Horecky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 755 p. $25.00.
EAST CENTRAL EUROPE. Edited by Paul L. Horecky. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969, 956 p. $27.50.
Mr. Horecky, of the Library of Congress, to whom we are already indebted

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for his annotated bibliographies on Russian and Soviet affairs, here provides much needed guides, with comments, to the basic publications on Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

YUGOSLAVIA AND THE NONALIGNED WORLD. By Alvin Z. Rubinstein. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, 353 p. $11.00.

A substantial study of the origins and development of Jugoslavia's foreign policy toward the new nations of Asia and Africa—its aims and its consequences.

AN ESSAY ON YUGOSLAV SOCIETY. By Branko Horvat. White Plains: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969, 245 p. $12.00.

This "essay" by a noted Jugoslav Marxist economist is in fact a series of papers written over 16 years, presenting a picture of Jugoslavia's special brand of socialism. No mere official description, it contains much original thought.

THE GREEK PASSION: A STUDY IN PEOPLE AND POLITICS. By Kenneth Young. London: Dent, 1969, 542 p. 70/.

A most provocative and controversial presentation of the Greek political climate over the ages. The author's conclusion, that "the lamentable political history of the Greeks suggests that in a free society they are incapable of ruling themselves," necessarily casts the present régime in a rather favorable light.

THE GREEKS: DILEMMA BETWEEN PAST AND PRESENT. By Stephanos Zotos. New York: Funk, 1969, 270 p. $6.95.

A Greek newspaperman, now a political exile, undertakes an informal portrait of his nation, its culture and habits.

BARBARISM IN GREECE. By James Becket. New York: Walker, 1970, 147 p. $5.95.

A collection of documents, chiefly case histories, relating to the use of torture by the present Greek régime.

DIPLOMAT IN PARIS, 1936–1939: PAPERS AND MEMOIRS OF JULIUSZ LUKASIEWICZ, AMBASSADOR OF POLAND. Edited by Waclaw Jedrzejewicz. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 408 p. $12.50.

Posthumously edited memoirs and papers of the former Polish Ambassador to France dealing centrally with the occupation of the Rhineland, the Teschen dispute and the mounting crisis from March to September 1939. A valuable companion piece to the memoirs of Jozef Lipski.

CHURCH IN A MARXIST SOCIETY: A CZECHOSLOVAK VIEW. By Jan Milič Lochman. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 198 p. $5.95.

Reflections by a leading Czech theologian on the experiences of the Christian church in a radically secular society where "God is not quite dead."

TWENTIETH CENTURY RUMANIA. By Stephen Fischer-Galati. New York: Columbia University Press, 1970, 248 p. $7.95.

A concise, thoughtful interpretation of the profound changes in Rumanian life and politics in this century, but with an eye to the significant elements of continuity that have survived and reëmerged in the communist era.

The Middle East

EGYPT, THE CRUCIBLE: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION IN THE ARAB WORLD. By Harry Hopkins. Boston: Houghton, 1970, 533 p. $10.00.

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A sweeping and sometimes fleeting treatment of the Arab revolution as it has taken hold since 1952 in Egypt, the country the enthusiastic author sees as the "pivot" and the hope of the Arab world.

THE SUEZ EXPEDITION: 1956. By Général d'Armée André Beaufre. New York: Praeger, 1970, 161 p. $7.00.

The commander of the French invasion force tells his story of the "short-lived but brilliant military success" which ended in total political defeat. He is outspoken in pointing out the errors of political decision, command organization and timing which led to failure. (First published in a French edition in 1967.)

THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF NAHUM GOLDMANN: SIXTY YEARS OF JEWISH LIFE. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969, 358 p. $7.95.

Why Goldmann has been both a leader in world Zionism and a controversial figure in Israel emerges clearly from this autobiography in which he gives, in addition to fascinating detail on his diplomatic activity in the cause of the Jewish state, his considered views on the complex relationship between Israel and the Diaspora.

A MODERN HISTORY OF SYRIA: INCLUDING LEBANON AND PALESTINE. By A. L. Tibawi. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970, 441 p. $10.95.

A general history covering the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The author's main interest is in the period of World War I and its aftermath when the Western powers broke up the unity of the Arab East. Treatment of Syria after independence is sketchy.

South and Southeast Asia

MODERNIZING PEASANT SOCIETIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN ASIA AND AFRICA. By Guy Hunter. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Institute of Race Relations), 1969, 324 p. $6.50.

An interesting study of pitfalls to be avoided when developing countries at different stages of development and with different cultural backgrounds attempt to borrow ideas, institutions and technology from developed countries.

A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA. By Richard Allen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, 306 p. $6.50 (Paper, $2.50).

Emphasis is on the roles of the British, French and Dutch in this study of common characteristics of Southeast Asia's culture and society and the effects of American involvement in the area.

PROBLEMS OF DEFENCE OF SOUTH AND EAST ASIA. Edited by K. K. Sinha. Bombay: Manaktalas, 1969, 479 p. Rs. 50.

Regional defense arrangements among Asian nations and the practical problems and difficulties in existing or possible devices for further coöperation and coördination. Emphasis is on India, with China's crucial role also in the forefront.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA. Edited by R. T. Shand. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969, 360 p. $9.00.

Ten specialists discuss the main technical, economic and socio-political ingredients of an effective approach to the solution of the problem of poverty in post-World War II Asia, especially food supplies.

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A VIEW FROM NEW DELHI. By Chester Bowles. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969, 268 p. $7.50.

A selection of speeches and articles by the Ambassador to India, 1963–1969, to show America's objectives in world affairs in general and in particular to give India's younger generation greater confidence in their country and its future.

THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID IN INDIA. By P. J. Eldridge. New York: Schocken Books, 1970, 289 p. $9.00.

The basic economic characteristics of aid supplied to India, the objectives of donors of that aid and the political impact on the country.

ECONOMIC POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN PAKISTAN. By Stephen R. Lewis, Jr. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969, 191 p. $12.50.

A quantitative and analytical study of how a spectacular industrial growth can occur in an otherwise stagnant economy.

HIMALAYAN FRONTIERS: A POLITICAL REVIEW OF BRITISH, CHINESE, INDIAN AND RUSSIAN RIVALRIES. By Dorothy Woodman. New York: Praeger, 1970, 423 p. $12.50.

A geographer shows how the Himalayas have dominated the Asian policies of Britain, China and the U.S.S.R.

THE VIETNAMESE AND THEIR REVOLUTION. By John T. McAlister, Jr. and Paul Mus. New York: Harper and Row, 1970, 173 p. $5.95.

A Princeton professor translates, reorganizes, revises and in some instances rewrites Paul Mus' classic "Viet Nam" (1952), in an effort to analyze the cultural foundations of Vietnamese politics. (Prepared under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.)

THE LAND IN BETWEEN: THE CAMBODIAN DILEMMA. By Maslyn Williams. New York: Morrow, 1970, 241 p. $7.95.

An Australian journalist and film-maker, visitor to Cambodia, doubted that Prince Sihanouk could achieve the dreams of his subjects.

INDONESIAN POLITICAL THINKING, 1945–1965. Edited by Herbert Feith and Lance Castles. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970, 505 p. $13.50.

Representative writings to show the flow of events affecting post-independence political affairs in Indonesia and how they have been received by the populace according to its ideological orientation.

SUKARNO AND THE STRUGGLE FOR INDONESIAN INDEPENDENCE. By Bernhard Dahm. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969, 374 p. $15.00.

A political study of the man, designed to trace his ideological development. Translation, with revisions and updating, of the author's "Sukarnos Kampf um Indonesiens Unabhängigkeit" (1966).

East Asia and Pacific Ocean

ASIAN DILEMMA: UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA. Edited by Elaine H. Burnell. Santa Barbara: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1969, 238 p. $2.25 (Paper).

Based on the assumption that it is time for a fundamental change in American and Japanese foreign policy toward China, these position papers by Japanese and American politicians discuss the international status of Taiwan, disposition

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of military forces in the Pacific, the role of the great powers in Asia and other key issues. An important work.

CHINA'S TURBULENT QUEST. By Harold C. Hinton. New York: Macmillan, 1970, 340 p. $7.95.

A highly intelligent appraisal of the many imponderables in China's foreign relations since 1945. The analysis includes China's place as a thermonuclear power, the uncertain results of the cultural revolution, the unresolved Vietnam crisis and Sino-Soviet border disputes.

THE GREAT POWER STRUGGLE IN CHINA. Hong Kong: Asia Research Centre, 1969, 503 p. (Hong Kong Book Centre, distributor, HK$60.)

Documents arranged chronologically to present the official appraisal of China's development from 1966, when the red guards appeared as an instrument of policy, to October 1968, when the military emerged as a dominant factor on the political scene, together with the policies adopted to cope with this situation.

A CONCISE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF MODERN CHINA (1840–1961). By Frank H. H. King. New York: Praeger, 1970, 243 p. $7.50.

Dr. King struggles intelligently with inadequate statistical evidence to probe the important aspects of the Ch'ing economic system and the effects of the impact of Western intervention in China and Taiwan.

CHINA AFTER THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. New York: Random House, 1970, 247 p. $7.95.

An important study, made up of selections from *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* of how China fares today in the fields of technology, economics, politics and foreign affairs by 11 specialists who examine China's main problems: population growth, shortage of fertile land and paucity of skills.

VIETNAM AND CHINA, 1938–1954. By King C. Chen. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969, 436 p. $12.50.

Mainly an evaluation of Ho's rise to power and of the nature and significance of the Vietnamese communist movement under the impact of the Chinese communist revolution.

ESSENTIAL WORKS OF CHINESE COMMUNISM. Edited by Winberg Chai. New York: Pica Press, 1970, 464 p. $7.00.

Introduction to and development of Chinese communism from the first manifesto of 1922 through major works of Mao, Liu and others in 1968. Documents are preceded by explanatory notes.

A HISTORY OF KOREA. By Takashi Hatada. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio, 1969, 182 p.

Translation of a Korea-born Japanese's study showing especially the interrelationship between Korea's political history and its social and economic development.

THE WORLD OF JAPANESE BUSINESS. By T. F. M. Adams and N. Kobayashi. Palo Alto: Kodansha International, 1969, 326 p. $6.95.

Full of interesting observations on the customs of Japanese business—and the ease with which Westerners misunderstand them. The authors are an American consultant long resident in Japan and a Japanese lawyer with American experience.

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PACIFIC ORBIT: AUSTRALIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1942. Edited by Norman Harper. New York: Humanities Press, 1969, 256 p. $6.75.

Alliance and partnership in defense, trade, education and culture. Sponsored by the Australian-American Association, formed after World War II.

EXPERTS IN ASIA: AN INQUIRY INTO AUSTRALIAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. By A. H. Boxer. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1969, 180 p. Austr. $6. (Zion, Ill.: International Scholarly Book Services, distributors.)

Australia's experience as a foreign aid donor to Asia under the Colombo Plan and the United Nations: the efficacy of past and current programs and suggestions for improvement.

NEW ZEALAND. By Keith Jackson and John Harré. New York: Walker, 1969, 224 p. $6.50.

Coexistence in a multiracial society, mostly made up of Maori and Europeans, possessing a high level of cultural achievement.

VUNAMAMI: ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION IN A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY. By Richard F. Salisbury. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, 389 p. $10.75.

How a small nonindustrial society in New Guinea, by use of its own resources alone, managed to achieve a sustained economic development over the last 90 years. An anthropological-economic study.

PHILIPPINE DIARY, 1939–1945. By Brigadier General Steve Mellnik. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1969, 316 p. $6.95.

An absorbing account of how this officer escaped from internment after the fall of Corregidor, directed guerrilla forces and returned to recapture this stronghold.

Africa

THE AFRICAN GENIUS. By Basil Davidson. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1970, 367 p. $7.95.

The character of the indigenous cultures of the continent is the central concern of this most recent volume by one of Africa's most prolific and sensitive students.

AFRICAN RENAISSANCE. By Leonard Barnes. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970, 304 p. $6.95.

Combining case studies of individual countries with a continental perspective, a British student of African administration with wide experience in the Colonial Service gives a highly critical assessment of efforts at modernization and development.

THE ECONOMIES OF AFRICA. Edited by P. Robson and D. A. Lury. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969, 528 p. $12.50.

Single-economy studies of Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria and Sudan plus analyses of the East African and Central African economies. In addition to these separate essays by well-known economists, the editors include a general introductory analysis of the African economies.

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN AFRICA. By Peter Robson. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968, 320 p. $9.50.

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An interesting assessment, by a professor of economics at University College, Nairobi, of the various attempts of African states to achieve economic integration.

NATION-BUILDING IN AFRICA. By Arnold Rivkin; edited by John H. Morrow. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1970, 312 p. $10.00.

Thoughtful and comprehensive, this general assessment of the problems and prospects of political and economic development by the late American scholar combines case studies of six countries with general theoretical considerations.

MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA. By Robert D. Loken. New York: Praeger, 1969, 152 p. $12.50.

A Ford Foundation specialist describes how, in the light of African experience to date, manpower development programs should be formulated.

ALGERIA: THE POLITICS OF A SOCIALIST REVOLUTION. By David and Marina Ottaway. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970, 322 p. $8.75.

An account of Algerian politics since independence, combining scholarship with first-hand journalism. Personalities and ties of clan come through as the real determinants of Algerian socialism.

THE POLITICS OF TRADITION: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN NORTHERN NIGERIA, 1946–1966. By C. S. Whitaker, Jr. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the Center of International Studies), 1970, 563 p. $13.50.

Addressing himself to his fellow political scientists, a Princeton professor argues that "modernity" and "tradition" have a far more complicated relationship to one another than is commonly recognized: the former does not inexorably replace or supplant the latter; rather, they achieve, at least in northern Nigeria, what he calls a "stable symbiosis."

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY. Edited by Carl K. Eicher and Carl Liedholm. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1970, 456 p. $10.00.

Thirteen original essays and eight reprints of previously published articles concerning not only the development of the economy since the colonial period but also its future prospects. The contributors are mainly university economists.

WEST AFRICA. By W. B. Morgan and J. C. Pugh. London: Methuen, 1969, 788 p. (New York: Barnes and Noble, $19.00.)

A comprehensive, general geography by two University of London scholars.

GOVERNMENT AND POWER IN WEST AFRICA. By Robert S. Jordan. New York: Africana Publishing Corp., 1970, 336 p. $6.95 (Paper, $2.95).

An excellent general introduction to contemporary politics in English-speaking West Africa by a political scientist at George Washington University. Though conceived as a text for advanced secondary-school students in West Africa, it will well serve a far wider audience.

FROM UNION TO APARTHEID: A TREK TO ISOLATION. By Margaret Ballinger. New York: Praeger, 1970, 499 p. $12.50.

A distinguished South African politician, who from 1938 until 1960 represented in the parliament the African population of her country, traces the origin and demise of this form of representation.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Donald Wasson

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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